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Abstract 
The research carried out focuses on the way generators connect to 
distribution networks. Permission to connect a generator to the distribution 
system is generally obtained on the basis that the generator’s effect is limited 
and that the network voltages and currents remain acceptable at all times. 
This firm access connection policy limits the capacity of generation that can 
be connected.  
Generators may be allowed to connect to distribution networks above the 
limit defined by the firm access connection policy. When there is inadequate 
capacity in the system, the non-firm generators are generally constrained off 
on a “last-in, first-off” basis (the last to connect is the first to be affected). 
Only the order of connection of the generators is taken into account. 
Different costs of operation and ability to be dispatched are not considered. 
Thus, the firm access connection policy does not maximise the economic 
value of the generators. 
The coordination of independent distributed generators is formulated in 
this research to maximise the income received by the generators. The 
coordination schedules generators connected to the same circuit according to 
their different costs of operation and ability to be dispatched, without 
exceeding the power limit of the circuit. Additional income is obtained by the 
generators for the additional electricity sold and the substitution of expensive 
generators by cheaper ones. An income-sharing mechanism based on 
cooperative game theory to share the additional income is outlined. The 
objective is to provide the generators an economic incentive to be operated 
in a coordinated manner. 
Demand side flexibility can be used to maximise the production of the 
generators. The coordination of generators and controllable load is devised in 
this research to maximise the income of the generators. Controllable load is 
asked to shift its consumption to allow the generators to maximise their 
production. The additional income resultant of the coordination is allocated 
to the generators and the controllable load. A bargaining approach of game 
theory is used to determine this allocation. The controllable load receives 
part of the additional income to cover the increase of its electricity bill and 
to incentivise its coordination with the generators. This study is then 
extended to consider energy storage systems instead of controllable load, in 
coordination with non-dispatchable generators. 
A representative of the Portuguese distribution network is used to validate 
the coordination of independent distributed generators and the coordination 
of generators and controllable load. Four independent distributed generators 
and a load equivalent are connected to the network. A number of cases of 
wind power, price of electrical energy and load consumption are considered. 
Different costs of operation of the generators are analysed. Different levels of 
load flexibility and load capacity are evaluated. 
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Resumo 
A investigação desenvolvida concentra-se na ligação de geradores às redes 
de distribuição. A permissão para ligar um gerador à rede de distribuição é 
geralmente obtida no pressuposto que o seu efeito é limitado e que as 
tensões e correntes na rede se mantêm aceitáveis em todas as circunstâncias. 
Esta política de acesso firme limita a capacidade de geração que pode ser 
ligada.  
Geradores podem obter autorização de ligação às redes de distribuição 
acima do limite definido pela política de acesso firme. Quando existe 
capacidade inadequada no sistema, os geradores sem acesso firme são 
geralmente restringidos segundo a regra “último a entrar, primeiro a sair”. Só 
a ordem de ligação à rede é tida em consideração. Diferentes custos de 
operação e capacidades de serem despachados não são considerados. Assim, a 
política de acesso firme não maximiza o valor económico dos geradores. 
A coordenação de produtores dispersos independentes é formulada nesta 
investigação para maximizar o rendimento recebido pelos geradores. A 
coordenação escalona geradores ligados no mesmo circuito de acordo com os 
seus diferentes custos de operação e capacidades de serem despachados, sem 
exceder o limite de potência do circuito. Rendimento adicional é obtido pelos 
geradores pela energia adicional vendida e pela substituição de geradores 
caros por geradores mais baratos. Um mecanismo de partilha de rendimentos, 
baseado na teoria dos jogos cooperativos, para partilhar o rendimento 
adicional é delineado. O objectivo é fornecer aos geradores um incentivo 
económico para a sua operação de forma coordenada. 
A flexibilidade da procura pode ser usada para maximizar a produção dos 
geradores. A coordenação de geradores e carga controlável é desenvolvida 
nesta investigação para maximizar o rendimento dos geradores. A carga 
controlável é chamada a transferir o seu consumo de forma a permitir aos 
geradores a maximização da sua produção. O rendimento adicional resultante 
da coordenação é alocado por geradores e carga controlável. Uma abordagem 
de negociação da teoria dos jogos é usada para determinar esta alocação. A 
carga controlável recebe parte do rendimento adicional para cobrir o 
aumento da sua conta da electricidade e para incentivar a sua coordenação 
com os geradores. Este estudo é em seguida estendido para incorporar 
sistemas de armazenamento de energia em vez de carga controlável, em 
coordenação com geradores não despacháveis. 
Uma secção da rede de distribuição portuguesa é usada para validar a 
coordenação de produtores dispersos independentes e a coordenação de 
geradores e carga controlável. Quatro produtores dispersos independentes e 
um equivalente de carga estão ligados à rede. Alguns casos de potência de 
vento, preço da energia eléctrica e consumo da carga são considerados. 
Diferentes custos de operação dos geradores são analisados. Diferentes níveis 
de flexibilidade e de capacidade da carga são avaliados. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 - Scope of the research 
The research carried out focuses on the way generators connect to 
distribution networks. Generation in distribution networks is designated in 
this research as “distributed generation”, following the definition given in 
section 1.4.1. However, this research is expected to be applicable to other 
network voltage levels. 
Large amounts of “fit-and-forget” connection of generation are expected 
in distribution networks. In this policy, one generator’s effect is assumed to 
be limited and network voltages and currents are expected to remain 
acceptable at all times. This firm access connection policy limits the amount 
of generation capacity that can be connected. Increased difficulty to get 
permission to install new power system equipment (e.g, overhead lines) and 
the costs required are barriers to network capacity expansion [1-3]. Network 
capacity expansion is not considered in this research. 
Permission to connect generation without firm access rights is generally 
obtained on the basis that when there is inadequate capacity in the system, 
the non-firm generators are constrained off on a “last-in, first-off” basis (i.e., 
the last to connect is the first to be affected). Different costs of operation 
and ability to be dispatched are not considered. Thus, the economic value of 
the generators is not maximised. 
1.2 - Research questions 
This research aims to address the following questions: 
 Can independent distributed generators be operated in a coordinated 
manner so that all increase their income for selling electricity? 
 Can the flexibility of the demand side be used to maximise the income 
of the generators? 
1.3 - Objectives of the research 
The following objectives are set to answer the research questions 
mentioned in section 1.2: 
 Definition of a methodology to coordinate independent distributed 
generators: 
o The objective is to maximise the income of the generators for 
selling electricity; 
 Integration of controllable load and energy storage systems in the 
coordination to allow the generators to maximise their production; 
o The flexibility of the demand side is aimed to allow the 
generators to maximise their income;  
 Establishment of an income-sharing mechanism to share the income 
obtained in coordination, so both generators and demand have an 
economic incentive to participate. 
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The definition of distributed generation and the drivers for its increased 
connection are presented in section 1.4. The definition of demand-side 
integration and the drivers for its implementation are shown in section 1.5.  
1.4 - Distributed generation 
1.4.1 - Definition  
The definition adopted in this research for distributed generation is the 
one described in [2] for “embedded or dispersed generation”. Distributed 
generation is defined as: 
 Being non-centrally planned (i.e., not planned by the network 
operator); 
 Being non-centrally dispatched; 
 Having less than 100 MW of installed capacity; 
 Being connected to the distribution system. 
1.4.2 - Drivers for the increase of the connection of distributed 
generation 
Connection of increased amounts of distributed generation is a result of 
technical/commercial, strategic/regulatory and environmental drivers [2, 3]: 
Technical/commercial drivers 
 Smaller periods of construction, lower capital expenditure and shorter 
amortisation periods, when compared to centralised generators; 
 Possibility of modular projects; 
o New generators can be added to the project along time, e.g. 
according to the availability of capital; 
 Low energy density in the case of renewable energy sources; 
o Renewable generators need to be smaller and geographically 
dispersed. 
 Facility in finding sites for smaller generators; 
 Connection closer to demand to reduce network and operation costs; 
o For instance, combined heat and power schemes require close 
location to heat load due to the cost of transporting heat. This leads to 
the construction of small generation units, geographically dispersed 
and connected to distribution networks. 
Strategic/regulatory drivers 
 Deregulation of electric power systems; 
o Modifications in the commercial structure of electric power systems; 
o Open access to distribution networks; 
 National/international targets; 
 The interest of some countries to diversify energy sources (energy 
security concerns). 
Environmental drivers 
 Effort to reduce the emission of greenhouse effect gases (mainly CO2); 
o Many governments have programmes to support the utilisation of 
low-carbon energy resources for the production of electricity [4]; 
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 Public opposition to the construction of centralised generators and 
over-head transmission circuits. 
1.4.3 - Commercial incentives for the connection of distributed 
generation 
Connection Feed-in Tariffs (FITs) and quota obligations (QO) are widely 
adopted forms of incentives to the connection of distributed generation 
(renewable and low carbon). FITs are price-based mechanisms while QO are 
volume-based mechanisms. FITs are in place in countries as Portugal and 
Germany. Some examples of QO schemes are the Renewable Obligation in the 
UK and the Renewable Portfolio Standard in the USA. Currently both 
approaches tend to be technology-specific, based on “bands”. Banding has 
been introduced to distinguish levels of support that renewable and low 
carbon generators receive based on their type of technology. This has been 
implemented to reflect differences across technologies such as those related 
to planning, implementation costs and level of maturity of technology [3]. 
Several applications of smart grid technologies in literature introduce 
dynamic price or price-related control signals in distribution systems [4]. A 
spot pricing algorithm in radial distribution systems that takes into account 
power flows and circuit constraints is proposed in [5]. Nodal pricing in 
distribution networks with DG based on the resolution of the economic 
dispatch problem is formulated in [6]. Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) with 
system state prediction and load uncertainty simulation is presented in [7]. 
Cooperative game theory is used to determine the share of each DG in the 
reduction of the loss element of the LMP. 
1.5 – Demand-side integration 
1.5.1 - Definition  
The term demand-side integration (DSI) was adopted at the CIGRE Paris 
Session 2006 to represent the technical area focused on the demand side and 
its potential as a source of supply [5]. DSI covers all activities focused on 
advanced end-use efficiency and effective electricity utilisation, in 
particular: 
 Demand Response – mechanisms to manage the demand in response to 
supply conditions: 
o Peak clipping – reduction of peak demand especially when it 
approaches the thermal limits of feeders/transformers or the supply 
limits of the network; 
o Valley filling – introduction of load in off-peak periods in the form of 
energy storage; 
o Load shifting – movement of loads during the day to minimise the 
electricity bill; 
o Dynamic energy management – integrated approach that addresses 
permanent energy savings, permanent demand reductions and 
temporary peak load reductions; 
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 Energy efficiency – programmes to reduce the overall consumption of 
energy while maintaining user comfort or level of service; 
 Strategic load growth – programmes to increase load in a strategic 
manner, e.g. to increase supply from low-carbon energy sources. 
1.5.2 - Drivers for the increase in demand-side integration 
The implementation of DSI is encouraged by technical/commercial, 
industrial, social and environmental drivers [1, 5]:  
Technical/commercial drivers 
 System reliability concerns due to increase in demand and increased 
difficulty to get permission for the installation of new power system 
equipment; 
 Possibility of energy and cost savings for network operators through 
customer participation; 
 Integration of non-dispatchable generation using the flexibility of the 
demand side.  
Industrial drivers 
 Increased availability of demand-side resources such as flexible loads, 
distributed generation and energy storage devices (including electric 
vehicles); 
 Introduction of smart metering, that allows: i) the provision of signals 
to incentivise customer participation; ii) the implementation of 
advanced control actions. Considering two-way communication is 
available, smart meters allow the measurement, collection, analysis 
and management of customer energy use. This ultimately leads to 
increased load flexibility which can be used to meet the power system 
needs [1].  
Social drivers 
 Public opposition against capacity expansion to accommodate 
increased levels of demand; 
 Public awareness to the possibility of meeting demand by combining 
grid-purchased electricity with onsite energy production. This allows 
customers to trade electricity produced onsite and increases flexibility 
of demand. 
Environmental drivers 
 Effort to decarbonise electric power and transport systems, which 
leads to: 
o the need for conservation and energy efficiency measures; 
o the integration of new electrical loads such as electric vehicles and 
heat pumps. This leads to an increase in demand.  
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1.6 - Thesis structure 
The structure of this thesis is given in the following summary: 
Chapter 2 
Literature review on the integration of distributed generation is 
presented. The challenges of the “fit-and-forget” connection of distributed 
generation are identified. Contributions for the mitigation of its effects are 
reviewed. Research on the coordination of independent distributed 
generators is reported. Game theory is introduced to address the allocation of 
the additional income obtained by independent generators in coordination. An 
overview of demand-side integration is provided regarding: i) the mechanisms 
for its implementation; ii) its benefits to the integration of generation; iii) its 
benefits to the consumers. 
Chapter 3 
The limitations of the firm access connection policy are investigated. A 
representative of the distribution system of Northeast Portugal is used as an 
illustrative example. Distributed generation with different costs of operation 
and ability to be dispatched is considered. The technical possibility of 
connecting generation capacity above the limits defined by the firm access 
connection policy is introduced. The economic inefficiency of the operation 
of the distribution network is identified. 
Chapter 4 
The coordination of independent distributed generators is outlined. The 
aim is to maximise the income of generators for selling electricity. An 
income-sharing mechanism based on cooperative game theory is introduced to 
share the additional income obtained in coordination. The coordination of 
independent distributed generators is evaluated on a reduced version of the 
distribution network introduced in Chapter 3. The coordination is evaluated 
during a selected period of six days. This period consists of different cases of 
price of electrical energy, wind power and load consumption. Comparison 
against the non-coordinated operation of generators is provided. The effect of 
different costs of operation of the generators in the value of the coordination 
is evaluated. The willingness of the generators to participate in the 
coordination considering different allocations of the additional income is 
analysed. 
Chapter 5 
The coordination of distributed generators and controllable load is 
presented. The operation of the Aggregator considering the flexibility of 
controllable load is described. The aim of the coordination of generators and 
controllable load is to maximise the income of generators for selling 
electricity. An income-sharing mechanism to allocate the additional income 
to the generators and the controllable load is detailed. The coordination of 
generators and controllable load is evaluated on the reduced version of the 
distribution network. The same period of six days is used. Different load 
capacities and fractions of flexible consumption are analysed. Comparison 
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against the non-coordinated operation of generators and controllable load is 
provided. Economic incentives to generators and controllable load for 
operating in a coordinated manner are quantified. 
Chapter 6 
The coordination of independent non-dispatchable generators and energy 
storage systems is presented. Energy storage systems are asked to change 
their schedule to allow generators to maximise their production. The 
operation of the Aggregator considering the connection of energy storage 
systems is described. Additional income is obtained from the coordination for 
the additional energy produced. This additional income is allocated to the 
generators and the energy storage systems using a bargaining approach of 
game theory. The coordination is evaluated on a two-busbar distribution 
network with two generators and an energy storage system connected. The 
evaluation is performed using a set of extreme cases of price of electrical 
energy and wind power. The impact on the additional income of different 
orders of connection to the network is analysed. Comparison against the 
non-coordinated operation of generators and energy storage systems is 
provided. Economic incentives to generators and energy storage system for 
operating in a coordinated manner are quantified. Then, the evaluation is 
extended to a year of operation to assess the impact on the additional income 
of different installed capacities of the energy storage system.  
Chapter 7 
The contribution of this research is presented. Conclusions are drawn, 
addressing: i) the limitations of the firm access connection policy; ii) the 
coordination of independent distributed generators; iii) the coordination of 
generators and controllable load; iv) the coordination of non-dispatchable 
generators and energy storage systems. Suggestions for extending the work 
carried out in this research are provided. 
Appendices 
In Appendix A are presented the cost-benefit analyses behind the 
determination of the ratings of generators connected without firm access 
rights. In Appendix B are provided details of the AC optimal power flow (OPF) 
carried out in the representative of the Portuguese MV distribution network 
introduced in Chapter 3. Details of the six days of operation used to validate 
the coordination of independent distributed generators and the coordination 
of distributed generators and controllable load are given in Appendix C. 
Results of the implementation of the coordination of independent distributed 
generators to each of the six days of operation are provided in Appendix D. 
Results of the implementation of the coordination of distributed generators 
and controllable load to each of the six days of operation are provided in 
Appendix E. 
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Chapter 2 - Background and literature 
review 
2.1 - Introduction 
An overview of the challenges to the connection of distributed generation 
is given in this chapter. Contributions to facilitate the integration of 
increased amounts of distributed generation are reviewed. Particular 
attention is paid to the coordination of independent distributed generation. 
Game theory is presented as a tool to encourage independent generators to 
be coordinated. The potential of demand-side integration to allow the 
integration of additional amounts of distributed generation is analysed.  
2.2 - Integration of Distributed Generation 
Distribution networks were traditionally designed to accept bulk power 
from the transmission network and to distribute it to consumers. Power flows 
were considered to be unidirectional, from the higher to the lower voltage 
levels. However, with increasing penetration of distributed generation (DG) 
power flows may become reversed. DG is operated on a must-run basis due to 
environmental, commercial and political drivers [2-4]. Increasing levels of 
“fit-and-forget” connection of DG are expected in distribution networks. The 
challenges introduced by the “fit-and-forget” connection of generation are 
identified in section 2.2.1. Contributions to integrate DG are covered in 
sections 2.2.2 and 2.3. 
2.2.1 - Challenges to the connection of additional amounts of 
distributed generation  
Concerns with the “fit-and-forget” connection of DG include [6, 7]: 
 voltage regulation; 
 thermal limits of lines and transformers; 
 effect on network losses; 
 behaviour of DG in the case of network perturbations (“survival” to 
voltage dips); 
 higher need of balancing and reserve services; 
 increased harmonic distortion; 
 network protection issues: 
o modifications in network short-circuit levels; 
o modifications in fault current profiles; 
o impact on fault location and clearing practices; 
Many DG schemes are connected in rural zones (with low demand). There 
are voltage constraints that limit the amount of DG capacity that can be 
connected [8]. Traditional line drop compensation techniques lose their 
effectiveness with the connection of DG. 
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The value of losses in each node depends of the penetration level of DG. 
Typically, losses decrease with low DG penetration levels. However, after a 
certain penetration level they start to increase [9]. 
Many DG schemes are based on intermittent energy sources (e.g., wind 
and photovoltaic). The massive connection of these DG schemes introduces an 
increased demand for balancing and reserve provision services from the 
transmission networks [10]. A methodology to identify the appropriate level 
of reserves and their cost in a power system with high penetration of wind 
power is presented in [11]. Performance metrics are used to clarify 
conflicting economic effects of wind power penetration: fuel cost reduction 
and reserve cost increase. It is reported that reserve costs vary significantly 
due to wind power uncertainty.  
Thus, the “fit-and-forget” connection of further DG will be technically 
limited in the near future. The installed capacity of new DG schemes will be 
limited by this firm access connection policy. The amount of energy exported 
will be constrained. On the point of view of network operators, quality of 
supply may be affected. An increase in network operation costs is expected. 
Therefore, the value of DG may be reduced if no changes are made to the 
planning and operation of distribution networks. 
Network reinforcement programmes are underway in many countries to 
allow the massive connection of DG [12]. However, in other countries 
regulation and economic reasons are likely to prevent network reinforcement 
to be effective in the timely connection of greater amounts of generation. For 
instance, in Great Britain energy regulator OFGEM only allows for 
generator-driven investment when there is contracted generation requiring 
connection [13]. Thus, Distribution and Transmission Network Operators 
(DNOs and TNOs, respectively) in Great Britain cannot invest ahead of need 
under the current regulatory framework. In addition, there is currently a 
“£200/kW installed” cost cap on socialised investment in any upgrade to the 
distribution network. This means that large upgrades to DNO’s assets to 
connect generation, which might benefit the DNO and the customers in the 
long term, should be financed in great part by the generator [13]. This is 
likely to impact the economic return of prospective generation projects at 
distribution level and deter the connection of new generation.  
On the other hand, contributions are being presented to integrate DG 
without considering such reinforcements. These contributions aim to mitigate 
the issues related with the “fit-and-forget” connection of DG and allow the 
integration of additional generation capacity [14-16].  
2.2.2 - Contributions to the integration of distributed generation  
An overview of the contributions to allow the integration of additional 
generation capacity is provided as follows. 
Voltage coordination by voltage changing devices and DG 
 When a DG scheme is connected, its active power export reduces the 
power flow from the primary substation and so it reduces the voltage 
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drop along the feeder. If the power export from the DG is larger than 
the feeder load, the power flows from the DG to the primary 
substation and this causes a voltage rise between the primary 
substation and the generator [2]; 
 Several publications address the coordination between on-load tap 
changers, capacitor and inductor banks, FACTS (flexible AC 
transmission systems) and DG (active and reactive power flow) towards 
the regulation of network voltage profiles [17-19]; 
 By controlling distribution network voltage profiles it is possible to 
integrate increased capacity of DG. 
Provision of ancillary services by DG 
 Depending on their generation technology, DG schemes may supply 
several ancillary services to Distribution Network Operators (DNOs). 
The provision of ancillary services to DNOs by DG can lead to a more 
economically efficient power system [20]; 
 These DNO ancillary services include power balance, local voltage and 
reactive power support, mitigation of losses, congestion management 
and black start (power system restoration after a fault) [21, 22]; 
 More flexible operation of DG according to network price signals can 
save investment or delay network reinforcement [23]; 
 Operation schemes for DG to mitigate fast voltage fluctuations, voltage 
dips and harmonic distortion are addressed in [24]. 
 A global restoration procedure for a power system with the 
participation of DG is presented in [22]. The procedure allows DG 
schemes with black start capability to accelerate network 
re-energising, restoring clients faster than in the conventional 
procedure. The results obtained show an increased performance of the 
restoration procedure with the contribution of DG compared with the 
base case (where no DG is directly involved). No commercial 
mechanisms to reward this participation are presented; 
 Different levels of participation of DG in the provision of ancillary 
services can be found in Europe. In most European countries, there is 
little contribution of DG to network ancillary services [23]. Current 
contributions of DG are: to keep their power factors within certain 
ranges, and; through aggregators, to participate in the balancing 
market or provide reserves. 
New Regulatory frameworks / Grid Codes 
 The establishment of commercial arrangements between DNOs and DG 
to recognize the contribution of DG to network efficiency are being 
sought in some countries [23]: 
o Regulated payments to the owners of DG schemes (e.g. 
reflected in use-of-system tariff charges). 
o Bilateral contracts between DG and DNOs. 
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o Participation of DG in the markets: (i) energy balancing and 
reserve markets; and (ii) network related markets, such as local 
balancing, reactive power, congestion management and energy 
losses compensation; 
 The importance of shifting the current EU prohibition (European 
Directive 2003/54/EC) of DG ownership by DNOs is addressed in [25, 
26]; 
 This rule was designed to avoid that a DNO favours with a generation 
business within the same group. This may lead to a lack of integration 
between network and generation planning. The importance of allowing 
DNOs to deploy DG in well-defined circumstances is highlighted in [25]. 
These circumstances include: if deploying DG at specific network 
locations is more economically favourable than investing in network 
infrastructure; when overall network efficiency can be improved (e.g., 
by reducing losses) without altering market competitiveness. Other 
approach to consider the ownership of DG by DNOs is to adapt a USA 
regulatory approach that introduces an obligation for DNOs to acquire 
DG. This is put to DNOs as an alternative to network 
reinforcement [25]. 
 The creation of carbon taxes is proposed as a form of promoting the 
integration of renewable DG [27]. A carbon tax addresses the carbon 
content of fuels used for energy production. Carbon taxes might 
increase the competitiveness of renewable DG when compared to 
conventional generation. However, this consideration depends on the 
price and market context of each country [27]. 
Modifications in the structure of electricity markets  
 The creation of wholesale electricity markets introduced a competitive 
framework for the appearance of new players in the electricity sector 
(as new generators and retailers). These markets appeared as a result 
of a deregulation process that aimed to [28]: 
- provide better incentives for controlling capital and operating costs 
of new and existing generating capacity; 
- encourage innovation in power supply technologies, and; 
- shift the risks of technology choice, construction cost and operating 
inefficiencies from consumers to suppliers.  
 Existing electricity markets have been operated in various 
arrangements, such as electricity pools or bilateral contracts. 
Electricity pools enable competition in generation as they allow a merit 
order on the dispatch of generation. They also facilitate the 
mechanisms to support competition in supply where customers can 
freely choose their supplier. On bilateral trading, customers have the 
opportunity to negotiate the best energy price from suppliers and 
generators without being constrained by any official price [28];  
 Alterations in the electricity market design to enable the integration of 
further amounts of wind power are presented in [29, 30]: 
o Creation of “faster markets” (intraday schedule of generators); 
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 May reduce costs with reserves, forecasting and increase 
revenues for wind power producers as they are able to 
make more accurate bids; 
o Implementation of broader-area markets; 
 Cooperation between control areas to: 
 reduce the effect of wind intermittency; 
 stabilise prices within control areas, regulating 
power flows. 
o Widespread application of implicit auctioning to allocate 
cross-border power capacity [29]; 
 To promote the efficient use of interconnectors of 
neighbouring countries: 
 by means of mechanisms such as market coupling 
and market splitting; 
 A market interface for the participation of DG in wholesale electricity 
markets is presented in [31]. DG is interfaced as an “Equivalent Power 
Producer” on a pool-based market. Changes to spot price computation 
and capacity payments are described. A mechanism to mitigate the 
volatility of spot prices due to the integration of DG is introduced. The 
market interface is evaluated on the Chilean electricity market. 
Islanded operation of distribution networks  
 Considering network islanding operation is allowed, DG may find 
attractive economic opportunities [32, 33]: 
o Important loads (e.g., large consumers) may be maintained in 
service by DG; 
o Financial penalties for DNOs due to consumer interruptions and 
network unavailability may be reduced; 
o DG may be able to continue to sell energy during islanding; 
 Maintaining in service important loads is addressed in a number of 
publications: 
o A load shedding optimisation problem is formulated in [34]. The 
objective is to minimise the cost of load shedding after a 
disturbance. The optimisation problem is non-linear. Load 
priorities are pre-set offline and do not vary with changes in 
network operating conditions; 
o A load shedding scheme based on a dynamic priority list is 
presented in [32]. The dynamic priority list is determined using 
the real-time decision making technique AHP (Analytic Hierarchy 
Process). 
Non-firm access to the networks 
 Network operators may allow the connection of generation without 
firm access rights – non-firm access to the networks [35-37]; 
 Non-firm access to the networks is aimed to allow generation to be 
connected in advance of necessary reinforcement works to remove a 
network constraint (such as circuit capacity limits, static or dynamic as 
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presented in [38]). However, on occasions the output of the generators 
with non-firm access may need to be curtailed; 
 Non-firm access to the networks implies the usage of one or more of 
the following strategies when there is inadequate capacity in the 
system [39, 40]:  
o Power curtailment; 
o Coordinated Voltage Control; 
o Adaptive power factors for DG power plants; 
o Local reactive power compensation; 
 Power curtailment is generally associated with the partial or full 
reduction of the generator output in case of network constraints.  
 Contributions presenting power curtailment as a way to integrate 
further amounts of generation have been presented [36, 40-42]; 
 Curtailment of active power to increase reactive power injection in 
distribution networks in proposed in [41, 42]. Results show that 
reactive power compensation increases the amount of generation that 
can be connected, especially in networks with a high reactance to 
resistance ratio. Active power curtailment reduces the income of the 
generators; 
 An online AC Optimal Power Flow algorithm to manage the power flows 
of DG when network voltage or current limits are exceeded is 
presented in [40]. “Last-in, first-off” power curtailment is included in 
the formulation.  
 Financial and technical impacts of the connection of further amounts 
of DG considering different connection policies are demonstrated 
in [36]. Three connection policies are considered: firm connection 
policy, non-firm connection policy and the “first firm then non-firm” 
connection policy. Five sections of the 38 kV distribution network of 
Ireland are used to evaluate the potential benefits of each connection 
policy. An optimisation procedure is presented with the objective of 
maximising the energy delivered per unit of investment. Capital, 
operation, maintenance, connection, reserve and cycling costs are 
considered. Significant differences in DG scheduling are reported along 
a year depending on the connection policy. Differences are observed 
also in cycling costs, emission benefits and fuel usage. The non-firm 
connection policy presents a greater net benefit for the case study and 
optimisation methodology described. 
 The commercial rules for allocating curtailed capacity supported by 
active management solutions have been designated as “Principles of 
Access” (POAs), following a paper from Currie et al. [43]. Such active 
management solutions adjust the amount and frequency of curtailment 
in order to provide system reliability, minimise social costs and attract 
DG investment. These Principles of Access are expected to promote 
[44, 45]: 
o Cost effectiveness - for both generators and distribution network 
operators; 
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o Network efficiency - maximise the amount of generation that 
can be economically connected in any constrained zone and 
promote efficient network operation; 
o Certainty - provide each generator with certainty as to the long 
term level of curtailment; 
o Simplicity - methodology should be easy to implement and 
understand; 
o Fairness - be equitable in its allocation of curtailment costs 
between generators; 
 Different Principles of Access (POAs) establish differently physical 
curtailment and financial payment rules. The way curtailment is 
allocated will influence the distribution of risks among parties (DNOs, 
generators and consumers); 
 The following Principles of Access are being trialled and implemented 
internationally to regulate the access to distribution network capacity 
when non-firm access is permitted [43, 44, 46]:  
o Last-in, first-off (LIFO): generators are given a specific order for 
being curtailed (normally based on the date of application for 
connection or date of connection). The last on the list (based on 
the ranking) is the first to be disconnected under a network 
constraint.  
o Pro Rata, equal percentage basis or shared percentage: 
curtailment is equally allocated between all generators that 
contribute to the constraint. The amount of curtailment can be 
computed as a percentage of available capacity, installed 
capacity, or other ratio.  
o Market-based approaches: generators bid for curtailment by 
offering a price based on market mechanisms. 
 Figures 2.1 to 2.3 illustrate these Principles of Access. Only generators 
without firm access rights are shown. The dotted line in Figures 2.1 
and 2.2 refers to a generic capacity factor below which the generators 
are not willing to accept further curtailment. This is related to the 
savings made by the generators for connecting without firm access 
rights (and therefore not paying for network reinforcements to obtain 
firm access rights). 
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Figure 2.1 – “Last-in, first-off” access (based on [44]) 
 
Figure 2.2 – Pro-rata access (based on [44]) 
 
Figure 2.3 - One form of market-based access: capacity auction (based on [44]) 
These Principles of Access are described with more detail as follows. 
 Last-in, first-off (LIFO) access 
The “last-in, first-off” (LIFO) approach prioritises the access of generators to 
the networks on the basis of their order of connection. It aims to ensure that 
no generator can be adversely affected by the arrival of new generators. 
Therefore, the latest generator to connect (having non-firm access rights) is 
the first to be curtailed. 
LIFO offers a simple and transparent allocation. In addition, it does not need 
major technological changes in order to be applied [43]. However, this option 
does not necessarily incentivise nor support the connection of new and more 
efficient generation. This is due to the fact that the new generation is taken 
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off first than older generation, which may have already repaid their initial 
investment [45]. Additionally, it does not take into account different abilities 
of generators to be dispatched. This way, non-dispatchable generation may 
be taken off first and see its production lost. The economic value of 
generators is also not taken into account, as generators with lower costs of 
operation will be curtailed first if they were the last to be connected. 
The risk allocation of being curtailed is transferred to the marginal generator 
(the last generator is the first to be curtailed in case of constraints). Under 
current commercial arrangements e.g. in the Great Britain, compensation to 
curtailed generators is not regulated and hence cannot be passed back to 
customers. This is opposed to the arrangements at the transmission level, 
where generators may be able to recover losses with curtailment through use 
of system charges [47]. 
LIFO has been applied in the Orkney Isles Project in the UK by DNO Scottish 
and Southern Energy Power Distribution (SSEPD). It also serves as baseline for 
pilot projects on the active management of distribution networks in the UK, 
supported by DNOs and the Regulator under the Low Carbon Networks Fund 
(e.g., UK Power Networks – Flexible Plug and Play project; Scottish Power – 
Aura-NMS project) [48]. 
The distribution network in Orkney is connected to the Scottish mainland via 
two 50 km 33kV submarine cable circuits with capacities of 20 MVA and 
30 MVA. Gas, wind and wave energy generators with either firm or non-firm 
access rights are currently connected to this network. The DNO controls the 
electricity output of the generators in real time in order to match the 
available capacity using the LIFO principle. Generation is actively managed 
based on the N-1 subsea circuit capacity limit (20 MVA) plus the maximum 
demand on the network.  
 Pro Rata access 
Under a Pro Rata approach, generators are equally curtailed regardless of 
their order of connection when a constraint occurs. Thus, the risk is 
transferred equitably among generators, reducing the risk to the last 
generator (when compared to LIFO access). However, the last generator may 
be cross-subsidised by not being exposed to the curtailment costs it imposes 
on all generators behind the constraint. This could mean that an excessive 
amount of generation may connect behind a constraint when compared with 
the “social optimum”. The “social optimum” is obtained when the marginal 
connection cost of an additional unit of capacity is equal to its marginal 
benefit (e.g., the value of the energy produced) [45]. 
Pro Rata curtailment for wind generators has been recently proposed by the 
Single Electricity Market operator (SEM) for Ireland and Northern Ireland. It is 
also being applied by network operator Southern California Edison (United 
States) in specific conditions such as planned outages for maintenance 
purposes. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC, United States) 
supports Pro Rata as a non-discriminatory approach to the curtailment of 
non-firm connections [49]. 
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The Single Electricity Market (SEM) operator has proposed the use of Pro Rata 
(with defined curtailment limits) as replacement of a LIFO approach. Wind 
generator curtailment is only considered after other solutions involving 
conventional generation are exhausted.  
Distribution network operator UK Power Networks is currently trialling a 
Principle of Access to the networks based on Pro Rata access called 
Reinforcement Quota [44]. This trial is part of a project entitled “Flexible 
Plug & Play”, funded by the regulator OFGEM under the Low Carbon Networks 
Fund. The project aims to provide cheaper and faster connections to 
generators connecting to the networks operated by UK Power Networks. 
Under Reinforcement Quota, the network operator determines for each 
constrained section of the network a reinforcement trigger above which the 
cost of curtailment (i.e., loss of income of generators as a result of 
curtailment) exceeds the cost of reinforcing that section. When this trigger is 
achieved, network reinforcement is actioned being the costs apportioned pro 
rata to the non-firm connected generators. These non-firm generators receive 
in return firm access rights to the network.  
Generators with non-firm access rights are allowed to connect under a 
Reinforcement Quota approach unless the quota or the reinforcement trigger 
presents “unacceptably high” curtailment levels [44]. This curtailment level 
limit is being refined with stakeholders, taking into account factors as capital 
costs, capacity factors and required rate of return/capital structures. If 
curtailment levels following a number of generation applications are above 
acceptable, the DNO analyses the case for strategic investment in the area to 
reduce the worst case curtailment level to the maximum acceptable level. 
Factors taken into consideration include the local availability of primary 
resources and the number of pending connection requests. If business case for 
reinforcement is identified, it is carried out and costs are apportioned to the 
non-firm generators once the Reinforcement Quota is full and the 
reinforcement trigger is met. If no business case for reinforcement is 
identified, the existing network capacity is auctioned to the highest bidding 
generators willing to connect to that network section. 
Reinforcement Quota allows the DNO to set the quota and reinforcement 
trigger without having to consider the internal economics of different 
generators. Reinforcement Quota also allows a coordinated and overall 
cheaper connection solution for generators (when compared to the “fit-and-
forget” policy) minimizing network investment ahead of need. 
One of the limitations of the Reinforcement Quota is that its viability varies 
with the particulars of the network and the cost and nature of the possible 
reinforcement solution. Other limitation is that generators will be required to 
pay a deferred connection charge which could create financing challenges. 
Furthermore, this connection charge will not be applied if the reinforcement 
trigger is never met. So a generator is left with the uncertainty of putting in 
place a contingent amount of cash that may not be necessary (but that 
increases its financing costs). 
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 Market-based access 
Marked-based approaches explore financial contracts and/or the performance 
of individual generators [45]. 
In a market-based approach, the risk is transferred to the generator that bids 
(for being curtailed) and whose offer is accepted. This has the advantage of 
allowing generators to accept curtailment according to their costs of doing so, 
encouraging generator investment in flexibility. If market conditions are 
ideal, the selected generator to be curtailed is the one with the lowest bid 
price. Nevertheless, it may not always be possible to select cost-effective 
bidders if low competition between bidders behind individual constraints is 
identified. In addition to this, the size of generators is also relevant, as 
transaction costs for small generators may be an issue. The administrative 
burden for a DNO to set up a bidding mechanism may also be a source of 
difficulty. 
A market-based approach has been implemented under the “Connect and 
Manage” approach used in Great Britain. “Connect and Manage” has been 
created by National Grid (transmission system operator for England and 
Wales) in 2010 to address network reinforcement [44]. This was triggered by 
the large number of renewable generation connection applications. The 
“Connect and Manage” scheme considers the connection of distributed 
generation to the transmission or distribution system. Distributed generation 
refers here to those generators that are large enough to have or are 
considered to have a significant impact on the transmission system [44]. 
Under “Connect and Manage”, generators get firm access rights to the 
network before necessary major reinforcements works are put in place. In the 
meantime, generators may have to be curtailed. For such, National Grid 
allocates curtailment using a market-based scheme called Balancing 
Mechanism. The Balancing Mechanism enables supply and demand to be 
balanced across the electricity transmission system whilst resolving system 
constraints. The network operator tries to find the most cost-effective offers 
for balancing the system taking into account diversity of supply in order to 
maintain system reliability. Bids are in general accepted in cost order, but 
dynamic limitations communicated by the bidder and specific geographical 
conditions may prevent this. Compensation for curtailment costs is recovered 
via Balancing Services Use of System charges. Generators are not required to 
participate in the Balancing Mechanism and are not subject to any limitation 
in the prices they may offer to be curtailed. Generators that do not 
participate in the Balancing Mechanism can have a bilateral contract with the 
network operator for providing balancing services. The costs associated with 
these actions are also transferred to transmission users via Balancing Services 
Use of System charges. 
“Connect and Manage” has demonstrated significant reduction in the waiting 
time for connecting to the transmission network. The implementation of this 
approach accelerates the granting of firm access rights to the network. 
However, this approach cannot be currently implemented in distribution 
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networks in Great Britain due to differences in the regulatory principles 
affecting connection charging. The risk of network reinforcements is generally 
transferred to the generators when an upgrade to the distribution network is 
required, whereas in the transmission network these costs may be socialised 
via transmission networks use of system charges. Also, compensation for 
curtailment at distribution level is not regulated and hence cannot be passed 
back to the users of the system. At transmission level curtailment costs may 
be recovered through the Balancing Mechanism via Balancing Services Use of 
System charges. In addition, when the number of generators behind an 
individual constraint is small, the network operator may not be able to select 
cost-effective bidders. The network operator may be obliged to pay very high 
prices to generators for them to accept curtailment. These payments do not 
necessarily reflect the subsidies that generators receive (such as Renewable 
Obligations or Feed-in Tariffs) and are ultimately passed to the users of the 
system. 
Summary of the contributions reviewed 
A summary of the contributions to the integration of DG reviewed is 
presented in Table 2.1. Main objective(s) and direct involvement of DG in the 
contributions are shown.  
The coordination of independent distributed generators is reviewed in 
section 2.3. The coordination operates generators to fulfil network operation 
objectives (e.g., voltage regulation) and/or commercial objectives (e.g., 
maximisation of the income of the generators). 
Table 2.1 – Summary of the contributions to the integration of DG 
Contribution Main objective(s) 
Direct 
involvement of DG 
   Voltage coordination by voltage 
changing devices and DG 
 Regulate network voltages to increase 
the connection capacity of DG; 
Yes 
Provision of ancillary     
services by DG 
 Improve network operation; 
 Reduce network operation costs; 
Yes 
New Regulatory       
frameworks / Grid Codes 
 Implement technical and commercial 
arrangements to  increase the value of 
DG; 
No 
Modifications in the structure 
of electricity markets 
 Increase production from DG;  
 Allow the participation of DG in 
electricity markets; 
No 
Islanded operation of 
distribution networks 
 Reduce network outage times; 
 Increase production from DG; 
Yes 
Non-firm access to the 
networks 
 Allow the integration of increased 
capacities of DG; 
 Increase production from DG; 
 Reduce time and cost required for 
connection. 
Yes 
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2.3 - Coordination of independent distributed generators 
Contributions that address the coordination of independent DG may be 
divided in three categories: 
 Planning and economic assessment: techno-economic  analyses of the 
value of coordinating DG; 
 Network operator-driven coordination: planning and operation 
determined by network operators to address network operation 
objectives; 
 Market-driven coordination: market-based solutions to increase the 
income of the owners of DG schemes.  
2.3.1 - Planning and economic assessment  
The use of biodiesel DG for providing balancing services in the case of  
shortfall in wind power production is introduced in [50]. This possibility is 
assessed against: spinning reserve provision; hydro storage and standing 
reserve provision. The choice of biodiesel DG supporting wind power is 
supported by its small scale (50 kW to 5 MW installed capacity) and fast 
synchronisation times (less than a minute). The Northern Irish power system is 
used to demonstrate the environmental and financial benefits of the 
methodology. Extreme wind power scenarios are considered. Results of one 
month of operation demonstrate fast response to wind power fluctuations. 
The use of remotely controlled biodiesel DG reduced system operational fuel 
costs in the practical example analysed.  
An overall strategy for the planning and operation of non-firm connected DG 
is given in [37]. The probability of occurrence of critical network operating 
points that affect the connection of non-firm connected DG is assessed. 
Voltage sensitivity factors are calculated across the distribution network for 
such. The financial risk to the owners of the DG schemes is quantified. A 
minimum cost curtailment method based on the coordination of DG and the 
usage of voltage sensitivity factors is introduced. The ability of certain DG 
schemes to be dispatched is utilised to enable this minimum cost curtailment. 
A rural section of the Irish 38 kV distribution network is used to validate the 
methodology. DG availability and load profile data are obtained from one 
year of historical data.  
Multi-period optimal power flow (OPF) procedures to evaluate the maximum 
possible penetration of non-dispatchable DG capacity are presented in [39, 
51]. Non-firm access to the networks is allowed. The following strategies to 
integrate DG are included: coordinated voltage control, adaptive power 
factors and generation curtailment. The results obtained are compared 
against the “last-in, first-off” connection of DG on a 33 kV distribution 
network of the UK. Coincident data of load and wind power over a year of 
operation is available. The installed capacity of DG increases significantly 
with the use of the strategies to integrate DG. An increase in losses is 
observed due to the integration of newer DG power plants. 
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A methodology to coordinate the approval and integration of new 
independent DG is introduced in [52]. The objective is to maximise the 
connection of generation while complying with network voltage and current 
limits. The income of the owners of DG is maximised taking into consideration 
different generation sites, sizes, commissioning dates and production 
schedules. Then, the generator sizes and production schedules are forwarded 
to the network operator. In turn, network operators run optimal power flow 
studies with the data provided. When excesses in network voltages occur, the 
methodology runs a “Domains and Commons Module”, which determines the 
contribution of each generator to these excesses. An “Output Reduction 
Module” determines the generation curtailment required by means of an 
optimisation algorithm. Generators are ultimately offered firm access rights 
of connection. The methodology is evaluated on a 32-bus radial distribution 
network, on a 5-year planning time horizon. Four independent generators ask 
permission to connect to the network, all having different technologies. An 
increased global income for DG is demonstrated. Reduction in the energy 
import from the interconnections, improvements in voltage regulation and 
reduction of losses are also reported.  
2.3.2 - Network operator-driven coordination 
The concept of delegated dispatch is introduced in [53]. Delegated 
dispatches are control centres designed to operate on behalf of network 
operators when critical network operating points occur (such as network 
voltage issues and congestion). A delegated dispatch includes DG with 
different ability to be dispatched (wind-based generation, small hydro, 
photovoltaic, and others) in a certain region of the system. When corrective 
actions are needed, the system operator communicates them to the 
delegated dispatches. In this paper, only wind generation is considered to be 
available. Both active and reactive power commands are considered. Wind DG 
is divided in three groups, each representing different capabilities to control 
active and reactive power outputs. 
A delegated dispatch is formulated as a nonlinear optimisation algorithm. 
The global income of wind generators is maximised on a market environment 
subject to the restrictions issued by the system operator. A section of the 
Spanish distribution network is used to validate the methodology. The price of 
electricity (feed-in tariffs, bilateral contracts) is already determined by the 
time of running of the delegated dispatch. Each delegated dispatch covers the 
entire distribution network below the interconnection with the transmission 
network. An operation time step of 15 minutes is considered between the 
communication by the network operator and the corrective action performed 
by the delegated dispatches. 
A centralised control system to manage active and reactive powers 
produced by wind and diesel generators and set transformer taps online is 
presented in [54]. The objective is to minimise total network costs. Network 
voltage stability constraints are considered. The control system is designed to 
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have near real-time operation. No commercial arrangements are considered 
to promote the coordinated operation of the generators. 
Real-time thermal constraint management using DG is addressed in [55]. 
The output powers of DG are set with the objective of minimising the power 
curtailment required to meet static network current limits. Two techniques 
are evaluated: a constraint programming algorithm and a current tracing 
algorithm. The constraint programming algorithm consists in “shaping” the 
desired solution using a backtrack approach. The solution obtained satisfies 
the order of connection of the generators and load flow constraints. The 
current tracing algorithm is an upstream search procedure that tracks the 
usage of the constrained line by each DG scheme. Based on the tracing 
obtained, the output power of each DG scheme is set in proportion until line 
thermal limits are met. This algorithm does not consider the order of 
connection of the generators. Both techniques are applied to a distribution 
network. Computational times are suitable for real-time implementation. The 
current tracing algorithm presents a smaller amount of power curtailed and a 
faster performance.  
An optimal power flow algorithm is introduced in [56] as an alternative to 
the constraint programming-based and current tracing algorithms described 
in [55]. The optimal power flow algorithm considers the order of connection 
of the generators.  
The coordination of the output powers of DG when network congestion 
occurs is detailed in [57]. Three possible strategies based on the evaluation of 
network power flow sensitivity factors (PFSFs) are presented. PFSFs measure 
the change in network voltages and angles with marginal changes in the 
injection of active and reactive power. PFSFs are used to evaluate the impact 
of power injection in each busbar to network congestion. Variable thermal 
ratings are considered for the transmission/distribution lines. Thermal state 
estimation is used in areas where no real-time thermal rating control systems 
are available. The three strategies to schedule the generators are: “last-in, 
first-off” approach based on PFSFs; an equalitarian approach, that determines 
the schedule of the generators based on a weighted proportion of PFSFs; and 
a “technically most appropriate” approach, which ranks generators by their 
PFSFs and actuates when necessary according to that ranking. The three 
strategies are compared against “last-in, first-off” operation of the 
generators, considering static thermal limits of the lines.  
The comparison of strategies is performed considering the annual energy 
income, network losses and voltage profiles. Costs of real-time thermal rating 
equipment and communication facilities are considered. Reactive power is 
assumed to be constant during the year of simulation. The time step between 
measurements is 30 minutes. Net present values and profitability indexes of 
each strategy for each generator are presented. The control actions are 
implemented by a rule-based inference system. This system collects all 
information regarding power flows, meter data and constraint limits. The 
system also sets, at every time step, the commands to be sent to the DG 
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schemes. For computation efficiency, PFSFs are pre-calculated being 
collected in real-time from a look-up table. Results show an increase in the 
aggregated amount of energy produced using any of the three strategies. 
However, the authors stress the need to devise commercial arrangements to 
promote the use of the methodology. 
2.3.3 - Market-driven coordination 
A virtual power plant (VPP) is an infrastructure that aggregates distributed 
energy resources (generation and demand) to address technical and 
commercial operation objectives, see Figure 2.4 [58].  
 
Figure 2.4 - The concept of virtual power plant [58] 
The VPP is controlled centrally by an operator or aggregator. A review of 
the concepts of virtual power plant and virtual utility is presented in [59]. 
VPP is defined as a “new model of energy infrastructure which consists of 
integrating different kind of DG in an energy (electricity and heat) generation 
network controlled by a central energy management system” [59]. The FENIX 
project [58] was a European Union (EU) project to develop the concept of 
VPP. The aim was “to conceptualise, design and demonstrate a technical 
architecture and commercial framework for enabling DG to become the 
solution for the future cost efficient, secure and sustainable EU electricity 
supply system” [58]. The FENIX Project produced three main outcomes:  
 FENIX Box server, which serves to aggregate demand and generation 
and ensure their operation according the optimisation model;  
 Commercial VPP server, that schedules and provides energy 
optimisation functions for the DG;  
 Technical VPP in the distribution management system server, that 
validates the generation schedules taking into account network 
voltages and currents. 
A number of contributions address the mitigation of power imbalances of 
wind generation using the coordination of generation on a market 
environment [60-63]. A combined bidding and operating market strategy for 
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hydro and wind generation is presented in [62]. Hydro generation is used to 
minimise imbalance penalties of wind generation in day-ahead markets. The 
objective is to maximise the total income for selling electricity. The 
generators are owned by the same producer.  
The coordinated operation of wind and thermal generators to reduce the 
risk of wind imbalance penalties is presented in [63]. The objective function 
is to maximise the total expected income subject to the trading risk attitude 
of the owner of the generators. Generators are assumed to be owned by the 
same producer. Uncertainty of wind power outputs, energy prices and 
imbalance prices is considered. Traded energy volumes are lower with 
risk-averse bidding. This is because wind generators reduce their bids to avoid 
under-generation penalties and thermal generators do not produce to avoid 
periods of lower income. 
The utilisation of water storage to increase the penetration of wind 
generation is presented in [64]. Water storage is controlled to smooth wind 
power fluctuations and maximise the wind-hydro global income for selling 
active power. A day-ahead hourly discretised optimization algorithm sets the 
schedule of both wind generators and hydraulic pumping. Generators may be 
owned by the same producer. Inputs are the wind power forecast, the 
estimation of price of electricity and the boundaries of the desired 
aggregated power profile. Wind power forecast is a stochastic quantity given 
by two series of hourly values: wind power average values and its standard 
deviation magnitude. The forecasting error is incorporated in the model by 
means of a neuro-fuzzy methodology. The estimation of price of electricity is 
made considering the feed-in tariff system in Portugal. The boundaries of the 
desired aggregated power profile are set by the network operator. The 
methodology runs a number of Monte Carlo simulations to collect different 
cases of available wind power for the next operating day. The optimisation 
algorithm is then run for each case of available wind power. The optimal 
wind-hydro dispatch is a “band” of possible solutions. 
A day-ahead planning algorithm for a multi-reservoir hydro system 
coordinated with wind power is developed in [60]. The objective is to 
minimise wind energy curtailment. Wind and hydro generators are owned by 
different producers. Hydro generators have priority access to the network. 
Uncertainty of wind power outputs and market prices is considered. It is 
assumed that the hydro generators are paid for reducing power production to 
allow wind generators to produce. The price paid to the hydro generators for 
the coordination service is agreed beforehand by the generators. This price is 
based on average annual economic losses of the wind generators due to 
curtailment, based on historical data. Results show that both wind and hydro 
generators receive a greater income if they coordinate their output powers.  
Coordination of independent generators to maximise the income of the 
generators is presented in [61]. Wind and hydro generators are connected to 
different feeders but sharing the same grid connecting point. Wind generators 
are connected without firm access rights. The methodology is set on the 
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day-ahead market. The storage capacity of the hydro generation is used to 
define a joint power schedule for the next day of operation (24 market 
periods of one hour). Penalisations for over/underproduction of the 
generators are included. A seven-day time span is considered to account with 
basin management constraints. Uncertainties in both prices and wind speeds 
are incorporated. Results show an increase in global electricity selling 
revenues. The extra income obtained by the coordination is shared by the 
generators using the Shapley Value (game theory approach). Shapley Value is 
an approach for the allocation of gains obtained in coalition and recognises 
the contribution of each player to these gains. Each generator receives a 
greater income in comparison to what they would have received without 
coordination. The methodology is validated on the Swedish transmission 
network.  
2.3.4 - Comments on the reviewed approaches of the coordination of 
independent generation 
The technical and economic benefits of coordinating generation are 
addressed in the “Planning and Economic Assessment” contributions 
reviewed.  These contributions do not address the allocation of the benefits 
obtained to the generators. Limited details of the technical implementation 
of these methodologies are provided. 
“Network-operator driven” contributions envisage the improvement of 
network operation and are generally operated by network operators. These 
contributions do not deliver economic signals to promote the coordinated 
operation of DG. The coordination of DG is then a mandatory requirement of 
network operators.  
“Market-driven coordination” contributions aim to maximise the electricity 
produced and the income of DG. However, most contributions reviewed do 
not provide details on how to allocate the additional income obtained by the 
generators.  
Game theory provides tools to allocate the income originated by different 
players in a coalition. The application of game theory to the coordination of 
independent DG is addressed in section 2.4. 
2.4 - Applicability of game theory to the coordination of 
independent generation  
Game theory deals with problems of conflict amongst interacting decision 
makers. It may be regarded as a generalisation of decision theory to include 
multiple decision makers [65, 66]. These decision makers are usually called 
“players”. Game theory can be classified in two major areas: non-cooperative 
and cooperative game theory. 
2.4.1 - Non-cooperative and cooperative game theory 
Game Theory provides tools to study the non-cooperative interactions 
between participants (commonly designated as “players”) looking to 
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maximise their income. In a non-cooperative game, each player has a number 
of choices/strategies available and a set of returns (commonly designated as 
“payoffs”) corresponding to these strategies. Examples of these interactions 
are wholesale electricity markets, which are normally established on the 
assumption that participants do not cooperate.  
Non-cooperative games can be zero-sum games or nonzero-sum games 
[67]. In zero-sum games, gains of one player equal the losses of the other 
player(s). In nonzero-sum games, gains of one player do not equal the losses 
of the other player(s). A solution to non-cooperative games is the concept of 
Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium exists if, for all players, one player’s 
strategy is the best response to the strategies of the other players [68]. 
Multiple Nash equilibria may exist for a given game.  
In non-cooperative game theory, the payoff of a player depends not only 
on the strategy chosen but also on the strategies adopted by the remaining 
players. In addition, the rules of the game, the strategies available and their 
associated payoffs are of common knowledge. Each player is assumed to act 
rationally to maximise its own payoff [65]. The solution of non-cooperative 
games is the set of strategies adopted by each player individually and their 
outcome [67]. Non-cooperative games are believed to promote competition, 
driving players to bid near their marginal costs as competition grows. 
Therefore market efficiency is increased and prices are reduced [65]. 
Cooperative game theory is a branch of Game Theory that focuses on how 
an amount obtained in a coalition should be divided equitably amongst 
players. Particulars such as how players behave and how coalitions are formed 
(e.g., order of entrance in the coalition) are not addressed. The various 
solutions proposed for cooperative games can be interpreted as alternative 
solutions to an allocation problem [65]. Coalitions are formed to allow players 
to benefit from economies of scale, increasing their payoffs when compared 
to individual operation [67, 69]. The solution of cooperative games refers to 
the “grand coalition”, i.e. the coalition of all players. Although being in a 
coalition, players ultimately aim to maximise their own income [65].  
Cooperation in wholesale electricity markets is normally not accepted by 
regulators as it may lead to market distortions due to the reduction in the 
number of players and the increase of the relative weight of certain players. 
This may give market power to some players (e.g., by means of cartelisation), 
which would harm competition, reduce market efficiency and drive up prices 
for consumers [28, 70]. However, in cases where players share a scarce 
resource (e.g., a distribution circuit) or when players can obtain cost savings 
with economies of scale, cooperative game theory is reported to be an 
efficient way to promote efficiency in electricity networks [71-73]. Proposed 
applications of cooperative game theory to electricity markets include the 
reduction of network losses [71] and the reduction in transaction charges and 
costs of operation of generators [72, 73].  
The allocation of the additional income obtained in coordination by 
independent generators connected to the same circuit can be formulated 
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using cooperative game theory. A branch of cooperative game theory, 
cooperative games with transferable utility, is presented in section 2.4.2. In a 
cooperative game with transferable utility it is assumed that the earnings of a 
group of players can be expressed by an amount of utility [68]. This amount 
of utility is transferred without loss to the players. 
2.4.2 - Cooperative games with transferable utility 
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is described by a 
pair ),( vN , where  nN ...,,2,1  is a finite set with n elements (players) and   
is the “characteristic function” [68]. A subset S of the player set N is called 
“coalition”. N is the grand coalition, i.e. the coalition of all players. The 
number of players in a coalition S is denoted by  . The characteristic function 
  assigns a “worth”      to each coalition   [74]. The worth of a coalition is 
the amount of utility (which can be expressed in monetary terms) to be 
allocated to the players [68]. If for all NTS , , being TS ,  
)()()( TvSvTSv   
then the cooperation has greater value than the sum of the value obtained by 
coalitions alone. The property described by condition (2.1) is known as 
superadditivity. A stronger notion than superadditivity is convexity (see 
condition (2.2)). 
)()()()( TvSvTSvTSv   
The total payoff      of the grand coalition should be allocated to the 
players so that their cooperation is incentivised. Let      be the worth of the 
individual operation of player  . An allocation is a vector   Nnxxx  ...,,1 , 
where    is the payoff due to player  . Allocations are efficient if the payoff is 
entirely distributed, i.e. ∑           . The payoff received by each player   
should be at least equal to the amount it would have received individually, 
i.e. 
ii vx   for all     . This property is called individual rationality. 
Allocations that meet the efficiency and the individual rationality properties 
are called imputations. Thus,      is the set of imputations of   (see 
condition (2.3)).  






 
Ni
ii
n NiivxNvxxvI )(),(|:)(  
2.4.3 - Methods to solve cooperative games with transferable utility 
The solution to TU-games is an allocation or set of allocations admissible 
to all players. There are two groups of solution methods for TU-games [67, 
68, 75, 76]: (a) subset methods (e.g.: the Core, Least Core, Bargaining Set, 
Weber Set, Selectope) and (b) one-point methods (e.g: Nucleolus and 
Prenucleolus, the Shapley value, τ-value). The solution method for a given 
game should be chosen according to the particulars of that game [69].  
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
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2.4.3.1 – Subset-based methods 
Subset methods provide a "range" of allocations that satisfy the players. 
This flexibility allows players to consider various solutions.  
Core of a Cooperative Game 
An imputation is an efficient allocation that satisfies individual rationality, 
see condition (2.3). By extending the property of individual rationality to 
coalitions, then for all non-empty coalitions S: 
NSSvx
Si
i 

 allfor  ,)(  
The property described by condition (2.4) is called group rationality. The 
set of imputations (condition (2.3)) that fulfil group rationality (condition 
(2.4)) form the core [68]. Formally, 






 
 Si
i
Ni
i
n NSSvxNvxxvC ),( and),(|:)(  
Being      the core of  . The lower bound of the core is the baseline for 
all players: no player will have incentive to cooperate if it receives less than 
in individual operation. The upper bound of the core is the set of allocations 
that one player can request without harming the other players’ payoffs. The 
core can be empty or non-empty.  
Least Core 
Considering an imputation  , the excess vector  



Si
ixSvxSe )(),(  
is regarded as the objection raised by a coalition   against imputation   (see 
equation (2.6)). Let )(1 xe  be the largest excess of any coalition relative to  , 
)(2 xe the second largest excess and so forth. The Least Core of a TU-game is 
the set    of all imputations   that minimise )(1 xe , i.e., that minimise the 
biggest complain of S [69]. 
2.4.3.2 – One-point methods 
One-point methods aim to select one allocation that satisfies all players.  
Nucleous and Prenucleous  
Considering the definition of Least Core, let    be the set of all   in    
that minimises )(2 xe ,    be the set of all   in    that minimises )(3 xe , and so 
forth. This process will ultimately lead to a set    consisting of a sole 
imputation  , called the nucleolus.  The nucleolus    is the imputation that 
minimises the maximum complaint of all coalitions. Formally (see 
condition (2.7)) [68]: 
  












 
Si
ixSvvNu )(maxmin:)(  
This minimisation is subject to the constraints of the core (efficiency, 
individual and group rationality).  
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
(2.7) 
(2.6) 
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The prenucleolus is the efficient allocation that minimises the maximum 
complaint of all coalitions [66]. The prenucleolus does not guarantee the 
individual rationality property, which may lead to a solution outside the core.  
Shapley Value 
Consider      to be the set of superadditive games with   players. The 
Shapley Value is the unique value nNH )(:  that satisfies simultaneously 
the following four properties (equations 2.8 to 2.12) [76]: 
- Efficiency: for every supperadditive game )(NHv ,  
)()( Nvv
Ni
i 

  
- Symmetry: If two players   and   contribute by the same amount to all 
coalitions − for all  jiNS ,\ ,     jSviSv  ), then  
   vv ji    
- Dummy Player: If the contribution of a player   to any coalition is the same 
that player   is able to achieve individually − for all S such that    , 
     ivSviSv   
This means that player   receives a payoff exactly equal to the amount 
that it is able to achieve individually. For any  , if   is a dummy player then  
 ivvi )(  
- Additivity:  satisfies additivity if, for every superadditive game 
)(, NHwv    
   wvwv   )(  
Provided that the aforementioned properties are fulfilled, the Shapley 
value   for player    , for all       , is given by equation (2.13): 
 
  
 





iNS
i SviSv
n
sns
v
\
)(
!
!1!
:)(  
  and   denote the number of elements of   and  , respectively.     
{ }        is defined as player  ’s marginal contribution to coalition  . Term 
          
  
 means that players are randomly ordered and all permutations (i.e., 
orders of entrance in the coalition) have equal probability. Thus, the Shapley 
value of player   is the average of player  ’s marginal contribution to all 
coalitions, including the empty coalition. The marginal contributions of each 
player in a 3-player game (players   ,   ,   ) is given in Table 2.2.  
If game   is a convex game (see constraint (2.2)) then the Shapley Value is 
in the core. 
Computational effort required to obtain the Shapley Value increases 
significantly with the increase in the number of players. This is due to the 
increase in the number of permutations. 
  
(2.8) 
(2.11) 
(2.9) 
(2.10) 
(2.12) 
(2.13) 
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Table 2.2 – Marginal contributions of each player in a 3-player game 
Player   Permutation                   { }        
{  }    
 
   0! (3 - 0 - 1)!/3!= 0.33(3)  ({  }) -   () 
(  )    1! (3 - 1 - 1)!/3!= 0.16(6)   ({  ,   }) -   ({  }) 
(  )    1! (3 - 1 - 1)!/3!= 0.16(6)   ({  ,   }) -   ({  }) 
(  ,   )    2! (3 - 2 - 1)!/3!= 0.33(3)   ({  ,   ,   }) -   ({  ,   }) 
{  }    
 
   0.33(3)   ({  }) -   () 
(  )    0.16(6)   ({  ,   }) -   ({  }) 
(  )    0.16(6)   ({  ,   }) -   ({  }) 
(  ,   )    0.33(3)   ({  ,   ,   }) -   ({  ,   }) 
{  }    
 
   0.33(3)   ({  }) -   () 
(  )    0.16(6)   ({  ,   }) -   ({  }) 
(  )    0.16(6)   ({  ,   }) -   ({  }) 
(  ,   )    0.33(3)   ({  ,   ,   }) -   ({  ,   }) 
τ-value 
The τ-value (or tau value) is the trade-off between two vectors:     , the 
marginal contribution vector, and;     , the minimum right vector [69]. For 
player  ,      is given by equation (2.14): 
   iNvN=vvMi \:)(   
      is the marginal contribution of player   to the grand coalition. It is 
the best payoff player   can expect (see equation (2.15)).
 
 
   
 
 max:)( ; 







 


iS\j
jS iSi vMSv=vm  
      is the minimum right of player  , if all other players in   obtain their 
marginal contributions.  
To compute the τ-value, let τ be the imputation that fulfils ∑        
 
   , 
such that             for some value  . In a 3-player game, the 
4-equation and 4-unknowns system necessary to obtain   is given by 
equation (2.16). The values for m and M are obtained as shown in Table 2.3. 
 
 
 






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
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(2.14) 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
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Table 2.3 – Marginal contribution vectors of a 3-player game 
Vector Player 1 –    Player 1 –    Player 1 –    
                    {  }                     {  }                     {  }  
             {  }             {  }            {  } 
2.4.4 - Application of game theory to electric power systems 
The strategic behaviour of electricity market participants and solutions to 
avoid market power are addressed in [77-82]. The allocation of network costs 
using cooperative game theory is addressed in [83, 84]. The allocation of 
transmission network losses is presented in [85]. A contribution to 
transmission congestion pricing is investigated in [86]. Cooperative game 
theory is used to compensate generators for congestion relief in [87]. The 
pricing of reactive power support is addressed in [88].  
Demand-side integration strategies using game theory are described in [89, 
90]. Game theory is used to encourage consumers to adopt the expected 
behaviour and obtain cost savings. 
The allocation of the benefits of firm energy bids of independent hydro 
generators is presented in [91]. The coordination of independent generators 
connected to the same network using cooperative game theory is presented in 
[61, 72]. The objective is to increase the income of the generators. 
2.5 - Demand-side integration in distribution network operation 
Demand-side integration is a set of methodologies to use demand and local 
generation to support network operation/management and improve the 
quality of power supply [1]. The term “demand-side integration” is used by 
CIGRE to congregate different nomenclature such as demand-side 
management and demand response [5, 92]. 
Demand-side integration is expected to increase so as to limit the growth 
in demand and make better use of the networks. Also, the flexibility of 
demand is being presented to allow the integration of additional amounts of 
non-dispatchable generation [93, 94]. Demand-side integration is expected to 
allow [95, 96]: 
 Reduction of demand peaks; 
 Load shifting and valley filling; 
 Reduction in overall demand without reducing services (energy 
efficiency); 
The participation of the demand-side aims to promote [95, 96]: 
 Power system balancing in systems with high penetration of 
non-dispatchable generation; 
 Increase of the share of load supplied by low-carbon generation; 
 Provision of ancillary services by the demand; 
 Reduction in network operating costs;  
 Deferment of investments in transmission and distribution systems. 
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Energy storage systems 
Energy storage systems are an example of demand-side resources able to 
respond to electric power system or market conditions. Different applications 
of energy storage systems are presented in Table 2.4 [96]. Benefits are 
referred to the United States network operators.  
Table 2.4 - Applications of energy storage systems [96] 
 
The penetration of electric vehicles may bring a widespread availability of 
energy storage. Apart from allowing the connection of larger amounts of 
electric vehicles, the development of electric vehicle aggregators in 
electricity markets aims to allow [97-99]: 
 the production of additional electricity from non-dispatchable 
generation; 
 the prevention of network congestion; 
 improvements in network voltage regulation; 
Heat pumps can also be used as energy storage to increase production 
from non-dispatchable generation [100, 101]. 
Difficulties to the implementation of distributed energy storage systems 
include [96]: 
 Regulatory barriers: regulated utilities may face difficulties to ensure 
return of capital costs and thus in obtaining regulatory approval for 
such investments; 
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 Market structure: many consumers are still under a flat price scheme, 
which does not provide incentive for the use of storage. 
In addition, shifting large amounts of consumption can result in changes in 
wholesale electricity prices [102].  
2.5.1 - Mechanisms to implement demand-side integration 
The implementation of demand-side integration is facilitated by smart 
metering. Smart metering allows real-time information exchange and the 
implementation of control actions. This way, two approaches to implement 
demand-side integration are considered: price-based schemes (e.g., time of 
use rates) and incentive-based schemes (e.g., direct load control) [92, 103, 
104]. 
Price-based schemes promote changes to load consumption by means of 
electricity price signals. Incentive-based schemes provide incentives to 
modify the load. The remuneration of incentive-based schemes is separate 
from the electricity bill. 
Price-based and incentive-based implementations are also classified by 
timing requirements, see Figure 2.5 [5]. Incentive-based schemes tend to be 
implemented nearer to real-time operation. 
 
Figure 2.5 – Classification of demand-side integration implementations by timing requirements [5] 
Price-based schemes are detailed in section 2.5.1.1 and incentive-based 
mechanisms are addressed in section 2.5.1.2. 
2.5.1.1 - Price-based schemes 
In price-based schemes, dynamic pricing is used to promote changes in 
demand consumption. Both prices and time periods can be fixed and 
pre-defined. Schemes include time of use rates, real-time pricing and critical 
peak pricing [1, 92] (see Figure 2.6): 
 Time of use rates: different prices are used for different time periods. 
This is usually set for a 24-hour period. These prices vary according to 
the cost of generating and delivering power during different periods; 
 Real-time pricing: the electricity price fluctuates during the time 
period considered following changes in the wholesale electricity price. 
Time of
use rates
Critical Peak
Pricing
Real-time 
Pricing
Seconds Minutes Hours Days Months
Direct Load
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contracts
Ancillary 
services 
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Emergency 
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This fluctuation usually occurs with a granularity of one hour. Demand 
is notified of the real-time prices on a day-ahead or hour-ahead basis; 
 Critical peak pricing: this scheme is a mixture of time of use and real 
time prices. The basic rate structure is a time of use rate. However, 
the normal peak price is replaced by a much higher price. This very 
high price reflects predefined trigger conditions (e.g., network 
congestion).  
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
Figure 2.6 – Example of pricing schemes [1]: a) time of use rates b) real-time pricing c) critical peak 
pricing 
The performance of price-based schemes is assessed by the response of 
demand to price signals. This can be measured by calculating the price 
elasticity of load, which gives the rate of change of consumption per unit of 
change in price. 
2.5.1.2 - Incentive-based schemes  
Different incentive-bases schemes are listed as follows [1, 92]: 
 Load curtailment programmes: notify large consumers to reduce their 
consumption during system contingencies. Reduction is operated by the 
consumer; 
 Interruptible contracts: commit consumers to reduce a given amount of 
consumption when requested. Number of reduction requests, economic 
incentives and notification times are pre-established by consumer 
contract. This scheme is usually considered for large consumers; 
 Direct load control programmes: allow network operators to directly 
control end-use equipment (e.g, air conditioners, water and space 
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heaters). Direct communication links between the program facilitator 
and participating consumer equipment are required; 
 Demand-side bidding: allow consumers to offer load reduction at a 
given price. If the bid is accepted, consumers operate the agreed 
reduction. Small consumers need to be aggregated to be able to apply 
for this scheme; 
 Emergency demand response/ capacity market programmes: provides 
incentives for load reduction when the system is short of reserve. Load 
curtailment is regarded as system capacity to replace conventional 
generation; 
 Ancillary services market programmes: consumers are able to bid load 
curtailments as operational reserves. If bids are accepted, consumers 
are paid for their availability to be curtailed. If curtailment is 
operated, they are paid according to the electricity market price. 
2.5.2 - Benefits of demand-side integration to the integration of 
generation 
Demand-side integration facilitates the integration of generation as it 
allows [93, 94, 104, 105]: 
 Maximisation of the utilisation of generators (increase production 
export, reduce total generation costs); 
 Attenuation of the variability of non-dispatchable generators. 
A stochastic optimisation model for aggregating wind power and flexible 
loads in day-ahead electricity markets is presented in [106]. The joint 
offering of a demand response provider and wind power aims to reduce wind 
power imbalance penalties. A virtual power plant is implemented as an 
aggregator of the wind generators and the demand response provider. The 
possibility of load shifting is accounted. Uncertainty in wind power forecasts 
is included. Historical data of market prices and demand consumption are 
considered. Also, imbalance prices are deterministic, being a percentage of 
the market clearing price. Results demonstrate the benefit of the joint 
offering of wind power and demand. The correlation between wind power 
production and load consumption increases. However, as the amount of load 
flexibility grows the benefit obtained in joint operation tends to stabilise.  
An energy management system acting as an aggregator of distributed 
energy resources in the free market is presented in [107]. This aggregator 
aims to maximise the local production of non-dispatchable generators, as well 
as minimise the electricity bill of the load. Active management schemes (such 
as transformer on-load tap changing algorithms and generator power factor 
management) are included. Real-time pricing of the load is considered. The 
energy management system presented is based on the manual response of end 
users to real-time pricing. 
In [108], controllable load is incentivised to coordinate with wind power by 
means of a discounted price of electricity offered by the wind generators. 
Direct control of flexible loads by the wind generators is employed, 
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interfaced by a control centre. Dynamic programming algorithms and adaptive 
stochastic controllers are used. 
A model predictive controller to solve the economic dispatch problem at 
the transmission level considering large penetration of non-dispatchable 
generation and flexible load is presented in [109]. Non-dispatchable generator 
and demand outputs are decision variables. No congestion is considered. Load 
responsiveness to price is modelled using a demand function. Demand 
functions between hours are uncorrelated to alleviate computational effort. 
Results are analysed against a base case that: i) does not consider 
non-dispatchable generation and demand as decision variables; ii) assumes 
the demand to be inelastic. A greater utilisation of the available 
non-dispatchable generation and the reduction of total generation cost are 
observed with the controller. Also, demand reduces its total amount in 
comparison with the base case. 
2.5.3 - Benefits of demand-side integration to the consumers 
Demand-side integration aims to promote benefits for consumers [102, 
104, 110]: 
 Savings in the electricity bill; 
 Revenue collection for providing ancillary services; 
The aforementioned benefits are aimed not to reduce services to 
consumers or decrease their comfort.  
A decentralised consumption scheduling methodology for consumers of the 
same energy company is presented in [89]. Two objective functions are 
considered: the minimisation of the cost of energy supply (consumer 
objective); and the minimisation of the peak-to-average ratio of the load 
(energy company objective). A scheduling algorithm is installed in the smart 
meters to allow their interaction. Smart meters exchange limited amount of 
information. Results show that the minimum cost scheduling of the load also 
reduces the peak-to-average ratio of the load. 
The promotion of voluntary energy conservation is proposed in [111]. 
Real-time monitoring of the price of electricity and visibility of potential 
energy savings is used to provide incentives for consumers to shift peak 
demand. A hardware-based approach is presented to: i) curtail peak load and 
reduce electricity consumption using air conditioners; ii) emit real-time 
pricing signals to motivate end users to shift peak demand. Results obtained 
rely on the response of end users to price signals. 
2.5.4 - Benefits of coordinating independent distributed generation and 
demand 
Coordination of independent distributed generation and demand (such as 
controllable load and energy storage systems) has potential to: 
 Increase energy export in distribution networks; 
 Maximise the production of non-dispatchable generators; 
 Maximise the income of the owners of distributed generators; 
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 Provide additional revenues to demand, so as to incentivise its 
coordinated operation. 
Commercial mechanisms should be implemented so that both distributed 
generators and demand are incentivised to operate in a coordinated manner.  
2.6 - Summary 
The “fit-and-forget” connection of distributed generation introduces 
challenges to the connection of further capacity. Contributions to allow the 
connection of additional amounts of distributed generation were presented. 
The coordination of independent distributed generators was identified as a 
way to integrate greater capacities and maximise the income of the 
generators. Game theory was introduced to provide mechanisms to allocate 
the income obtained in coordination by all generators. The participation of 
the demand side in distribution network operation was analysed. The 
potential benefits of coordinating independent generation and demand were 
presented. 
The limitations of the “fit-and-forget” connection of generation are 
evaluated in Chapter 3. The coordination of independent distributed 
generators to mitigate these limitations is addressed in Chapter 4. The 
income obtained by the distributed generators is allocated using a mechanism 
based on cooperative game theory. The integration of controllable load in the 
coordination is considered in Chapter 5. The coordination of non-dispatchable 
generators and energy storage systems is presented in Chapter 6. The 
additional income obtained is allocated to generators and demand 
(controllable load/energy storage systems). The demand receives part of the 
additional income to incentivise its operation in a coordinated manner. 
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Chapter 3 - Connection of generation to 
distribution networks 
3.1 - Introduction 
The connection and operation of distributed generators under the firm 
access connection policy is described. A representative of the distribution 
system of Northeast Portugal is used as an example. The connection of 
distributed generation without firm access rights is considered. The 
limitations of the firm access connection policy are then discussed. 
3.2 - Modelling of the distribution system analysed  
The firm access connection policy is described using the distribution 
system of Northeast Portugal as an example, see Figure 3.1. A 60 kV 
distribution network is illustrated. There are fifteen distribution substations 
and three interconnections with the transmission network. Wind and hydro 
distributed generation is connected.   
 
Figure 3.1 – 60 kV distribution network of Northeast Portugal (source: [112]) 
Load consumption and distributed generation output at the medium 
voltage (MV) side of the distribution network is shown in Table 3.1. Values 
were obtained at 8.30 a.m. on 20/12/2007 [112]. 
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Table 3.1 - Distribution substation loads and MV-connected distributed generation output, 
20/12/2007 at 8.30 a.m. (source: [112]) 
   Wind DG (MVA) Hydro DG (MVA) Thermal DG (MVA) 
 
Load 
(MVA) 
Total DG 
(MVA) 
Generation 
Maximum 
injection 
Generation 
Maximum 
injection 
Generation 
Maximum 
injection 
Amarante 19.1 5.1 - - 0.0 0.6 5.1 5.2 
Bragança 21.9 0.0 - - 0.0 4.2 - - 
Carneiro 2.8 0.0 0.0 1.5 - - - - 
Chaves 20.0 3.2 3.2 3.3 - - - - 
Mirandela 11.1 Without DG 
Morgade 3.6 2.5 2.5 3.0 - - - - 
M. Cavaleiros 14.2 1.7 1.7 2.0 - - - - 
Pinhão 10.0 Without DG 
Soutelo 8.4 8.0 8.0 8.0 - - - - 
Telheira 27.0 7.2 2.6 2.5 4.6 20.0 - - 
Valpaços 5.7 Without DG 
Varosa 36.3 41.5 41.2 39.4 0.3 13.0   
Vidago 11.2 2.7 1.2 1.2 1.5 4.2 - - 
Vila da Ponte 10.1 Without DG 
Total 201.4 71.9 60.4 60.8 6.4 42.0 5.1 5.2 
There is no distributed generation connected to the distribution substation 
indicated in Figure 3.1 (Valpaços), see Table 3.1. Valpaços distribution 
substation has a single 60kV/15kV transformer with 15 MVA of installed 
capacity. The MV network below Valpaços substation is shown in Figure 3.2. 
This MV network is a representative of a rural distribution network in 
Portugal. The short-circuit power behind Valpaços substation,    , is provided 
in [112].    is the leakage reactance of the transformer.    and       are 
the base power and the base voltage of the distribution network, 
respectively. Total load consumption in Figure 3.2 is equal to the 
consumption mentioned in Table 3.1, i.e. 5.7 MVA. Loads are considered to 
operate with a fixed power factor of 0.95 (inductive). 
 
Figure 3.2 – Distribution network below Valpaços substation (rural distribution network) 
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3.3 - Operation of generators with firm access rights 
Generators get permission to connect to distribution networks in Portugal 
on the basis of power flow studies with the following conditions [113]: 
- Generators must be operating at their maximum power, with unity power 
factor;  
- The voltage magnitude in the busbar of connection should not change more 
than +0.02 p.u., with all loads equal to zero;  
- Line capacity limits and voltage magnitude limits ([0.9 p.u.; 1.1 p.u.]) must 
be observed in all busbars.  
Generators who fulfil these and other non-technical requirements are 
allowed to connect to the distribution network with firm access rights.  
To exemplify the connection of generation with firm access rights, two 
independent distributed generators are connected to the distribution network 
of Figure 3.2. Generator GenA connected first to the network (on busbar B3) 
and has an installed capacity of 10 MVA. Generator GenB connected later (on 
busbar B9) and has an installed capacity of 5 MVA. Both generators are 
connected with firm access rights.  
GenA is a non-dispatchable generator (wind generator) and GenB is a 
dispatchable generator (thermal generator). A dispatchable generator has the 
ability to produce and store according to the strategy of the producer. 
Non-dispatchable generators only produce electricity when their primary 
resource comes available and do not have ability to store their production.  
3.3.1 - Limitation in the capacity that can be connected 
The operation of the distribution network is analysed considering two 
extreme power flow cases: 
- Case 1  Minimum MV-side voltage magnitudes: transformer operates at its 
highest tap on the HV side (1.06), loads are at their maximum value, 
generators do not operate; 
- Case 2  Maximum MV-side voltage magnitudes: transformer operates at its 
lowest tap on the HV side (0.94), no loads, generators operate at maximum 
output power with unity power factor; 
Figure 3.3 shows the operation of the distribution network in case 1. 
Power flows are indicated. In case 1 all network voltage and current limits 
are observed. As the generators are not operating, power flows from the HV 
to the MV side of the distribution network.  
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Figure 3.3 - Case 1  Operation of the distribution network with the highest transformer tap on the 
HV side, maximum load and generators not operating 
Figure 3.4 shows the operation of the distribution network in case 2. 
 
Figure 3.4 - Case 2  Operation of the distribution network with the lowest transformer tap on the 
HV side, no load and generators operating at maximum output 
In case 2 all network voltage and current limits are respected. Active 
power flows from the MV to the HV side, while reactive power flows in the 
opposite direction due to the reactive losses. If losses were not considered, 
power flowing through the substation transformer would reach the 
transformer capacity. This way, no further generation can connect with firm 
access rights. 
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3.3.2 - Technical possibility of connecting additional generation 
capacity 
The operation of the distribution network in case 2 (transformer operating 
at its lowest tap on the HV side, no loads, generators operating at maximum 
output power with unity power factor) is extended to 24 hours, see 
Figure 3.5. The time granularity considered is one hour. The consumption of 
all loads is represented by a typical winter consumption profile [114], with a 
fixed power factor of 0.95 (inductive). The total load consumption at 
8.30 a.m. is 5.7 MVA, as indicated in Table 3.1. The maximum consumption of 
the loads during the 24 hours is 7.3 MVA. The production of GenA follows the 
availability of wind. GenB schedules its production according to the price of 
electrical energy shown in Figure 3.5. The price of electrical energy 
considered was obtained in [115]. Both generators receive their income 
according to this price of electrical energy (no feed-in tariff schemes are 
considered). GenB does not produce between hours 0 and 8 because its costs 
of operation are higher than the price of electrical energy. GenB produces 
reactive power between hours 9 to 21. In Portugal, MV-connected generators 
below 6 MW of installed capacity must produce an amount of reactive power 
equal to 30% of their active power produced on peak hours (from 8 a.m. to 
10 p.m.) [113].  
During the 24 hours of operation considered, the power flowing through 
the distribution transformer is significantly below the rated capacity. 
Additional electrical energy could be produced on the MV side of the 
distribution network if further generation capacity was connected.  
3.4 - Connection of generators without firm access rights 
The connection of two other independent generators to the MV 
distribution network is considered (see Figure 3.6). Generator GenC 
connected to the network on busbar B8 and has an installed capacity of 
4 MVA. Generator GenD connected last (on busbar B5) and has an installed 
capacity of 3 MVA. The installed capacities of generators GenC and GenD 
were obtained following cost-benefit analyses, available in Appendix A. GenC 
is a dispatchable generator (thermal generator) and GenD is a 
non-dispatchable generator (wind generator). 
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Figure 3.5 - Operation of the distribution network during 24 hours, with the generators producing and with a typical load curve 
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Figure 3.6 - Distribution network with the four generators (GenA and GenB are firm connected, 
GenC and GenD have no firm access rights) 
As the connection of further generation with firm access rights is not 
possible, both GenC and GenD agreed to connect without firm access rights. 
Generators connected without firm access rights are constrained off on a 
“last-in, first-off” basis when there is inadequate capacity in the export 
circuit. 
3.4.1 - Minimum cost operation of the distribution network 
The distribution network of Figure 3.6 is operated with minimum cost if 
the generators with lower costs of operation are scheduled first. An AC 
optimal power flow (AC OPF) is run in the distribution network of Figure 3.6. 
The objective function is the minimisation of the costs of producing active 
power. Matlab-based package MATPOWER is used to run the AC OPF [116]. 
The distribution transformer tap is adjusted manually. Generation and load 
consumption data of hour 23 are considered (data shown in Figure 3.5). All 
generators are able to operate up to their rated powers and operate with 
unity power factor. GenA and GenD have no operation costs. The operation of 
GenB and GenC costs 35€ per MWh produced. Generators located upstream 
Valpaços substation are more expensive than GenB and GenC. The total load 
consumption is 6.04+j1.98 MVA. The results of the AC OPF are given in 
Figure 3.7. Full details of the AC OPF implementation are provided in 
Appendix B. 
The distribution network is operated with the minimum cost of 272.3€ in 
hour 23, that corresponds to the cost of operating generators GenB and GenC. 
GenA, GenC and GenD produce at full output power and GenB is constrained 
off to meet the transformer capacity limit. However, GenB was connected 
with firm access rights so it should not be curtailed. Therefore, the minimum 
cost schedule of the distribution network cannot be implemented due to the 
order of connection of the generators. 
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Figure 3.7 - Operation of the distribution network with the four generators in hour 23, with 
minimisation of the costs of producing active power (AC OPF) 
3.4.2 - Operation of the generators connected without firm access 
rights 
The operation of the distribution network during 24 hours (as described in 
section 3.3.2) is updated to consider generators GenC and GenD. The time 
granularity considered is one hour. GenC schedules its production according 
to the price of electrical energy shown in Figure 3.8 (same as in Figure 3.5). 
GenC does not produce between hours 0 and 8 because its costs of operation 
are higher than the price of electrical energy. The production of GenD follows 
the availability of wind. Both GenC and GenD are required to produce an 
amount of reactive power equal to 30% of their active power produced 
between 8 a.m. and 10 p.m., as their installed capacity is below 6 MW. 
In hours 9, 13, 22 and 23, the production of the generators exceeds the 
capacity limit of the transformer. GenD is curtailed to meet this excess, see 
Figure 3.8. GenD is curtailed because it was the last generator to be 
connected. GenD only produces when wind comes available, so its curtailed 
power is lost.  
Comparing the operation in hour 23 of Figure 3.8 with the results of the AC 
OPF in hour 23 (given in Figure 3.7), the cost of operating the distribution 
network is 315€ while with the AC OPF is 273€. This difference corresponds to 
the additional cost of operating generators GenB and GenC at full output 
power.  
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Figure 3.8 - Operation of the distribution network during 24 hours, with the four generators producing and with a typical load curve
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3.5 - Summary 
Permission to connect a generator to the distribution system is generally 
obtained on the basis that the generator’s effect is limited and that the 
network voltages and currents remain acceptable at all times. This firm 
access connection policy limits the capacity of generation that can be 
connected.  
Generators may be allowed to connect to distribution networks above the 
limit defined by the firm access connection policy. When there is inadequate 
capacity in the network, the non-firm generators are constrained off on the 
basis of “last-in, first-off” curtailment. Only the order of connection of the 
generators is taken into account. Different costs of operation and ability to be 
dispatched are not considered. Thus, the firm access connection policy does 
not maximise the economic value of the generators. 
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Chapter 4 - Coordination of independent 
distributed generators  
4.1 - Introduction  
This chapter first formulates the coordination of independent distributed 
generators. The coordination of independent distributed generators is 
presented as an alternative Principle of Access to the networks when non-firm 
access is allowed. The coordination of generators aims to maximise the 
income received by the generators. An Aggregator schedules the generators 
according to their costs of operation and abilities to be dispatched without 
exceeding the capacity limit of the constrained circuit. Additional income is 
obtained by the generators for the additional energy sold and by the 
substitution of expensive generators by cheaper ones. The income originated 
in coordination is allocated to all generators taking into account their 
electricity output and technology. This is done via an income-sharing 
mechanism based on cooperative game theory. An assessment of the 
willingness of the dispatchable generators to participate in the coordination is 
also presented.  
4.2 - The coordination methodology 
Operators of distribution networks limit the connection of generation in 
order to ensure acceptable voltages and currents at all times. However, to 
make projects more economically attractive, owners of distributed generator 
schemes often wish to increase the size of their generators. Also, new 
developers show interest in connecting to distribution networks even without 
having firm access rights of connection. “Last-in, first-off” operation is used 
by operators of distribution networks to curtail generation when the power 
limit of their circuits is exceeded. This rule only takes into account the order 
of connection of the generators.  
The coordination of independent distributed generators connected to the 
same circuit schedules generators according to their different costs of 
operation and ability to be dispatched. The coordination aims to maximise 
the income received by the generators without exceeding the power limit of 
the circuit. The coordination is operated by an Aggregator, run by the 
generators. Generators are scheduled so as to benefit from their different 
costs of operation and abilities to be dispatched when network constraints 
occur. The generators considered are assumed to be connected on a 
“must-run” basis, following an European Directive for renewable and low 
carbon generation [117]. In this Directive is expressed the interest in 
maximising energy export from these forms of generation. When network 
constraints occur, the coordination sets the productions of these generators 
so as to allow cheaper generators to run first and maximise electricity export 
from all generators. The additional income originated (when compared to 
“last-in, first-off” operation) is allocated to all generators taking into account 
their amount of electricity produced and type of technology. This is done 
Chapter 4 – Coordination of independent distributed generators 
50 
 
using cooperative game theory, which provides tools for the equitable 
allocation of an amount obtained in a coalition. Generators are then able to 
increase their income when compared to “last-in, first-off” operation and 
have an economic incentive to be operated in a coordinated manner. 
The operation of the Aggregator is summarised as follows:  
 The dispatchable generators change their output power to allow the 
non-dispatchable generators to operate; 
 The dispatchable generators operate in hours of reduced output of the 
non-dispatchable generators only if their operating costs are lower 
than the income received in those hours; 
 The non-dispatchable generators are curtailed when the circuit rating 
limit is still exceeded;  
 “Last-in, first-off” curtailment is used when the costs of operation of 
the generators are the same.  
 The generators receive their income as determined by an 
income-sharing mechanism based on cooperative game theory. The 
electricity output and technology of each generator are considered. 
The assumptions and limitations of the coordination are given in section 
4.2.1 and the operation of the Aggregator is detailed in section 4.2.2. 
4.2.1 - Assumptions and limitations of the coordination 
In this study, the coordination of independent distributed generators is 
formulated according to the following assumptions and limitations: 
Related to the distribution network 
• The distribution network considered is a two-busbar network; 
• Losses are not considered – no voltage drop; 
• The distribution circuit rating is fixed;  
• The only network constraint is the rating of the distribution circuit; 
Related to the distributed generators 
• There are dispatchable and non-dispatchable generators connected; 
• The capacity connected is higher than the rating of the circuit; 
• The generators may be required by network regulations to produce 
reactive power; 
• The generators are owned by independent producers; 
Related to the local load 
• The load is not controllable; 
• The load operates with a constant power factor; 
• The load profile is estimated by load forecasting; 
Related to the optimisation 
• The coordination optimises the production of electricity; 
• The generators are considered to be price takers; 
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• The forecasts considered (available power of the non-dispatchable 
generators, price of electrical energy and load consumption) are 
entirely reliable; 
• The dispatchable generators have fuel and start-up costs; 
• No costs of operation of the non-dispatchable generators are 
considered; 
• The costs of forecasting and telecommunication are not considered; 
Losses are not considered when scheduling the generators in the 
coordination methodology. This is because a method to apportion the losses 
caused/avoided by each generator (e.g. as presented in [118, 119]) and 
respective income reconciliation (pay or be paid for losses caused/avoided) 
has not been adopted. The level of losses in the distribution network varies 
with the load conditions, network parameters and configuration (including 
location and order of connection of the generators), and the output of the 
generators. Losses in the distribution network may grow or reduce with the 
amount of generation connected. If losses were considered, the schedule of 
the generators in coordination and respective allocation of the additional 
income would be dependent on the level of losses in the distribution network. 
Ultimately, generators would have to pay or be paid respectively a 
compensation for the increased or decreased amount of losses in the network 
they caused (e.g. using a method as proposed in [118, 119]). 
As in this work no losses are considered in the distribution network for 
determining the schedule of the generators in coordination, the distribution 
network may be reduced to a two busbar equivalent model. This two busbar 
network has the generators and the load connected to one busbar 
interconnected with the rest of the network via the distribution circuit that 
limits generation export. 
4.2.2 - Operation of the Aggregator 
The Aggregator uses the following parameters for the coordination of 
distributed generators (see Figure 4.1): distribution circuit rating; operating 
limits of the generators; fuel and start-up costs of the dispatchable 
generators; the order of connection of the generators. The operation of the 
Aggregator is described as follows: 
(1) The Aggregator receives from the generators their anticipated outputs 
and the amount of time that the dispatchable generators can produce 
continuously at full output power. The non-dispatchable generators make 
their projections based on power forecasts. The dispatchable generators 
make their projections considering the prediction of the price of electrical 
energy and any need to produce heat;  
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Figure 4.1 - The Aggregator operating the coordination of distributed generators 
(2) The Aggregator assesses whether the circuit rating is exceeded by the 
anticipated outputs by considering an estimation of the load. If the limit is 
not exceeded, the Aggregator accepts the anticipated outputs and takes no 
further action. If the limit is exceeded, the Aggregator runs an optimisation 
algorithm to schedule the dispatchable generators, as described in point (3). 
(3) The optimisation algorithm has an objective function (equation (4.1)) 
to maximise the income of the generators for selling electricity (variable F). 
The decision variables are the active power outputs of the distributed 
generators, P, and the binary variables that indicate the on/off state of the 
dispatchable generators, u, in each time step h of the optimisation. 
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The first term of equation (1) is the income of the dispatchable generators 
and the second term is the income of the non-dispatchable generators. d is 
the index of the dispatchable generators and DIS is the total number of 
dispatchable generators; n_d is the index of the non-dispatchable generators 
and N_DIS is the total number of non-dispatchable generators; w is a weight 
to enforce the order of access to the network when the costs of operation of 
the generators are the same; H is the time span of the optimisation; ρ is the 
price of electrical energy; Fuel and Start are the terms for the fuel and 
start-up costs of the dispatchable generator d and are given by equation (4.2) 
and equation (4.3), respectively [63]: 
h
dd
h
d
h
d PfcuFuel   
  1;0max  hdhddhd uusuStart  
fcd and sud are the fuel and start-up costs of the dispatchable generator d.  
The constraints of the optimisation algorithm are the apparent power limit 
of the distribution circuit (constraint (4.4)), the reactive power requirements 
of the generators (equations (4.5) and (4.6)), the operating limits of the 
generators (constraints (4.7) and (4.8)), the amount of electrical energy that 
(4.1) 
(4.3) 
(4.2) 
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the dispatchable generators can produce (constraint (4.9)) and the power 
factor of the load (equation (4.10)). 
Apparent power limit of the distribution circuit 
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Reactive power requirements of the generators 
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Operating limits of the generators 
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Power factor of the load 
 cos hh SloadPload  
Q is the reactive power output of the generators;  is the phase angle 
between current and voltage; i and j are different time steps within the time 
span of the optimisation H; S_min refers to the minimum output powers of 
the generators; S_max is the rated power of the dispatchable generator d; 
S_ant is the anticipated power output of the non-dispatchable generator n_d; 
TFull is the amount of time that the dispatchable generator d can produce 
continuously at full output power. 
(4) The outcome of the optimisation is the coordinated output of the 
generators that maximises the system income and does not exceed the circuit 
rating.  
The coordination of independent distributed generators assumes a 
price-based mechanism/incentive that remunerates the generators for their 
production is already in place. This pricing mechanism is not determined or 
altered by the Aggregator. In this work, for illustration purposes, the spot 
price of the Iberian Electricity Market (Portuguese side) is used to evaluate 
the coordination methodology. Using this pricing signal, generators are 
scheduled by the Aggregator to maximise their production of electricity.  
Some generators would not have an economic incentive to operate in 
coordination if their income came directly from the electricity they produce. 
Dispatchable generators connected without firm access rights would see their 
income reduced, as they are scheduled to operate in hours of lower price of 
(4.4) 
(4.8) 
(4.9) 
(4.7) 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.10) 
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electrical energy. Generators connected with firm access rights would not 
have any incentive to provide their anticipated outputs to the Aggregator. 
Therefore, the income received by each generator is determined using a 
mechanism based on cooperative game theory. Generators are paid what they 
would receive in “last-in, first-off” operation (i.e., without coordination) plus 
a share of the additional income obtained in coordination. The 
income-sharing mechanism is detailed in section 4.3. 
4.3 - Sharing the additional income obtained in coordination 
Additional income is obtained from the coordinated operation of the 
generators. This additional income is the result of: i) changing the output of 
the dispatchable generators (with higher costs of operation) to let the 
non-dispatchable generators operate; ii) asking the dispatchable generators to 
operate in hours of reduced output of the non-dispatchable generators 
(additional electricity production). The Aggregator allocates this additional 
income using a mechanism based on cooperative game theory. The amount of 
electrical energy produced and the type of each generator are considered. 
Each generator receives an allocation of the additional income in addition to 
the income they would have received in “last-in, first-off” operation. The 
income-sharing mechanism is explained in section 4.3.1. An assessment of the 
willingness of the dispatchable generators to participate in the coordination is 
presented in section 4.3.2. 
4.3.1 - Income-sharing mechanism 
The coordination of distributed generators produces a system 
income (SINC) given by equation (4.11). 
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The system income determined by equation (4.11) is greater than the sum 
of the income received by the generators in “last-in, first-off” operation. The 
difference between these two values is the additional income obtained in 
coordination,  (see equation (4.12)).  
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The suffix _lifo in equation (4.13) refers to the values of the variables in 
“last-in, first-off” operation. 
The Aggregator distributes the additional income considering the 
coordination as a cooperative game with transferable utility. The additional 
income is the worth of the coalition of all generators. The core of this 
cooperative game is the set of allocations that meet three criteria: (i) the 
additional income is entirely allocated; (ii) all generators receive a greater 
income in coordination in comparison to “last-in, first-off” operation; (iii) the 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
(4.13) 
Chapter 4 – Coordination of independent distributed generators 
55 
 
coalition of all generators provides a greater income for any generator when 
compared to the income it would have received in a partial coalition 
(coalitions that do not include all generators). The generators are unable to 
form partial coalitions. This is because they would need to know the 
anticipated outputs of the generators outside the coalition and the estimation 
of load consumption to schedule their own production. Therefore, the 
criterion iii) is always met. Any allocation inside the core provides all 
generators an economic incentive to operate in coordination. 
The core of this cooperative game can be a large set of allocations. Each 
of these allocations gives different economic incentives to the generators. So, 
the Aggregator chooses a single allocation from the core using 
equation (4.14). This allocation is determined by weighting the amount of 
electrical energy produced and the type of each generator. Generators at 
distribution level normally apply for a connection on the basis of the 
availability of local primary resources. In order to maximise the economic 
return of their projects, generators seek the cheapest point of connection to 
the distribution network. This point of connection, determined by the 
network operator, is normally the closest possible to the generator’s site. 
Therefore, connection to other sections of the distribution network (if 
allowed by the network operator) to benefit from larger allocations of 
additional income is likely to affect the economic viability of the generators.  
The type of each generator is differentiated using dimensionless 
technology coefficients (coef), agreed beforehand by the generators. The 
coefficients are reported to the Aggregator before its first operation. These 
coefficients are not expected to be modified unless an agreement between 
the generators to periodically revise them has been made. The coefficients 
are likely to be based on the technology coefficients defined in existing 
subsidy regimes.  
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The income that each generator receives in coordination is given in 
equation (4.15). Each generator receives an allocation of the additional 
income in addition to the income it would have received in “last-in, first-off” 
operation. 
(4.14) 
Chapter 4 – Coordination of independent distributed generators 
56 
 
   
   













DISNdnδalloclifoPρincome
DISdδallocStart_lifoFuel_lifolifoPρincome
dn
H
h
h
dn
h
dn
d
H
h
h
d
h
d
h
d
h
d
__,_
,_
_
1
__
1   
The modification of the coefficients alters the amount of additional 
income allocated to each generator. This affects the income received by each 
generator in coordination. However, regardless of the defined coefficients the 
allocations will still remain in the core. This means that the additional income 
originated is allocated in full and: 
- the generators increase their income in coordination when compared to 
individual operation (“last-in, first-off” operation); 
- the generators receive a greater income with the coalition of all 
generators than with partial coalitions; 
Thus, all generators have an economic incentive to be operated in a 
coordinated manner. 
4.3.2 - Assessment of the willingness of the dispatchable generators to 
participate in the coordination 
The dispatchable generators are interested in participating in the 
coordination as long as their income continues to increase.  
Consider the case of a dispatchable generator d that reduces its 
production by one unit of electricity (i.e., 1 MWh) in period h to allow a 
non-dispatchable generator n_d to operate. The dispatchable generator is not 
able to schedule this unit of production in other period. Also, this decrease in 
production does not lead to an additional start-up cost. The alteration in the 
production of generators d and n_d is described by equation (4.16): 
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new refers to the value of the variables after the alteration. The 
alteration given in equation (4.16) modifies the additional income as shown in 
equation (4.17). 
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The additional income increases by the amount of the fuel cost of the 
dispatchable generator d with the alteration shown in equation (4.16). The 
dispatchable generator will only be interested to continue reducing its output 
to allow the non-dispatchable generator to produce if (see inequation (4.18)): 
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The ratio             
   ⁄  is greater than 1 at all times. When the relation 
described by inequation (4.19) is not met, the dispatchable generator d is no 
longer interested in continuing to reduce its production.  
4.4 - Application of the coordination of generators to a two-
busbar distribution network 
The coordination of independent distributed generators is evaluated on a 
two-busbar version of the distribution network introduced in Chapter 3. Four 
generators are connected to the distribution network: a non-dispatchable 
generator and a dispatchable generator connected with firm access rights; a 
dispatchable generator and a non-dispatchable generator connected without 
firm access rights. An equivalent of the local load is also connected to the 
distribution network. The evaluation is performed during a selected period of 
operation of 6 days. This period of operation represents a set of extreme 
cases of price of electrical energy, wind power and load consumption. The 
influence of the costs of operation of the dispatchable generator without firm 
access rights in the additional income is investigated. The allocation of the 
additional income obtained is reported. The willingness of the dispatchable 
generators to participate in the coordination is analysed. For this, different 
technology coefficients are considered. The results of the application of the 
coordination of generators to the two-busbar distribution network are 
discussed in the summary. 
4.4.1 - Modelling of the two-busbar equivalent of the typical 
distribution network 
The two-busbar network used to evaluate the coordination of distributed 
generators is illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
Generators GenA and GenB are generators connected with firm access 
rights. GenA is a wind generator (non-dispatchable) and GenB is a thermal 
generator (dispatchable). GenC and GenD are generators connected without 
firm access rights. GenC is a thermal generator and GenD is a wind generator. 
The parameters of the system are given in Table 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Two-busbar distribution network used to evaluate the coordination 
GenA 
Chapter 4 – Coordination of independent distributed generators 
58 
 
Table 4.1 – Parameters of the system 
Parameter Value Unit 
Power limit of the distribution circuit (Scircuit) 15 MVA 
Minimum output power of GenA and GenD (S_minA, S_minD) 0 MVA 
Operating limits of GenB ([S_minB; S_maxB]) [2; 5] MVA 
Operating limits of GenC ([S_minC; S_maxC]) [1.6; 4] MVA 
Fuel costs of GenB and GenC (fcB, fcC) 35 €/MWh 
Start-up costs of GenB and GenC (suB, suC) 100 € 
Load capacity (L_MV) 7.3 MVA 
Power factor of L_MV 0.95 (ind) - 
Both active and reactive power flows are considered in the application of 
the coordination to the two-busbar equivalent of the distribution network. 
This is to reflect the requirement set in the Portuguese Grid Code with 
respect to reactive power export in generators below 6 MW of installed 
capacity. For such generators, reactive power export should be 30% of the 
active power exported during peak hours (8 a.m. to 10 p.m.) [113]. 
Therefore, the generators below 6 MW of installed capacity (GenB, GenC and 
GenD) are required to produce reactive power as follows [113]: 
Peak hours (hours 8 to 22) 
Reactive power output must be equal to 30% of the active power output 
(tan = 0.3); 
Off-peak hours (hours 23 to 7) 
Reactive power output must be equal to zero; 
Losses in the two-busbar equivalent are neglected. The distribution 
transformer is substituted by a lossless circuit (circuit B1-B2) with the same 
power capacity, Scircuit. The local load is represented by an equivalent load, 
L_MV. 
4.4.2 - Description of the period of operation considered for evaluating 
the coordination of distributed generators 
The coordination of distributed generators is evaluated on a selected 
period of six days that represents a set of extreme cases of price of electrical 
energy, wind power and load consumption (see Tables 4.2 to 4.5 and 
Figures 4.3 to 4.5). 
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Table 4.2 - Selected period of operation used for the evaluation of the coordination 
Day Price of electrical energy Wind power Load  
Day 1 Large variation of price High wind power Winter load profile 
Day 2 Medium magnitude of price Medium wind power Winter load profile 
Day 3 High magnitude of price Low wind power Winter load profile 
Day 4 Large variation of price High wind power Summer load profile 
Day 5 Medium magnitude of price Medium wind power Summer load profile 
Day 6 High magnitude of price Low wind power Summer load profile 
 
Figure 4.3 - Three profiles of one day of price of electrical energy [120] 
Table 4.3 - Average price of electrical energy on each day of the selected period of operation 
Average price of electrical energy (€/MWh) 
Day 1, Day 4 Day 2, Day 5 Day 3, Day 6 
38.20 41.92 47.75 
 
Figure 4.4 - Three profiles of one day of wind power  
Table 4.4 - Average wind power on each day of the selected day of operation 
Average wind power (p.u.) 
Day 1, Day 4 Day 2, Day 5 Day 3, Day 6 
0.89 0.54 0.29 
 
Figure 4.5 - Two profiles of one day of load [114] 
Table 4.5 - Average load on each day of the selected period of operation 
Average load (p.u.) 
Days 1, 2 and 3 Days 4, 5 and 6 
0.81 0.72 
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The wind power data was obtained from the wind speed data (10-minute 
average series) of a Portuguese wind farm. This wind speed data was applied 
to the power curve of the wind turbine Vestas V80 [121]. Price data was 
obtained from the Iberian Electricity Market (Portuguese side) [120]. Wind 
power and price data were not collected on the same days (there is no 
correlation between data). Load data corresponds to the average 
consumption profiles of a working day in Portugal from 2004 to 2007, provided 
by the Portuguese Energy Services Regulator [114]. The load profiles were 
normalised by the maximum value observed in the winter load profile. Tables 
with the values of wind power, price of electrical energy and load in each 
hour of the selected period of operation are given in Appendix C. 
4.4.3 - Assessment of the coordination in the selected period of 
operation  
The following considerations are made for the evaluation of the 
coordination of distributed generators:  
 GenA and GenD follow wind power forecasts;  
 GenB and GenC predict their output following the given price of 
electrical energy;  
 GenB and GenC are able to operate at full output up to 16 hours;  
 Without coordination, the generators access to the network by their 
order of connection;  
 GenB and GenC have the same costs of operation. The costs of 
operation of GenA and GenD are nil. Therefore, the Aggregator uses 
weights (                      ) to enforce the order of 
connection of the generators in the coordinated operation.  
Tables with the output powers of the generators in each day of operation, 
without and with coordination, are available in Appendix D. 
Day 1, Day 4 
 Without coordination 
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the output powers of the generators considering 
winter (day 1) and summer load profiles (day 4), respectively. GenB and GenC 
do not produce between hours 0 and 8, because the price of electrical energy 
is lower than their costs of operation. GenB and GenC produce at full output 
in the other hours.  
There is an excess of power in the distribution circuit on both days, 
indicated by the shaded areas in Figures 4.6 and 4.7. The Aggregator 
determines this excess by considering the anticipated outputs of the 
generators and the estimation of load consumption. The excess is met by 
GenD, as it was connected last to the network (“last-in, first-off” operation). 
Since GenD is a wind generator, its curtailed power is lost.  
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Figure 4.6 - Output powers of the generators without coordination (day 1) 
 
Figure 4.7 - Output powers of the generators without coordination (day 4) 
With coordination 
The Aggregator schedules GenD to produce up to its available power and 
reduces GenC to meet the circuit limit. GenC is scheduled because it is a 
dispatchable generator connected without firm access rights. GenC is not able 
to operate in other hours because the price of electrical energy is lower than 
its costs of operation. However, GenC is able to store its production and 
release it when more convenient. The coordination leads to an additional 
income due to the exchange of a generator with higher costs of operation by 
a cheaper one. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the coordinated output of the 
generators with the winter (day 1) and the summer load profiles (day 4), 
respectively. 
 
Figure 4.8 - Coordinated output powers of the generators (day 1)  
 
Figure 4.9 - Coordinated output powers of the generators (day 4) 
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In Tables 4.6 and 4.7 is presented the electrical energy produced and the 
income of each generator without and with coordination, respectively for 
day 1 and day 4. GenC produces less in day 4 when compared to day 1, as the 
amount of load consumption is lower. 
Table 4.6 - Electrical energy produced and income received by each generator without and with 
coordination (day 1) 
  GenA GenB GenC GenD TOTAL 
WITHOUT 
COORDINATION 
Electrical energy 
produced (MWh) 
212.50 72.27 57.79 61.25 403.81 
Income received (€) 7511.63 1211.71 948.89 2153.94 11826.17 
WITH 
COORDINATION 
Electrical energy 
produced (MWh) 
212.50 72.27 55.88 63.16 403.81 
Income received (€) 7511.63 1211.71 938.20 2231.45 11892.98 
Table 4.7 - Electrical energy produced and income received by each generator without and with 
coordination (day 4) 
  GenA GenB GenC GenD TOTAL 
WITHOUT 
COORDINATION 
Electrical energy 
produced (MWh) 
212.50 72.27 57.79 58.50 401.06 
Income received (€) 7511.63 1211.71 948.89 2039.11 11711.33 
WITH 
COORDINATION 
Electrical energy 
produced (MWh) 
212.50 72.27 53.13 63.16 401.06 
Income received (€) 7511.63 1211.71 919.38 2231.45 11874.17 
The coordination leads to an additional income of 66.81€ in day 1 and 
162.84€ in day 4. The total amount of electricity produced is the same with 
and without coordination in both days. 
Day 2, Day 5 
 Without coordination 
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show the output powers of the generators 
considering a winter load profile (day 2) and summer load profile (day 5), 
respectively. 
  
Figure 4.10 - Output powers of the generators without coordination (day 2) 
 
Figure 4.11 - Output powers of the generators without coordination (day 5) 
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There is an excess of power in the distribution circuit in both days, 
indicated by the shaded areas in Figures 4.10 and 4.11. This excess is met by 
GenD, as in days 1 and 4.  
With coordination 
The Aggregator schedules GenD to produce up to its available power and 
GenC operates in other hours to avoid exceeding the circuit rating. 
Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the coordinated output powers of the generators 
with the winter (day 2) and the summer load (day 5) profiles, respectively. 
 
Figure 4.12 - Coordinated output powers of the generators (day 2) 
 
Figure 4.13 - Coordinated output powers of the generators (day 5) 
The electrical energy produced and the income of each generator (without 
and with coordination) in days 2 and 5 is given in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, 
respectively. GenC has to schedule more production in day 5 when compared 
to day 2, as the amount of load consumption is lower. The electricity 
produced by GenC without and with coordination is slightly different in both 
days. This is due to the change of production from hours without reactive 
power production requirements to hours when that is required. 
The coordination of distributed generators leads to an additional income of 
86.62€ in day 2 and 217.40€ in day 5. The additional income originated is due 
to the exchange of a generator with higher costs of operation by a cheaper 
one and the additional amount of electricity that was able to be produced. 
Table 4.8 - Electrical energy produced and income received by each generator without and with 
coordination (day 2) 
  GenA GenB GenC GenD TOTAL 
WITHOUT 
COORDINATION 
Electrical energy 
produced (MWh) 
129.50 78.43 62.78 47.49 318.20 
Income received (€) 5556.48 643.95 515.28 1992.22 8707.93 
WITH 
COORDINATION 
Electrical energy 
produced (MWh) 
129.50 78.43 62.67 49.56 320.16 
Income received (€) 5556.48 643.95 505.31 2088.68 8794.42 
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Table 4.9 - Electrical energy produced and income received by each generator with and without 
coordination (day 5) 
  GenA GenB GenC GenD TOTAL 
WITHOUT 
COORDINATION 
Electrical energy 
produced (MWh) 
129.50 78.43 62.76 44.46 315.15 
Income received (€) 5556.48 643.95 515.12 1847.13 8562.68 
WITH 
COORDINATION 
Electrical energy 
produced (MWh) 
129.50 78.43 62.58 49.56 320.07 
Income received (€) 5556.48 643.95 484.65 2088.68 8773.76 
Day 3, Day 6 
 Without coordination 
Figure 4.14 shows the output powers of the generators considering a 
winter load profile (day 3) and a summer load profile (day 6). The output 
powers of the generators are the same on both days. 
 
Figure 4.14 - Output powers of the generators on days 3 and 6 - no excess power observed in the 
distribution circuit 
In days 3 and 6 there is no excess power in the distribution circuit. 
Therefore, the generators produce according to their anticipated outputs and 
the Aggregator takes no further action. 
4.4.3.1 – Considering different costs of operation of GenC 
The influence of the costs of operation of GenC in the coordination of 
generators is investigated. The coordination is evaluated on the selected 
period of operation considering five different costs of fuel: 25, 30, 35 (the 
value used in the previous simulations), 40 and 45 € per MWh. The start-up 
cost is kept at 100€ per start-up. Figure 4.15 shows the additional income 
obtained in each day with the different costs of fuel of GenC. Points A (day 4, 
fuel cost= 30 €/MWh) and B (day 5, fuel cost= 45 €/MWh) are indicated for 
further analysis.  
 
Figure 4.15 - Additional income obtained on each day with different costs of fuel of GenC  
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Figure 4.16 shows the coordinated output powers of the generators in 
day 4, when the cost of fuel is 30€/MWh  point A. 
 
Figure 4.16 - Coordinated output powers of the generators in point A 
The output power of the generators is the same as shown in Figure 4.9, 
when the cost of fuel is 35 €/MWh. However, the additional income obtained 
is inferior: 140€. This is explained by the reduction in the difference of the 
costs of fuel of GenC and GenD, which diminishes the additional income.  
Figure 4.17 shows the output power of the generators on day 5, when the 
cost of fuel is 45€/MWh  point B. 
 
Figure 4.17 - Output powers of the generators in point B 
There is no excess power in the distribution circuit in this case. The cost of 
fuel of GenC is higher than the price of electrical energy almost all day, 
except in hours 0, 21 and 22. GenC produces in hour 0 because it is was 
already operating before (no start-up cost). GenC does not produce in hours 
21 and 22 because the income received would be inferior to the start-up cost. 
As the output powers of the generators do not exceed the distribution circuit 
rating, there is no coordination and the additional income is nil.  
Figure 4.18 shows the additional income obtained on the selected week of 
operation with the different costs of fuel of GenC. 
 
Figure 4.18 - Additional income obtained on the selected week of operation with different costs of 
fuel of GenC 
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Figure 4.18 shows that, for this two-busbar distribution network and with 
the data and assumptions considered, the coordination of distributed 
generators has greater value when the cost of fuel of GenC is 35 €/MWh. 
4.4.4 - Allocation of the additional income to the generators 
The income of the generators is higher when they coordinate their output 
powers, in comparison to “last-in, first-off” operation. However, if the 
income received by each generator came directly from its electrical energy 
produced: GenA and GenB would receive the same as in “last-in, first-off” 
operation; GenC would receive less; and GenD would receive more. GenA and 
GenB would have no economic incentive to provide their anticipated outputs 
to the Aggregator. This way, GenA, GenB and GenC would prefer to maintain 
“last-in, first-off” operation. 
Then, the additional income obtained in coordination is allocated using a 
cooperative game with transferable utility. The technology coefficients used 
are the ones used in Portugal for the remuneration of renewable 
generators [122]. The formula to remunerate renewable generators contains a 
coefficient that differentiates the type of generation. The technology 
coefficients used are shown in Table 4.10. 
Table 4.10 - Technology coefficients used in the income-sharing mechanism [122] 
 GenA GenB GenC GenD 
Technology 
coefficient 
4.6 8.2 8.2 4.6 
Technology Wind 
Non-CHP biomass 
(forestry residues) 
Non-CHP biomass 
(forestry residues) 
Wind 
The allocations of the additional income chosen by the Aggregator for each 
day, using equations (4.11) to (4.14), are given in Figures 4.19 to 4.22. The 
income received by each generator with the income-sharing 
mechanism (equation (4.15)) is given in Tables 4.11 to 4.14. A comparison 
with the income received by each generator in “last-in, first-off” operation is 
also provided. 
Day 1 
  
 
Figure 4.19 - Sharing of the additional income obtained on day 1 (66.87€) 
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Table 4.11 - Income received by each generator without coordination and with the income-sharing 
mechanism (day 1) 
  GenA GenB GenC GenD TOTAL 
WITHOUT 
COORDINATION 
Income 
received (€) 
7511.63 1211.71 948.89 2153.94 11826.17 
WITH 
COORDINATION 
(income-sharing 
mechanism) 
Income 
received (€) 
7539.80 1228.78 962.09 2162.31 11892.98 
Variation 
(+28.17€, 
+0.37%) 
(+17.07€, 
+1.41%) 
(+13.20€, 
+1.39%) 
(+8.37€, 
+0.39%) 
(+66.81€, 
+0.56%) 
Day 2 
  
  
Figure 4.20 - Sharing of the additional income obtained on day 2 (86.49€) 
Table 4.12 - Income received by each generator without coordination and with the income-sharing 
mechanism (day 2) 
  GenA GenB GenC GenD TOTAL 
WITHOUT 
COORDINATION 
Income 
received (€) 
5556.48 643.95 515.28 1992.22 8707.93 
WITH 
COORDINATION 
(income-sharing 
mechanism) 
Income 
received (€) 
5582.50 672.02 537.72 2002.18 8794.42 
Variation 
(+26.01€, 
+0.47%) 
(+28.07€, 
+4.36%) 
(+22.44€, 
+4.36%) 
(+9.96€, 
0.50 %) 
(+86.49€, 
+0.99%) 
Day 4 
  
  
Figure 4.21 - Sharing of the additional income obtained on day 4 (162.84€) 
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Table 4.13 - Income received by each generator without coordination and with the income-sharing 
mechanism (day 4) 
  GenA GenB GenC GenD TOTAL 
WITHOUT 
COORDINATION 
Income 
received (€) 
7511.63 1211.71 948.89 2039.11 11711.33 
WITH 
COORDINATION 
(income-sharing 
mechanism) 
Income 
received (€) 
7580.95 1253.74 979.77 2059.72 11874.17 
Variation 
(+69.32€, 
+0.92%) 
(+42.03€, 
+3.47%) 
(+30.88€, 
+3.25%) 
(+20.61€, 
+1.01%) 
(+162.84€, 
+1.39%) 
Day 5 
  
  
Figure 4.22 - Sharing of the additional income obtained on day 5 (211.08€) 
Table 4.14 - Income received by each generator without coordination and with the income-sharing 
mechanism (day 5) 
  GenA GenB GenC GenD TOTAL 
WITHOUT 
COORDINATION 
Income 
received (€) 
5556.48 643.95 515.12 1847.13 8562.68 
WITH 
COORDINATION 
(income-sharing 
mechanism) 
Income 
received (€) 
5619.99 712.51 569.83 1871.43 8773.76 
Variation 
(+63.51€, 
+1.14%) 
(+68.56€, 
+10.65%) 
(+54.71, 
+10.62%) 
(+24.30€, 
+1.32%) 
(+211.08€, 
+2.47%) 
All generators increase their income when the income-sharing mechanism 
is used. The generators connected with firm access rights, GenA and GenB, 
increase their income despite not being scheduled. This is because the other 
generators cannot be scheduled without information about the anticipated 
outputs of GenA and GenB. So, GenA and GenB are rewarded for 
communicating their anticipated outputs to the Aggregator. 
4.4.4.1 – Willingness of the dispatchable generators to participate in the 
coordination 
The effect in the additional income of GenC of its marginal decrease in 
production (-1 MWh) to allow a marginal increase in the production of GenD 
(+1 MWh) in day 1 is evaluated. GenC is not able to schedule its production in 
other hours of that day because the price of electrical energy is lower than its 
costs of operation. The output power of the other dispatchable generator 
(GenB) is not altered.  
Figure 4.23 shows the additional income received by GenC when its 
production is reduced to allow the production of the same amount of 
30.08%
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25.95%
11.51%
Additional income= 211.08€
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electricity by GenD. The reference point of the x-axis (PC, PD) is the output 
power of the two generators in coordination as reported in Table 4.6 
(PC= 55.88 MWh, PD= 63.16 MWh). In Figure 4.23 is also shown how the 
additional income varies with different sets of technology coefficients. The 
sets of technology coefficients considered are: 
- The coefficients defined in the Portuguese legislation (same as adopted 
in section 4.4.4 and shown in Table 4.10); 
- Coefficients of the same value for all generators (no distinction); 
- Coefficients of the dispatchable generators are three times the 
non-dispatchable generators’ (coefB= coefC= 3.coefA= 3.coefD); 
- Coefficients of the non-dispatchable generators are three times the 
dispatchable generators’ (coefA= coefD= 3.coefB= 3.coefC); 
  
Figure 4.23 - Effect in the additional income of GenC of its reduction to allow GenD to produce, 
considering different technology coefficients 
The additional income of GenC increases when its production is reduced to 
allow GenD to produce. This increase occurs with every set of technology 
coefficients considered. Thus, all other generators are willing to participate 
in the coordination. 
4.5 - Summary  
The coordination of independent distributed generators has been 
evaluated. The evaluation has been performed on a two-busbar distribution 
network. A period of operation was selected, representing different cases of 
wind power, price of electrical energy and load consumption. 
The coordination allows generators to maximise their income without 
exceeding the power limit of the distribution circuit. The allocation of the 
additional income allows all generators to increase their income. The 
additional income is greater when the dispatchable generators reduce their 
output to allow the non-dispatchable generators to operate and are able to 
schedule their production in other hours. In some hours the dispatchable 
generators are not able to schedule all their production to allow the 
non-dispatchable generators to produce. This is because then their costs of 
operation are higher than the price of electricity. 
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The share of additional income received by each generator is added to 
what they would receive in “last-in first-off” operation (i.e., without 
coordination). Generators with firm access rights receive more and thus have 
an incentive to be operated in a coordinated manner. Generators without 
firm access rights are able to increase their income when compared to “last-
in, first-off” operation. Therefore, considering different costs of operation 
and allocations of the additional income, all generators are able to improve 
the return of their projects when compared to the return they would have if 
“last-in, first-off” operation were in place.  
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Chapter 5 - Coordinating generators and 
controllable load 
5.1 - Introduction  
The coordination of generators and controllable load aims to maximise the 
income of the generators. A controllable load has flexibility to shift at least 
part of its consumption. The Aggregator shifts the consumption of the 
controllable load to allow the generators to maximise their production. 
Additional income is obtained from: i) the additional energy that the 
generators are able to produce; ii) the change of production to hours with a 
higher price of electrical energy. The additional income is allocated to the 
generators and the controllable load. A bargaining approach of game theory is 
used to set this allocation. The coordination of generators and controllable 
load is evaluated considering different cases of load flexibility and capacity. 
5.2 - Integration of a controllable load in the coordination 
The objective of the coordination of generators and controllable load is to 
maximise the income of the generators. In the coordination of independent 
distributed generators described in Chapter 4, load was considered not to be 
controllable. Thus, generators produced up to the limit of the distribution 
circuit and the load was considered to be determined. In the coordination of 
generators and controllable load, the controllable load is asked to shift its 
consumption to: i) allow generators to produce additional electricity; ii) allow 
generators to change their production to hours of higher price of electrical 
energy. The operation of the Aggregator in the coordination of generators and 
controllable load has two stages (see Figure 5.1):  
 first, generators are scheduled as if load was determined (as described in 
Chapter 4);  
 second, if the production of the generators is not maximised, the 
Aggregator operates the coordination of generators and controllable load.  
The additional income obtained is allocated so that both generators and 
the load have an economic incentive to be operated in a coordinated manner. 
5.2.1 - Assumptions and limitations  
The coordination of generators and controllable load is formulated 
considering the following assumptions and limitations: 
• The controllable load is not owned by any of the generators; 
• Without coordination with the generators, the controllable load 
schedules its flexible consumption in the hours of lower price;  
• Only the energy component is considered in the price paid by the load 
for buying electricity. Transmission/distribution charges, VAT and 
other costs are not considered. 
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Figure 5.1 – Operation of the Aggregator with the integration of a controllable load in the 
coordination 
5.2.2 - Operation of the Aggregator with the integration of the 
controllable load  
The Aggregator has an additional input and two additional parameters 
(marked with *) in the coordination of generators and controllable load, see 
Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2 – Inputs, parameters and outcomes of the Aggregator in the coordination of generators 
and controllable load 
The objective function maximises the income of the generators (        for 
the dispatchable generators and           for the non-dispatchable 
generators) considering the cost of shifting the consumption of the 
controllable load,        (see equations (5.1) to (5.4)). 
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Maximise the income of the generators considering the cost of shifting the load 
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The suffix      updates the value of the variables introduced in Chapter 4 
to the coordination of generators and controllable load. The decision 
variables are       ,       ,          and          . The new fuel and 
start-up costs of each dispatchable generator d are given in equations (5.5) 
and (5.6), respectively:  
h
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h
d
h
d newPfcnewunewFuel ___   
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Variable           is the consumption schedule of the controllable load 
after the coordination with the generators. L is the price paid by the 
controllable load for buying electricity.                 is the consumption 
schedule of the controllable load if there was no coordination with the 
generators. There are no weights in equation (5.1) to enforce the order of 
access to the network when the costs of operation of the generators are the 
same. When the costs of operation are the same, the Aggregator adjusts the 
generation schedule after the optimisation to enforce the order of connection 
of the generators.  
The maximisation presented in equation (5.1) is subject to the apparent 
power limit of the distribution circuit (constraint (5.7)), the reactive power 
requirements of the generators (equations (5.8) and (5.9)), the operating 
limits of the generators (constraints (5.10) and (5.11)), the amount of 
electrical energy that the dispatchable generators are able to produce 
(constraint (5.12)), the power factor of the controllable load (equation 
(5.13)), the upper and lower bounds of flexible consumption (constraints 
(5.14) and (5.15)) and the maintenance of the same amount of consumption 
before and after the coordination with the generators (equation (5.16)). 
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              is the fraction of controllable load (value between 0 and 1) 
and           is the capacity of the controllable load. 
5.3 - Allocation of the additional income obtained with the 
coordination of generators and controllable load 
The coordination leads to an additional income when changing the 
production of the generators provides an income higher than the cost of 
changing the consumption of the load. The additional income obtained, 
     , is given by equation (5.17).  
SINCnewSINCnew  __  
         is the income obtained with the coordination of generators and 
controllable load (equation (5.1)) and SINC is the income obtained with the 
coordination of distributed generators (equation (4.11)). 
The allocation of the additional income       is made considering the 
coordination of generators and controllable load as a problem of Rubinstein 
bargaining [123]. Rubinstein bargaining is a non-cooperative game theory 
approach that addresses the negotiation between two players (in this case, 
the generators and the controllable load) that make alternating offers for 
sharing of a certain amount until one player accepts an offer. The offers 
made by each player are the allocation of the additional income      . 
According to the Rubinstein bargaining model, the generators and the 
controllable load should share the additional income       in equal parts 
(50% for each player) if: 
(5.11) 
(5.12) 
(5.10) 
(5.9) 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
(5.17) 
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• There is no devaluation of the amount to be shared after each round of 
negotiation. The negotiation occurs for a limited amount of time; 
• No player has interest in deliberately delaying the negotiation. Both have 
equal interest in the success of it; 
• The bargaining power of the players is equal, because they do not share 
privileged information. The Aggregator collects the parameters and inputs 
of the system without disclosing them to any of the players. 
As the aforementioned conditions are met, the additional income received 
by the generators,      , is given by equation (5.18):  
 newgen _5.0_    
  is the additional income obtained in the coordination of distributed 
generators, see equation (4.12). The new allocation of the additional income 
to each generator is given in equation (5.19).  




























  

  


  

  

1__
__,1_,_0
__,
___
_
_
,
___
__
_
_
1_
_
1
_
1
_
1_ 1
__
1
1
__
_
1
_
1_ 1
__
1
1
DISN
dn
dn
DIS
d
d
dnd
DIS
d
DISN
dn
H
h
h
dndn
H
h
h
d
h
dd
H
h
h
dndn
dn
DIS
d
DISN
dn
H
h
h
dndn
H
h
h
d
h
dd
H
h
h
d
h
dd
d
newallocnewalloc
DISNdnDISd,newallocnewalloc
DISNdn
newPcoefnewPnewucoef
newPcoef
newalloc
DISd
newPcoefnewPnewucoef
newPnewucoef
newalloc
 
The income received by the generators is given in equation (5.20), which is 
an update of equation (4.15) to include the terms           and      . 
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The income received by the controllable load after the coordination with 
the generators is given in equation (5.21).  
 newδLCOSTincomeL _5.0_   
The first term in equation (5.21),       , allows the load to cover the 
cost of changing its consumption.        is given by equation (5.4). The 
second term,            , represents the incentive of the load for its 
operation in a coordinated manner.   
5.4 - Example of the coordination with a controllable load on 
the two-busbar distribution network 
The coordination of generators and controllable load is evaluated on the 
two-busbar distribution network introduced in Chapter 4. The load connected 
to the distribution network is now considered to have flexible consumption. 
Different fractions of controllable load and load capacities are evaluated. The 
(5.20) 
(5.19) 
(5.21) 
(5.18) 
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evaluation is performed on the same selected period of operation. This period 
of operation represents a set of extreme cases of price of electrical energy, 
wind power and load consumption. The additional income obtained is 
quantified and the incentives for both generators and the load are reported.  
5.4.1 - Description of the price paid by the controllable load for buying 
electricity   
The price paid by the controllable load for buying electricity is different 
from the price of electrical energy. In each day of the period of operation, 
the load pays for electricity the price of electrical energy plus a margin of 6%, 
which corresponds to the supplier’s net margin1 (see Figures 5.3 to 5.5).  
Day 1, Day 4 
 
Figure 5.3 - Price paid by the controllable load for buying electricity on days 1 and 4 
Day 2, Day 5 
 
Figure 5.4 - Price paid by the controllable load for buying electricity on days 2 and 5 
  
                                         
1
 Value obtained from Ofgem (UK) for electricity consumers, September 2012 (available online: 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/39751/electricity-and-gas-supply-market-indicators-5-
september-2012.pdf – last accessed on 04/12/2012) 
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Day 3, Day 6 
 
Figure 5.5 - Price paid by the controllable load for buying electricity on days 3 and 6 
5.4.2 - Assessment on the selected period of operation 
The coordination is evaluated on the selected period of operation 
considering: 
• fractions of ±10% and ±100% load flexibility, considering a load capacity of 
7.3 MVA with a power factor of 0.95; 
• fractions of ±10% and ±100% load flexibility considering different load 
capacities (from no load to two times the installed capacities of the 
generators connected without firm access rights, GenC and GenD). 
The generation and consumption schedules determined by the Aggregator 
in each day of operation are provided in Appendix E. Generation and 
consumption schedules without coordination are also given. 
5.4.2.1 – Considering a ±10% fraction of load flexibility  
Day 1 
Without coordination of generators and controllable load 
The controllable load schedules its flexible consumption in the hours of 
lower price. Considering the price for buying electricity shown in Figure 5.3, 
the controllable load schedules its consumption as illustrated in Figure 5.6.  
 
Figure 5.6 - Consumption schedule of the controllable load with a ±10% fraction of load flexibility 
on day 1 (no coordination with the generators) 
The Aggregator schedules the generators but GenC is unable to produce all 
its available production in hours 9, 12, 13 and 15 (see the shaded areas in 
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Figure 5.7). This is because the distribution circuit limit was reached and 
GenC could not schedule its available production in hours 0 to 8. This is 
because the price of electrical energy then is lower than the operation costs 
of GenC. 
 
Figure 5.7 - Coordinated output of the generators with a ±10% fraction of load flexibility on day 1 
(without coordination with the controllable load) 
With coordination of generators and controllable load 
The Aggregator operates the coordination by changing the consumption of 
the controllable load to allow GenC to produce, see Figure 5.8. GenC still 
does not produce all its available production because the load is already at its 
maximum consumption in hour 9. 
 
Figure 5.8 - Consumption of the controllable load after the operation of the coordination of 
generators and controllable load, with a ±10% fraction of load flexibility on day 1 
The additional income obtained with the coordination,      , considering 
a ±10% fraction of flexible consumption on day 1 is given in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 – Additional income obtained with the coordination, with a ±10% fraction of load 
flexibility on day 1 
Income of the additional 
production of GenC (€) 
Increase of the electricity 
bill of the load,        (€) 
Additional 
income       (€) 
18.34 5.90 12.44 
Days 2 to 6 
On days 2 to 6, the additional income obtained is given in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 - Additional income obtained with the coordination, with a ±10% fraction of load 
flexibility on days 2 to 6 
Day Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 
Additional 
income       (€) 
0 0 8.90 0 0 
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On all days except day 4, the production of the generators is maximised 
after the operation of the coordination of distributed generators. Therefore, 
the coordination of generators and controllable load is not operated in those 
days. 
5.4.2.2 – Considering a ±100% fraction of load flexibility  
Day 1 
Without coordination of generators and controllable load 
The controllable load schedules its flexible consumption in the hours of 
lower price. Considering the price for buying electricity shown in Figure 5.3, 
the load schedules its consumption as illustrated in Figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5.9 - Consumption schedule of the controllable load with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
on day 1 (no coordination with the generators) 
The Aggregator schedules the generators, but GenB and GenC are unable 
to produce all their available production between hours 19 and 22 (see the 
shaded area in Figure 5.10). This is because the distribution circuit limit was 
reached and both GenB and GenC could not schedule their available 
production in hours 0 to 8. The price of electrical energy then is lower than 
the operation costs of GenB and GenC.  
 
Figure 5.10 - Coordinated output of the generators with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on day 1 
(without coordination with the controllable load) 
With coordination of generators and controllable load 
The Aggregator operates the coordination by changing the consumption of 
the controllable load to allow GenB and GenC to produce, see Figure 5.11.  
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Figure 5.11 - Consumption of the controllable load after the operation of the coordination of 
generators and controllable load, with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on day 1 
The consumption profile of the controllable load in coordination allows the 
generators to maximise their production. The additional income obtained 
with the coordination of generators and controllable load,      , considering 
a ±100% fraction of flexible consumption in day 1 is shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 - Additional income obtained with the coordination of generators and controllable load, 
with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on day 1 
Income of the additional 
production of GenB and GenC (€) 
Increase of the electricity 
bill of the load,        (€) 
Additional 
income       (€) 
461.17 315.66 145.51 
Day 2 
Without coordination of generators and controllable load 
The controllable load schedules its flexible consumption in the hours of 
lower price. Considering the price for buying electricity shown in Figure 5.4, 
the load schedules its consumption as illustrated in Figure 5.12. 
 
Figure 5.12 - Consumption schedule of the controllable load with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
on day 2 (no coordination with the generators) 
The Aggregator schedules the generators and they produce all their 
available production. However, GenC had to be turned off in hours 21 and 22 
to allow GenD to produce (see Figure 5.13). This leads to a start-up cost, 
which reduces the income obtained by the generators. 
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Figure 5.13 - Coordinated output of the generators with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on day 1 
(without coordination with the controllable load) 
With coordination of generators and controllable load 
The Aggregator operates the coordination by changing the consumption of 
the controllable load to maximise the production of the generators, see 
Figure 5.14. 
 
Figure 5.14 - Consumption of the controllable load after the operation of the coordination of 
generators and controllable load, with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on day 2 
The generation schedule after the coordination with the controllable load 
is shown in Figure 5.15. GenB is able to produce in the hours with higher price 
of electrical energy. GenC is not turned off at any time but still has to 
schedule part of its production off the hours with higher price of electrical 
energy.  
 
Figure 5.15 – Output powers of the generators after the coordination with the controllable load, 
with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on day 2 
The additional income obtained with the coordination,      , considering 
a ±100% fraction of flexible consumption on day 2 is given in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 - Additional income obtained with the coordination of generators and controllable load, 
with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on day 2 
Income for the rescheduling 
of GenB and GenC (€) 
Increase of the electricity 
bill of the load,        (€) 
Additional 
income       (€) 
274.12 135.18 138.94 
Day 3 
On day 3, the production of the generators is maximised after the 
operation of the coordination of distributed generators. Therefore, the 
coordination of generators with a controllable load is not operated. 
Days 4 to 6 
On days 4 to 6, the additional income obtained with the coordination is 
given in Table 5.5. In day 4, generators are not able to produce all their 
available production. This is because the cost of changing further 
consumption of the load was higher than the income originated by further 
increase in production. In day 5, GenC has still to schedule part of its 
production off the hours of higher price of electrical energy. In day 6, as in 
day 3, there is no operation of the coordination of generators and 
controllable load. 
Table 5.5 - Additional income obtained with the coordination of generators and controllable load, 
with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on days 4 to 6 
Day Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 
Additional 
income       (€) 
83.13 138.17 0 
5.4.2.3 – Considering different load capacities 
Figure 5.16 shows the additional income obtained with the coordination, 
      , considering different load capacities during the selected period of 
operation. Load capacities are presented in relation to the sum of the 
installed capacities of GenC and GenD,                 . Load 
capacity           varies from zero to the double of          . This is 
because the value of the coordination varies with the amount of generation 
capacity connected without firm access rights. Two fractions of load 
flexibility, ±10% and ±100%, are considered.  
 
Figure 5.16 – Additional income obtained with the coordination considering different fractions of 
controllable load and load capacities 
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With a ±10% fraction of load flexibility, there is additional income only 
when the load capacity is equal to the sum of the installed capacities of GenC 
and GenD. With a ±100% fraction of load flexibility, the additional income 
increases with the increase in load capacity. 
5.4.3 - Sharing the additional income obtained with the coordination of 
the generators and the controllable load 
The allocation of the additional income in days 1 and 2 are shown as 
follows. A ±100% fraction of load flexibility is considered. 
5.4.3.1 – Economic incentive for the generators 
Day 1, ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
The additional income received by the generators,      , is: 
    €80.37051.1455.004.298_5.0_  newgen   
The income received each generator, as defined by equations (5.19) 
and (5.20), is given in Table 5.6. A comparison with the results of “last-in, 
first-off” operation and the coordination of distributed generators (without 
coordination with a controllable load) is provided. 
Table 5.6 – Income received by each generator considering a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on 
day 1, considering: “last-in, first-off” operation; coordination of distributed generators; 
coordination of generators and controllable load 
 
Income of 
GenA (€) 
Income of 
GenB (€) 
Income of 
GenC (€) 
Income of 
GenD (€) 
TOTAL 
(€) 
LAST-IN, FIRST-OFF 
OPERATION (no coordination) 
7511.63 1211.71 810.16 1610.97 11144.47 
WITH COORDINATION 
(coordination of distributed 
generators) 
7642.27 1286.27 864.17 1649.80 11442.51 
WITH COORDINATION 
(coordination of generators 
and controllable load) 
7666.89 1305.83 885.43 1657.12 11515.27 
Day 2, ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
The additional income received by the generators,      , is: 
    €95.61194.1385.048.542_5.0_  newgen   
The income received by each generator is given in Table 5.7. A comparison 
with the results of “last-in, first-off” operation and the coordination of 
distributed generators (without coordination with a controllable load) is 
provided. 
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Table 5.7 - Income received by each generator considering a ±100% fraction of load flexibility on 
day 2, considering: “last-in, first-off” operation; coordination of distributed generators; 
coordination of generators and controllable load 
 
Income of 
GenA (€) 
Income of 
GenB (€) 
Income of 
GenC (€) 
Income of 
GenD (€) 
TOTAL  
(€) 
LAST-IN, FIRST-OFF 
OPERATION (no coordination) 
5556.48 643.94 328.96 1462.17 7991.55 
WITH COORDINATION 
(coordination of distributed 
generators) 
5719.93 819.89 469.33 1524.88 8534.03 
WITH COORDINATION 
(coordination of generators 
and controllable load) 
5740.42 842.53 487.81 1532.74 8603.50 
5.4.3.2 – Economic incentive for the controllable load 
Day 1, ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
The income received by the controllable load on day 1 after the 
coordination with the generators is:  
  €42.388)51.1455.0(66.315_5.0_  newδLCOSTincomeL  
Day 2, ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
The income received by the controllable load on day 2 after the 
coordination with the generators is: 
  €65.204)94.1385.0(18.135_5.0_  newδLCOSTincomeL  
5.5 - Summary  
The coordination of generators and controllable load has been evaluated 
on the two-busbar distribution network. The evaluation considered different 
load flexibility and capacity amounts during the selected period of operation. 
Results show limited benefit of the coordination when the load flexibility 
is small. The coordination has better results when the load is entirely 
flexible. Also, the value of the coordination increases with the increase in 
load capacity. The additional income obtained with the coordination is 
allocated to the generators and the controllable load. All generators receive a 
greater income if they coordinate with the controllable load. The controllable 
load is able to cover the increase of its electricity bill. In addition, it receives 
part of the additional income to incentivise its operation in a coordinated 
manner. 
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Chapter 6 - Coordinating non-dispatchable 
generators and energy storage systems 
6.1 - Introduction 
The coordination of independent non-dispatchable generators and energy 
storage systems connected to the same circuit is presented. The coordination 
aims to maximise the income received by the generators without exceeding 
the power limit of the circuit. The energy storage systems are asked to 
change their schedule to allow the generators to maximise their production. 
The coordination is operated by an Aggregator. Additional income is obtained 
from the coordination for the additional energy produced. This additional 
income is allocated to the generators and the energy storage systems using a 
bargaining approach of game theory – Rubinstein bargaining. 
6.2 - Coordination with energy storage systems 
The coordination of independent non-dispatchable generators and energy 
storage systems aims to maximise the income of the generators. The 
coordination is operated by an Aggregator, run by the generators and the 
energy storage systems. The operation of the Aggregator is summarised as 
follows:  
 The charging of the energy storage systems is scheduled to allow the 
generators to operate; 
 The discharging of the energy storage systems is operated in hours of 
reduced output of the generators; 
 The generators are curtailed when the circuit rating limit is still 
exceeded, on a “last-in, first-off” basis; 
 Additional income is obtained from additional energy production. The 
additional income obtained is allocated so that both generators and 
energy storage systems have an economic incentive to be operated in a 
coordinated manner.  
6.2.1 – Assumptions and limitations 
The coordination is formulated according to the same assumptions and 
limitations set in Chapter 4, with the exception of the following:  
Related to the distributed generators 
 Only non-dispatchable generators are considered; 
 The generators operate with unity power factor; 
Related to the energy storage systems 
 The energy storage systems are not owned by any of the generators; 
 Charging and discharging is performed according to the price of 
electrical energy; 
 The output of the energy storage systems can range from zero to the 
respective installed capacities; 
 Round-trip storage efficiency is considered to be 100%; 
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Related to the optimisation 
 The generators and energy storage systems are price takers; 
 The forecasts considered (available power of the non-dispatchable 
generators and price of electrical energy) are entirely reliable; 
 The non-dispatchable generators and the energy storage systems do not 
have costs of operation; 
6.2.2 – Operation of the Aggregator 
The Aggregator uses the following parameters for the coordination (see 
Figure 6.1): the order of connection to the network; the distribution circuit 
power capacity limit; operating limits of the generators and energy storage 
systems; the energy capacity and maximum number of daily charge/discharge 
cycles of each storage system.  
 
Figure 6.1 - The Aggregator operating the coordination of non-dispatchable generators and energy 
storage systems 
The operation of the Aggregator is described as follows: 
(1) The Aggregator receives from the generators their anticipated outputs 
and the anticipated charge/discharge schedule from the energy storage 
systems. Generators make their projections based on power forecasts. Energy 
storage systems make their projections considering the prediction of the price 
of electrical energy;  
(2) The Aggregator assesses whether the circuit rating is exceeded by the 
anticipated outputs. If the limit is not exceeded, the Aggregator accepts the 
anticipated outputs and takes no further action. If the limit is exceeded, the 
Aggregator runs an optimisation algorithm to schedule the generators and the 
energy storage systems, as described in step (3). 
(3) The optimisation algorithm has an objective function (Equation (6.1)) 
to maximise the income of the generators for producing 
electricity (variable F). The decision variables are the active power outputs of 
the generators and the energy storage systems in each time step h of the 
optimisation. P is the active power output of the generators. St_dis is the 
energy discharged by each energy storage system stor. St_ch is the energy 
charged by each energy storage system stor. 
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The first term of Equation (6.1) is the income of the non-dispatchable 
generators and the second term is the income of the energy storage systems. 
g is the index of the non-dispatchable generators; G and STOR are the total 
number of generators and energy storage systems, respectively; w is a weight 
to enforce the order of access to the network and favour the production of 
the generators in detriment of the discharge of the energy storage systems; H 
is the time span of the optimisation; ρ is the price of electrical energy. 
The constraints of the optimisation algorithm are: power limit of the 
distribution circuit (constraint (6.2)); operating limits of the generators 
(constraint (6.3)) and energy storage systems (constraints (6.4) and (6.5)); 
energy capacity limit of the energy storage systems (constraint (6.6)); limits 
for discharging (constraint (6.7)); and no charging and discharging in the same 
time step (constraint (6.8)). The discharge of the energy storage systems 
(given in constraint (6.5)) is limited by the operation of the generators: the 
generators are scheduled first, up to their anticipated power outputs,      ; 
then, the discharge of the energy storage systems is the minimum of the 
available capacity after scheduling the non-dispatchable generators and the 
maximum output power of the energy storage systems,   ̅. The maximization 
term max in constraint (6.5) prevents negative values in the discharge of the 
energy storage systems. 
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Chapter 6 – Coordinating non-dispatchable generators and energy storage systems 
88 
 
P is the minimum output power of the non-dispatchable generator g; P_ant 
is the anticipated power output of g, based on the power forecast; St is the 
minimum output power of the energy storage system stor;    is the maximum 
output power of stor; E_cap is the energy capacity limit of stor; nC is the 
maximum number of daily charge/discharge cycles of stor. 
(4) The outcome of the optimisation is the coordinated output of 
generators and energy storage systems that maximises the income of the 
generators and does not exceed the distribution circuit rating. 
6.3 - Application of the coordination to a two-busbar 
distribution network 
The coordination is evaluated on a two-busbar distribution network with 
two generators and an energy storage system connected. The evaluation is 
performed using a set of extreme cases of price of electrical energy and wind 
power. The impact on the additional income of different orders of connection 
to the network is analysed. Then, the evaluation is extended to a year of 
operation to assess the impact on the additional income of different installed 
capacities of the energy storage system. 
 
Figure 6.2 – Two-busbar distribution network used to evaluate the coordination 
6.3.1 - Modelling of the distribution network 
The two-busbar network used to evaluate the coordination is shown in 
Figure 6.2. Generator GenA is a wind generator connected with firm access 
rights. GenB is a wind generator connected without firm access rights. Energy 
storage system ES is connected without firm access rights. The installed 
capacities of the generators and energy storage system were determined 
following cost-benefit analyses. The parameters of the system are given in 
Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 - Parameters of the system 
Parameter Value Unit 
Power limit of the distribution circuit (Pcircuit) 15 MW 
Minimum output power of GenA and GenB (PA, PB) 0 MW 
Minimum charge/discharge limit of ES (StES) 0 MW 
Maximum charge/discharge limit of ES (  ̅ES) 4 MW 
Energy capacity of ES (E_capES) 5 [124] MWh 
Maximum number of daily charge/discharge cycles 
(nCES) 
1  
The weights w used on the objective function of the coordination are: 
       ;        ;       . 
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Figure 6.3 - Three profiles of one day of price of electrical energy [120] 
 
Figure 6.4 - Three profiles of one day of wind power  
6.3.2 - Description of the set of extreme cases of price and wind power 
The coordination is evaluated on a selected period of three days that 
represents extreme cases of price of electrical energy and wind power (see 
Table 6.2 and Figures 6.3 and 6.4).  
Price data was obtained from the Iberian Electricity Market (Portuguese 
side) [120]. The wind power data was obtained from the wind speed data 
(10-minute average series) of a Portuguese wind farm. This wind speed data 
was applied to the power curve of wind turbine Vestas V80 [121]. Price and 
wind power data were not collected on the same days (no correlation). 
Table 6.2 - Selected period of operation used for the evaluation of the coordination 
Day Price of electrical energy Wind power 
Day 1 Large variation of price High wind power 
Day 2 Medium magnitude of price Medium wind power 
Day 3 High magnitude of price Low wind power 
6.3.3 – Distribution network operation with extreme cases of price and 
wind power 
“Last-in, first-off” and coordinated operation of the generators and energy 
storage system are presented as follows. Two different orders of connection 
to the network are considered: GenB is connected last; ES is connected last.  
6.3.3.1 – “Last-in, first-off” operation 
GenB is connected last 
GenB is scheduled after GenA and ES have determined their anticipated 
outputs. 
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The output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in 
days 1 and 2 are shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. GenB is curtailed 
when the power limit of the distribution circuit is exceeded.  
 
Figure 6.5 - Output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in “last-in, first-off 
operation” when GenB is connected last (day 1) 
 
Figure 6.6 - Output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in “last-in, first-off 
operation” when GenB is connected last (day 2) 
Day 3 
The output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in day 3 
are shown in Figure 6.7. The distribution circuit limit is not exceeded. There 
is no energy curtailment. 
 
Figure 6.7 - Output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in “last-in, first-off 
operation” when GenB is connected last (day 3) 
ES is connected last 
ES is scheduled after GenA and GenB have determined their anticipated 
outputs. 
Days 1 and 2 
The output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in 
days 1 and 2 are shown in Figures 6.8 and 6.9, respectively. In day 2 
(Figure 6.9) it is assumed that ES comes fully charged from the previous 
24-hour period of operation. GenB is curtailed when the power limit of the 
distribution circuit is exceeded.  
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Day 3 
The output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in day 3 
are the same as shown in Figure 6.7. This is because the distribution circuit 
limit is not exceeded, as in the case when GenB is connected last. 
 
Figure 6.8 - Output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in “last-in, first-off 
operation” when ES connects last (day 1) 
 
Figure 6.9 - Output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in “last-in, first-off 
operation” when ES is connected last (day 2) 
6.3.3.2 – Coordinated operation of generators and energy storage systems 
The Aggregator schedules the charging of ES to hours when GenB is 
curtailed. Hours of higher price are selected first for charging. The 
discharging is set to hours of reduced output of GenA and GenB. This leads to 
an additional income, due to the additional electricity produced by GenB. 
Day 1 
The output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in 
coordination in day 1 are shown in Figure 6.10. ES changes its charging from 
hours 3 and 4 to hours 12, 13 and 15. The new charging hours are the hours of 
higher price when GenB was curtailed in “last-in, first-off” operation. This 
allows GenB to produce more electricity and originates an additional income. 
 
Figure 6.10 - Output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in coordination 
(day 1) 
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The electrical energy produced and the income of each generator and energy 
storage system in coordination in day 1 are presented in Table 6.3. 
Comparison with “last-in, first-off” operation is provided. 
Table 6.3 - Electrical energy produced and income of each generator and energy storage system 
with coordination and in “last-in, first-off” operation (day 1) 
   GenA GenB ES TOTAL 
WITH COORDINATION 
Electrical energy  
produced (MWh) 
255 89.54 5 349.54 
Income  
received (€) 
9013 3645 238 12896 
“LAST-IN, FIRST-
OFF” OPERATION 
GenB is 
connected last 
Electrical energy  
produced (MWh) 
255 86.76 5 346.76 
Income  
received (€) 
9013 3260 478 12751 
ES is connected 
last 
Electrical energy  
produced (MWh) 
255 88.36 5 348.36 
Income  
received (€) 
9013 3421 460 12894 
Day 2 
The output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in 
coordination in day 2 are shown in Fig. 6.11. The energy storage system 
changes its charging from hours 8 and 18 to hours 21 and 22. This is to allow 
GenB to produce in the hours of higher price when it was curtailed in “last-in, 
first-off” operation.  
The electrical energy produced and the income of each generator and 
energy storage system in coordination is presented in Table 6.4. It is again 
assumed that ES comes fully charged from the previous 24-hour period of 
operation. The negative income of ES in coordination means that the cost of 
charging is greater than the income received for the discharge. ES would have 
no income if it was paid according to its charge/discharge schedule in 
coordination. Thus, the income received by generators and energy storage 
system in coordination is determined using a bargaining mechanism of game 
theory. This gives both generators and energy storage systems an economic 
incentive to operate in a coordinated manner. 
Table 6.4 - Electrical energy produced and income of each generator and energy storage system 
with coordination and in “last-in, first-off” operation (day 2) 
   GenA GenB ES TOTAL 
WITH COORDINATION 
Electrical energy  
produced (MWh) 
155.4 73.7 5 234.1 
Income  
received (€) 
6668 3151 -21.31 9798 
“LAST-IN, FIRST-
OFF” OP. 
GenB is 
connected last 
Electrical energy  
produced (MWh) 
155.4 63.7 5 224.1 
Income  
received (€) 
6668 2645 63 9376 
ES is connected 
last 
Electrical energy  
produced (MWh) 
155.4 68.7 5 229.1 
Income  
received (€) 
6668 2898 42 9608 
6.4 - Allocation of additional income obtained in coordination  
The coordination of independent non-dispatchable generators and energy 
storage systems originates an income (INC) given by Equation (6.9). 
   
  

STOR
stor
H
h
h
stor
h
stor
h
G
g
H
h
h
g
h chStdisStρPρINC
1 11 1
__  (6.9) 
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Figure 6.11 - Output powers of the generators and the energy storage system in coordination 
(day 2) 
Income INC is greater than the income originated in “last-in, first-off” 
operation, INC_lifo (see Equation (6.10)). 
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Suffix _lifo in Equation (6.10) refers to “last-in, first-off” operation. The 
difference between INC and INC_lifo is the additional income obtained in 
coordination, , see Equation (6.11). This difference varies with the order of 
connection of the generators and energy storage systems in “last-in, first-off 
operation”.  
lifoINCINCδ _  
The allocation of   is made considering the coordination as a problem of 
Rubinstein bargaining [123], similarly as described in Chapter 5. In this case, 
the players are the sets of generators and energy storage systems. According 
to the Rubinstein bargaining model, the generators and energy storage 
systems share the additional income   equally (50% for each player). The 
additional income to be allocated by the generators,      , and the energy 
storage systems,     , is then given by Equation (6.12):  
  5.0__ stgen  
6.4.1 – Allocation amongst generators  
The part of       received by each generator    ,   , is determined in a 
similar manner as described in the coordination of independent distributed 
generators (Chapter 4, equation (4.14)), see equation (6.13). 
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6.4.2 – Allocation amongst energy storage systems  
The part of      received by each energy storage system           is 
calculated pro rata to the absolute amount of energy changed in 
coordination, see Equation (6.14). 
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6.5 - Sharing the additional income on the two-busbar 
distribution network example 
The coordination presented in section 6.3.3.2 originates an additional 
income in both days, as shown in Figure 6.12. The additional income is 
greater when GenB is connected last. This is because the amount of energy 
curtailed in “last-in, first-off” operation is greater than when ES is connected 
last.  
The additional income obtained in coordination is allocated as described by 
Equations (6.13) and (6.14) and added to what the generators and the energy 
storage system would receive in “last in, first-off” operation. GenA receives a 
greater income for communicating its anticipated output to the Aggregator. 
The income received by the generators and the energy storage system in days 
1 and 2 is given in Tables 6.5 to 6.8. Comparison with “last-in, first-off” 
operation is provided. As both generators are wind generators, they have the 
same technology coefficient coef.  
 
Figure 6.12 – Additional income  obtained in days 1 and 2 when: i) GenB is connected last; ii) ES is 
connected last 
Day 1 
Table 6.5 - Income received by each generator and energy storage system as determined by Eqs. 
(6.13) and (6.14) when GenB is connected last (day 1) 
  INCOME RECEIVED (€) 
GenB is connected last GenA GenB ES TOTAL 
With coordination – Equations (6.13) and (6.14) 9066.65 3278.85 550.50 12896 
“Last-in, first-off” operation 9013 3260 478 12751 
Table 6.6 - Income received by each generator and energy storage system as determined by 
Equations (6.13) and (6.14) when ES is connected last (day 1) 
  INCOME RECEIVED (€) 
ES is connected last GenA GenB ES TOTAL 
With coordination – Equations (6.13) and (6.14) 9013.74 3421.26 461 12896 
“Last-in, first-off” operation 9013 3421 460 12894 
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Day 2 
Table 6.7 - Income received by each generator and energy storage system as determined by 
Equations (6.13) and (6.14) when GenB is connected last (day 2) 
  INCOME RECEIVED (€) 
GenB is connected last GenA GenB ES TOTAL 
With coordination – Equations (6.13) and (6.14) 6811.12 2712.88 274 9798 
“Last-in, first-off” operation 6668 2645 63 9376 
Table 6.8 - Income received by each generator and energy storage system as determined by 
Equations (6.13) and (6.14) when ES is connected last (day 2) 
  INCOME RECEIVED (€) 
ES is connected last GenA GenB ES TOTAL 
With coordination – Equations (6.13) and (6.14) 6732.44 2928.56 137 9798 
“Last-in, first-off” operation 6668 2898 42 9608 
6.5.1 – Additional income obtained during one year of operation 
The coordination is operated during one year, in independent 24-hour 
periods with one hour time step. 
6.5.1.1 – Impact of different orders of connection to the network 
The additional income  obtained in coordination during one year is 
presented in Figure 6.13. Wind power data from the same Portuguese wind 
farm is used. Price data used is obtained from the Iberian Electricity Market 
(Portuguese side) from May 2010 to April 2011 [125].  
 
Figure 6.13 – Additional income  obtained during one year when: i) GenB is connected last; ii) ES is 
connected last 
The additional income obtained is greater when GenB is connected last. 
This is because of the greater amount of energy curtailed in “last-in, first-off” 
operation. In both orders of connection the coordination is operated 
approximately 25% of the year. The coordination is not operated in the rest of 
the year as the distribution circuit limit is not exceeded then.  
The income received by the generators and the energy storage system in 
the year of operation considered is given in Table 6.9. The additional 
income  during the year of operation is 18.03 k€ if GenB is connected last 
and 9.05 k€ if ES is connected last. 
Table 6.9 - Income received by each generator and energy storage system with coordination and in 
“last-in, first-off” operation during the year of operation considered 
  INCOME RECEIVED (k€) 
  GenA GenB ES TOTAL 
WITH COORDINATION – Equations (6.13) and (6.14) 1206.90 528.66 44.59 1780.15 
“LAST-IN, FIRST-OFF” 
OPERATION 
GenB is connected last 1203.78 516.63 41.71 1762.12 
ES is connected last 1203.78 527.26 40.06 1771.10 
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6.5.1.2 – Impact of different installed capacities of ES 
The additional income  obtained during one year of operation with 
different installed capacities of the energy storage system ES is shown in 
Figure 6.14. The energy capacity of ES is maintained as 5 MWh.  
The additional income obtained increases as the installed capacity of ES 
grows. The additional income obtained stops to increase when the installed 
capacity of ES matches the installed capacity of GenB (6 MW). 
 
Figure 6.14 – Additional income  obtained during one year with different installed capacities of ES 
when: i) GenB is connected last; ii) ES is connected last 
6.6 - Conclusion 
The coordination of independent non-dispatchable generators and energy 
storage systems allows generators to maximise their income without 
exceeding the power limit of the distribution circuit.  
Additional income results of the change of the charge/discharge schedule of 
the energy storage systems to allow the non-dispatchable generators to 
operate. This additional income obtained is allocated to generators and 
energy storage systems. The energy storage systems receive part of the 
additional income to incentivise its operation in a coordinated manner.  
The coordinated output of generators and energy storage systems does not 
depend on the order of connection to the network. However, the additional 
income obtained varies with the order of connection. The additional income is 
greater when a non-dispatchable generator is connected last. This is because 
the amount of energy curtailment in “last-in, first-off” operation is greater 
than when an energy storage system is connected last.  
The additional income obtained increases with the growth of the installed 
capacity of the energy storage system. The additional income obtained stops 
to increase when the installed capacities of the energy storage system and 
the generator connected without firm access rights are equal. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusions and future work 
7.1 - Contribution of this research 
The following was addressed: 
 The limitations to the connection of generation capacity of the firm 
access connection policy were identified; 
 The benefit of coordinating independent distributed generators to 
maximise their income was presented; 
 The coordination of generators and independent controllable load was 
introduced to maximise the income of the generators; 
 Economic incentives for both generators and controllable load to 
operate in a coordinated manner were analysed;  
 The potential of coordinating non-dispatchable generation and energy 
storage systems was assessed. 
7.2 - Connection of generation to distribution networks 
The operation of a distribution network with the inclusion of independent 
distributed generators connected with and without firm access rights of 
connection was analysed. A representative of the distribution system of 
Northeast Portugal was used as an example. 
7.2.1 - Operation of the distribution network with generators connected 
with firm access rights only 
The distribution network was operated with acceptable voltages and 
currents in two extreme power flow cases.  
By extending the operation of the distribution network to a period of 24 
hours, the technical possibility of producing further electricity was identified. 
The export capacity of the distribution network is below its rated value during 
part of the 24 hours due to: (i) the non-operation of the dispatchable 
generator in certain hours because of its costs of operation, and; (ii) the 
reduced availability of wind in certain hours. However, no additional capacity 
could be connected with firm access rights. 
7.2.2 - Operation of the distribution network with generators connected 
without firm access rights  
Two generators agreed to connect to the distribution network on the basis 
of non-firm access. The minimum cost operation of the network could not be 
implemented because of firm access right privileges and the “last-in, 
first-off” policy. Different costs of operation and ability to be dispatched are 
not considered in “last-in, first-off” operation. Only the order of connection 
of the generators is considered when there is inadequate capacity in the 
distribution network. The economic value of the generators was not 
maximised, as a cheap generator was curtailed to allow a more expensive 
generator to produce. 
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7.3 - Coordination of independent distribution generators 
The coordination of independent distributed generators maximises the 
income of the generators without exceeding the capacity limit of the 
network. In this research, the coordination is evaluated in a medium voltage 
distribution network. However, it can be applied to other network voltage 
levels. 
The coordination of independent distributed generators leads to an 
additional income, in comparison to the income originated by “last-in, 
first-off” operation. The additional income is maximised when the 
non-dispatchable generators maximise their production and the dispatchable 
generators are able to schedule all their available production in other hours. 
 On some days, dispatchable generators are not able to schedule all their 
production in other hours because the price of electrical energy is lower than 
their costs of operation.  
Non-dispatchable generators are curtailed when the cost of turning off 
dispatchable generators is higher than the income obtained by the additional 
production of the non-dispatchable generators. 
The additional income originated will be limited when the connection of 
new generators does not provide additional production of electricity or the 
scheduling of more expensive generation in other hours.  
7.3.1 - Sharing the additional income obtained in coordination 
The additional income obtained in coordination is allocated to the 
generators. This is performed by an income-sharing mechanism based in 
cooperative game theory. All generators receive a greater income when 
compared to what they would have received in “last-in, first-off” operation. 
No generator can form partial coalitions with other generators to increase its 
income. This is because one generator would have to know the anticipated 
outputs of the generators outside the coalition and the estimation of load 
consumption to schedule its own production. 
7.3.2 - Influence of different costs of operation on the additional 
income 
The additional income obtained varies with the costs of operation of the 
dispatchable generator connected without firm access rights. This generator 
changes its production to allow the non-dispatchable generators to produce. 
In the example considered, the additional income was maximised when the 
cost of operation of this generator was 35 €/MWh. Below this cost of 
operation, the additional income obtained was lower as the difference 
between costs of operation of dispatchable and non-dispatchable generators 
was lower. Above this cost of operation, the price of electrical energy was 
lower than the costs of operation of the dispatchable generator in many 
hours. Thus, the dispatchable generator did not operate in those hours and 
the distribution capacity limit was not exceeded. 
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and future work 
 
99 
 
7.3.3 - Influence of different technology coefficients on the additional 
income received by each generator 
The dispatchable generator connected without firm access rights receives 
a greater income in coordination. Its income increases with: i) the growth in 
the amount of production changed to allow the non-dispatchable generators 
to produce; ii) the increase in its allocation of the additional income, which is 
determined by the technology coefficients. Therefore, all other generators 
are also incentivised to operate in a coordinated manner. 
7.4 - Coordinating generators and controllable load 
The integration of controllable load in the coordination aims to maximise 
the income of the generators. Additional income is obtained from the 
additional energy that the generators are able to produce and the change of 
production to hours with a higher price of electrical energy. 
The production of the generators is not maximised when the cost of 
changing consumption of the controllable load is higher than the income 
originated by the increase in their production.  
The controllable load receives part of the additional income originated: i) 
to cover the costs of changing its consumption; ii) to incentivise its operation 
in a coordinated manner. 
7.4.1 - Additional income considering a ±10% fraction of load flexibility 
In the example considered, the coordination considering a ±10% fraction of 
controllable load had limited impact on the income of the generators. Results 
were limited by the small fraction of controllable load. The additional income 
obtained hardly would cover the operation costs of the coordination of 
generators and controllable load. 
7.4.2 - Additional income considering a ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
In the example considered, the coordination presented greater benefit 
with a ±100% fraction of load flexibility. The additional income obtained was 
significantly higher when compared to the case of ±10% fraction of load 
flexibility. However, a fraction of flexibility of ±100% is difficult to obtain.  
7.4.3 - Additional income considering different load capacities 
The additional income obtained had little variation with different load 
capacities when a ±10% fraction of controllable load was considered. For load 
capacities below the capacity of the generators without firm access rights, 
the coordination was not operated. This is because the cost of changing the 
controllable load was higher than the income originated by the increase in the 
production of the generators. For load capacities above the capacity of the 
generators without firm access rights, the coordination was not operated. The 
Aggregator could maximise the income of the generators without coordinating 
with controllable load. 
In the case of a ±100% fraction of controllable load, the additional income 
obtained increased with the increase in load capacity. This happened as the 
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controllable load was able to change its consumption with lower costs when 
its capacity increased.  
7.4.4 - Sharing the additional income to the generators and the load 
The additional income was allocated in equal parts by the generators and 
the controllable load. This allocation was determined using the Rubinstein 
bargaining model. The Aggregator set the income of the generators using the 
income-sharing mechanism described in the coordination of distributed 
generators. Both generators and controllable load have an economic incentive 
to be operated in a coordinated manner. 
7.5 – Coordinating generators and energy storage systems  
The coordination of independent non-dispatchable generators and energy 
storage systems allows generators to maximise their income without 
exceeding the power limit of the distribution circuit.  
7.5.1 – Coordinated operation with extreme cases of price and wind 
power 
The Aggregator schedules the charging of the energy storage systems to 
hours when the non-dispatchable generators are curtailed.  
The coordinated output of generators and energy storage systems does not 
depend on the order of connection to the network.  
7.5.2 – Sharing the additional income to the generators and energy 
storage systems 
Comparison with “last-in, first-off” operation shows that energy storage 
systems would see their income reduced if they were paid according to their 
charge/discharge schedule in coordination. Thus, the income received by 
generators and energy storage system in coordination is determined using a 
bargaining mechanism of game theory – Rubinstein bargaining. 
The part of the additional income received by each non-dispatchable 
generator is determined in a similar manner as described in the coordination 
of independent distributed generators (Chapter 4). The part of the additional 
income received by each energy storage system is calculated pro rata to the 
absolute amount of energy changed in coordination. Both generators and 
energy storage systems have an economic incentive to be operated in a 
coordinated manner. 
7.5.3 – Additional income obtained during one year of operation 
With different orders of connection to the network 
The additional income obtained varies with the order of connection. The 
additional income is greater when a non-dispatchable generator is connected 
last. This is because the amount of energy curtailed in “last-in, first-off” 
operation is greater than when the energy storage system is connected last. 
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With different installed capacities 
The additional income obtained increases with the growth of the installed 
capacity of the energy storage systems. The additional income obtained stops 
to increase when the installed capacities of the energy storage systems and 
the generators connected without firm access rights are equal. 
7.6 - Future work 
The following is indicated as further work to this research: 
7.6.1 - Coordination of independent distribution generators 
 Introduce losses in the coordination methodology; 
o Adopt a method to apportion the losses caused/avoided by each 
generator and respective income reconciliation (pay or be paid 
for losses caused/avoided); 
 Develop a methodology to determine the limit when the connection of 
a new generator without firm access rights would not bring additional 
value to the coordination; 
 Development of real-time mechanisms to adjust the output powers of 
the generators when changes in forecasted inputs occur; 
o These real-time mechanisms aim to maximise the income of the 
generators; 
 Include the production of heat by thermal generators;  
o Maximisation of the income of thermal generators considering 
the need to produce both electricity and heat; 
 Definition of the communication infrastructure to implement the 
coordination. 
o To allow the practical testing and implementation of the 
coordination of independent distributed generators. 
7.6.2 - Coordinating generators and controllable load 
 Inclusion of constraints to schedule certain amounts of consumption. 
o Incorporation of constraints for devices that must be operated 
during defined time slots (e.g., wet appliances, space heating). 
7.6.3 - Coordinating non-dispatchable generators and energy storage 
systems 
 Incorporation of dispatchable generators and controllable load in the 
coordination; 
o Establishment of a global methodology to maximise the 
production of the generators, providing an economic incentive 
for all to be operated in a coordinated manner; 
 Consideration of losses in the energy storage systems (round-trip 
efficiency below 100%). 
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Appendix A - Cost-benefit analyses to determine the 
installed capacities of generators GenC and GenD  
The installed capacities of GenC and GenD are determined using 
cost/benefit analyses. The installed capacities chosen are the ones that 
provide a greater economic return for their producers at the end of their 
investments. These cost/benefit analyses have the following assumptions: 
 One year of operation of the generators is considered; 
 The generators schedule their production in periods of 24 hours;  
 Only the active power production of the generators is considered; 
 There is no load consumption; 
 Generator GenA produces according to the availability of wind. One year 
of wind speed average time series (10-minute average series) from a 
Portuguese wind farm is considered, see Figure A1. Data were collected 
from May 2010 to May 2011.  
 
Figure A1 - Wind speed average time series from a Portuguese wind farm (May 2010-May 2011) 
The power curve of wind turbine Vestas V80 (shown in Figure A2 [121]) is 
linearized to determine the wind power produced by GenA during the year of 
operation. 
 
Figure A2 – Power curve of wind turbine Vestas V80 
The available wind power during the year of operation is shown in the 
cumulative wind power curve of Figure A3. 
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Figure A3 – Cumulative wind power curve from May 2010 to May 2011 
 Generator GenB schedules its production according to the price of 
electrical energy. For this, the price of electrical energy of the Iberian 
Electricity Market (Portuguese side) during one year (May 2010 to May 
2011) is used, see Figure A4. 
 
Figure A4 – Price of electrical energy of the Iberian Electricity Market (Portuguese side) during one 
year (May 2010 to May 2011) 
 The parameters of the generators are presented in Table A1.         and 
         are the installed capacities of GenC and GenD, respectively. 
Table A1 – Parameters of the generators 
Parameter Value Unit 
Minimum output power of GenA and GenD 0 MVA 
Maximum power output of GenA 10 MVA 
Operating limits of GenB           MVA 
Operating limits of GenC                          MVA 
Maximum power output of GenD          MVA 
Fuel costs of GenB and GenC (fcB, fcC) 35 €/MWh 
Start-up costs of GenB and GenC (suB, suC) 100 € 
The amount of electrical energy that GenB and GenC can produce per day 
is fixed (16 hours of full output power). 
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Cost-benefit analysis to determine the installed capacity of GenC 
GenC operates when there is available capacity in the distribution circuit 
(after GenA and GenB have scheduled their output powers). GenC schedules 
its production according to the price profile given in Figure A4.  
Ratings from 1 MW to 10 MW for GenC are evaluated. The initial 
investment considered is 1 M€ per MW installed [126]. The operation and 
maintenance costs are 2% of the initial investment per year during the 
lifespan of the investment [127]. Parameters for the financial analysis are 
shown in Table A2.  
Table A2 – Parameters for the cost/benefit analysis of the rating of GenC 
Lifespan of the 
investment (years) 
252 
Discount rate of the 
investment 
5% 
Annual Consumer 
Price Index 
3.8%3 
The annual consumer price index is used to update the price profile given 
in Figure A4 for each year of the investment. Periods of unavailability of the 
generator are not taken into account. Taxes, risk premiums and 
loan/amortisation plans are also not considered. 
The production of GenC and respective income generated during the year 
of operation with different ratings is presented in Table A3.  
Table A3 – Production of GenC and respective income generated during the year of operation 
Rating 
(MVA) 
Production 
(MWh/year) 
Income (€) 
1 4979.99 56822.25 
2 10387.15 121404.77 
3 15767.88 185620.72 
4 21228.67 250919.68 
5 26335.52 311496.96 
6 31254.54 372335.30 
7 36162.60 429756.04 
8 40850.33 484100.46 
9 45294.35 530594.55 
10 49324.84 571903.25 
The net present value at the end of the investment is calculated using 
equation (A1). 
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Where   is the discount rate of the investment,        is the income 
generated by GenC and   is the year of the investment. 
                                         
2
 Expected lifetime of a biomass generator, according to [111]  
3
 Consumer Price Index in Portugal in the period May 2010-May 2011 (source: www.ine.pt) 
(A1) 
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The net present value (NPV) at the end of the investment for each possible 
rating of GenC is shown in Figure A5.  
 
Figure A5 – Net Present Value at the end of the investment with different ratings of GenC 
The return of the investment is greater being the rating of GenC equal to 
4 MVA. The internal rate of return of the investment (rate above which one 
investment has positive NPV) with GenC equal to 4 MVA is 5.27%.  
Cost-benefit analysis to determine the installed capacity of GenD 
GenD produces according to the availability of wind shown in Figure A1. 
GenD operates when there is available capacity in the distribution circuit 
(after GenA, GenB and GenC have scheduled their output powers). GenD is 
curtailed when the distribution circuit rating is exceeded. 
Ratings from 1 MW to 10 MW for GenD are evaluated. The initial 
investment considered is 1 M€ per MW installed [128]. This amount includes 
turbine, grid connection, electrical installation and civil engineering costs. 
The operation and maintenance costs are 12.5 € per MWh produced, an 
average over the lifespan of the investment [128]. Parameters for the 
financial analysis are shown in Table A4.  
Table A4 – Parameters for the cost/benefit analysis of the rating of GenD 
Lifespan of the 
investment (years) 
204 
Discount rate of the 
investment 
5% 
Annual Consumer 
Price Index 
3.8% 
The annual consumer price index is used to update the price profile given 
in Figure A4 for each year of the investment. Wake effect and periods of 
unavailability of the generator are not taken into account. Taxes, risk 
premiums and loan/amortisation plans are also not considered. 
The production of GenD and respective income generated during the year 
of operation with different ratings is presented in Table A5.  
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Table A5 – Production of GenD and respective income generated during the year of operation 
Rating 
(MVA) 
Production 
(MWh/year) 
Income (€) 
1 2001.49 85465.93 
2 3863.60 164156.38 
3 5625.37 238018.72 
4 7299.89 307737.48 
5 8901.51 373934.55 
6 10308.26 433152.84 
7 11611.60 488353.33 
8 12830.64 540303.43 
9 13990.64 589867.92 
10 15098.17 637268.43 
The net present value at the end of the investment for each possible 
rating of GenD, calculated using equation (A1), is shown in Figure A6.  
 
Figure A6 – Net Present Value at the end of the investment with different ratings of GenD 
The return of the investment is greater being the rating of GenD equal to 
3 MVA. The internal rate of return of the investment (rate above which one 
investment has positive NPV) with GenD equal to 3 MVA is 6.14%.  
 
206.53
314.39 352.12 329.83 256.33
89.22
-133.17
-400.17
-700.36
-1030.81-1200
-1000
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
N
e
t 
P
re
se
n
t 
V
al
u
e
 (
k€
)
Possible rating of GenD (MVA)
 117 
 
Appendix B - AC optimal power flow in the representative 
of the Portuguese MV distribution network  
An AC optimal power flow (OPF) is run in the representative of the 
Portuguese MV distribution network introduced in Chapter 3, see Figure B1. 
The objective is to minimise the costs of producing active power. The AC OPF 
is run in the Matlab-based package MATPOWER [116].  
 
Figure B1 - Distribution network below Valpaços substation 
Busbar B0 is introduced to represent the network connected upstream the 
Valpaços distribution substation, see Figure B1.  
The operating limits of the generators in the AC OPF are given in Table B1: 
Table B1 – Operating limits of the generators in the AC OPF 
Generator Operating limits Unit 
GenA [0; 10] MVA 
GenB [2; 5] MVA 
GenC [1.6; 4] MVA 
GenD [0; 3] MVA 
Generators GenA and GenD have no operation costs. The operation of 
GenB and GenC costs 35€ per MWh produced. No start-up costs are 
considered. The generators located upstream the Valpaços substation (busbar 
B0) have a cost function    defined as follows:                     
  
         (adapted of [129]).    is the active output power of the 
generators located upstream the Valpaços substation. 
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The following taps were manually tested for the transformer connected 
between busbars B1 and B2: {0.94; 0.96; 0.98; 1; 1.02; 1.04; 1.06}.  
The results of the AC OPF reported by MATPOWER are shown as follows. 
Power flows and busbar voltage data are presented. The objective function 
value is 558.4€. The cost of operation of the generators located upstream the 
Valpaços substation is                                     . Then, 
the cost of operating generators GenA, GenB, GenC and GenD is       
            . This minimum cost of operating the distribution network is 
obtained being the transformer tap equal to 1.06.  
 
Results of the AC OPF reported by MATPOWER 
################################################################### 
MATPOWER Version 4.1, 14-Dec-2011 -- AC Optimal Power Flow 
MATLAB Interior Point Solver -- MIPS, Version 1.0, 07-Feb-2011 
Converged! 
Converged in 0.15 seconds 
Objective Function Value = 558.4 €/hr 
================================================================================ 
|     System Summary                                                                      | 
================================================================================ 
How many?                  How much?                 P (MW)         Q (MVAr) 
---------------------       -------------------     -------------   ----------------- 
Buses               10      Total Gen Capacity       222.0         -300.0 to 300.0 
Generators          5      On-line Capacity      222.0         -300.0 to 300.0 
Committed Gens  5      Generation (actual)       21.5                4.8 
Loads                5      Load                       21.0               2.0 
  Fixed              5          Fixed                     21.0          2.0 
  Dispatchable       0          Dispatchable             -0.0 of -0.0   0.0 
Shunts               0      Shunt (inj)                -0.0                0.0 
Branches            10      Losses (I^2 * Z)           0.49               2.81 
Transformers        1      Branch Charging (inj)                         0.0 
Inter-ties           0      Total Inter-tie Flow       0.0                0.0 
Areas                1 
                    Minimum                      Maximum 
            -------------------------     ------------------------------- 
Voltage Magnitude    0.918 p.u. @ bus 6           1.000 p.u. @ bus 0    
Voltage Angle        0.00 deg   @ bus 0           12.05 deg   @ bus 9    
P Losses (I^2*R)                                   0.14 MW    @ line 2-3 
Q Losses (I^2*X)                                   1.35 MVAr  @ line 1-2 
Lambda P            35.00 €/MWh @ bus 9        339.54 €/MWh @ bus 0    
Lambda Q             0.00 €/MWh @ bus 0          89.13 €/MWh @ bus 6    
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================================================================================ 
|     Bus Data                                             | 
================================================================================ 
 Bus       Voltage           Generation            Load                       Lambda(€/MVA-hr) 
  #   Mag(pu) Ang(deg)   P (MW)  Q (MVAr)  P (MW) Q (MVAr)       P         Q    
----- -------   --------       --------  --------   --------  --------     -------   ------- 
0     1.000    0.000*       0.75      4.79      15.00    0.00      339.539     - 
1     0.998    2.153            -          -               -           -         333.865  3.056 
2     0.921    7.232            -          -               -           -          51.915   87.474 
3     0.932   10.012       10.00     0.00      2.65       0.87       42.128   89.118 
4     0.919    7.651            -         -          1.16       0.38       50.690   88.396 
5     0.922    8.290        3.00      0.00            -           -          48.379   88.735 
6     0.918    7.999           -          -          0.85       0.28       49.547   89.126 
7     0.927    8.639           -          -          1.38       0.45       47.024   88.560 
8     0.939   11.064       4.00      0.00           -            -          38.421   89.066 
9     0.944   12.047       3.78      0.00           -            -          35.000   89.125 
                                 --------  --------   --------  -------- 
               Total:           21.53    4.79      21.04    1.98 
================================================================================ 
|     Branch Data                                                                               | 
================================================================================ 
Branch    From   To    From Bus Injection     To Bus Injection       Loss (I^2 * Z)   
  #       Bus      Bus    P (MW)   Q (MVAr)     P (MW)   Q (MVAr)   P (MW) Q (MVAr) 
-----    -----    -----      --------  --------        --------    --------    --------  -------- 
   1        0          1        -14.25   4.79      14.39     -4.25       0.137      0.55 
   2       1          2         -14.39   4.25      14.39     -2.89       0.000      1.35 
   3        2          3         -7.21     1.21       7.35      -0.87       0.141      0.34 
   4        2          4         -0.98     0.70       0.98      -0.69       0.003      0.01 
   5        2          7         -6.20     0.98       6.26      -0.84       0.062      0.15 
   6        4          5         -2.14     0.31       2.15      -0.29       0.010      0.02 
   7        5          6         0.85      0.29      -0.85     -0.28       0.002      0.01 
   8        7          8        -7.64      0.39       7.76      -0.06       0.112      0.32 
   9        8          9        -3.76      0.06       3.78       0.00       0.019      0.06 
  10        6          9        -0.00      0.00       0.00      -0.00       0.000      0.00 
                                                                     --------  -------- 
                                                           Total:   0.486      2.81 
################################################################### 
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Appendix C - Data of the selected period of operation  
Data of the selected period of operation used to evaluate the coordination 
of independent distributed generators and the coordination of generators and 
controllable load are presented as follows. Tables C1 to C6 show the values of 
price of electrical energy, wind power and load consumption for each hour of 
six days of operation. 
Price data was obtained from the Iberian Electricity Market (Portuguese 
side) [120]. Wind power data was obtained from the wind speed data (10 
minute average series) of a Portuguese wind farm. This wind speed data was 
applied to the power curve of the wind turbine Vestas V80. Wind power and 
price data were not collected on the same days (there is no correlation 
between data). Load data corresponds to the average consumption profiles of 
a working day in Portugal from 2004 to 2007, provided by the Portuguese 
Energy Services Regulator [114]. The load profiles were normalised by the 
maximum value observed in the winter load profile.  
Day 1 – Large variation of price, high wind power, winter load profile 
Table C1 – Values of price of electrical energy, wind power and load consumption on day 1  
Hour 
Price of electrical 
energy (€/MWh) 
Wind power (p.u. of 
rated power) 
Load consumption (p.u. of 
maximum consumption) 
0 30 1 0.75 
1 15.69 1 0.67 
2 4.90 1 0.63 
3 3 1 0.61 
4 2 0.99 0.60 
5 4 0.93 0.61 
6 5.65 1 0.63 
7 32.28 1 0.66 
8 22 0.99 0.73 
9 38.67 1 0.83 
10 38.89 1 0.88 
11 40.01 1 0.91 
12 48.33 0.94 0.91 
13 45.59 0.99 0.86 
14 43.85 0.94 0.88 
15 45.59 0.94 0.89 
16 43.57 0.82 0.88 
17 49.11 0.69 0.89 
18 53.06 0.50 0.93 
19 57.87 0.77 1 
20 100 0.70 1 
21 89 0.59 0.98 
22 57.87 0.81 0.93 
23 45.95 0.65 0.87 
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Day 2 – Medium magnitude of price, medium wind power, winter load 
profile 
Table C2 – Values of price of electrical energy, wind power and load consumption on day 2  
Hour 
Price of electrical 
energy (€/MWh) 
Wind power (p.u. of 
rated power) 
Load consumption (p.u. of 
maximum consumption) 
0 47.48 0.65 0.75 
1 44.82 0.78 0.67 
2 43.38 0.82 0.63 
3 43.13 0.56 0.61 
4 43.10 0.48 0.60 
5 42.80 0.70 0.61 
6 39.14 0.73 0.63 
7 38.02 0.31 0.66 
8 37.90 0.42 0.73 
9 40.45 0.19 0.83 
10 43.10 0.10 0.88 
11 41.45 0.10 0.91 
12 40.82 0.07 0.91 
13 41.16 0.15 0.86 
14 40 0.24 0.88 
15 39.07 0.57 0.89 
16 38.20 0.74 0.88 
17 38.20 0.47 0.89 
18 37.90 0.59 0.93 
19 38.73 0.45 1 
20 42.15 0.83 1 
21 48.98 1 0.98 
22 51.68 1 0.93 
23 44.48 1 0.87 
Day 3 – High magnitude of price, low wind power, winter load profile 
Table C3 – Values of price of electrical energy, wind power and load consumption on day 3  
Hour 
Price of electrical 
energy (€/MWh) 
Wind power (p.u. of 
rated power) 
Load consumption (p.u. of 
maximum consumption) 
0 44.40 0.20 0.75 
1 48.51 0.14 0.67 
2 44.40 0.07 0.63 
3 43.59 0.14 0.61 
4 42.40 0.38 0.60 
5 42.40 0.26 0.61 
6 43.59 0.21 0.63 
7 43.59 0.15 0.66 
8 40.38 0.20 0.73 
9 44.08 0.31 0.83 
10 49.30 0.35 0.88 
11 51.30 0.26 0.91 
12 64.99 0.27 0.91 
13 56.38 0.45 0.86 
14 52.01 0.34 0.88 
15 52.27 0.24 0.89 
16 52.01 0.43 0.88 
17 51.25 0.40 0.89 
18 49.51 0.53 0.93 
19 48.51 0.47 1 
20 46.10 0.22 1 
21 44.02 0.31 0.98 
22 44.99 0.28 0.93 
23 46.10 0.23 0.87 
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Day 4 – Large variation of price, high wind power, summer load profile 
Table C4 – Values of price of electrical energy, wind power and load consumption on day 4  
Hour 
Price of electrical 
energy (€/MWh) 
Wind power (p.u. of 
rated power) 
Load consumption (p.u. of 
maximum consumption) 
0 30 1 0.66 
1 15.69 1 0.62 
2 4.90 1 0.58 
3 3 1 0.56 
4 2 0.99 0.54 
5 4 0.93 0.55 
6 5.65 1 0.56 
7 32.28 1 0.58 
8 22 0.99 0.65 
9 38.67 1 0.76 
10 38.89 1 0.80 
11 40.01 1 0.82 
12 48.33 0.94 0.84 
13 45.59 0.99 0.80 
14 43.85 0.94 0.81 
15 45.59 0.94 0.80 
16 43.57 0.82 0.80 
17 49.11 0.69 0.78 
18 53.06 0.50 0.77 
19 57.87 0.77 0.77 
20 100 0.70 0.80 
21 89 0.59 0.82 
22 57.87 0.81 0.80 
23 45.95 0.65 0.75 
Day 5 – Medium magnitude of price, medium wind power, summer load 
profile 
Table C5 – Values of price of electrical energy, wind power and load consumption on day 5  
Hour 
Price of electrical 
energy (€/MWh) 
Wind power (p.u. of 
rated power) 
Load consumption (p.u. of 
maximum consumption) 
0 47.48 0.65 0.66 
1 44.82 0.78 0.62 
2 43.38 0.82 0.58 
3 43.13 0.56 0.56 
4 43.10 0.48 0.54 
5 42.80 0.70 0.55 
6 39.14 0.73 0.56 
7 38.02 0.31 0.58 
8 37.90 0.42 0.65 
9 40.45 0.19 0.76 
10 43.10 0.10 0.80 
11 41.45 0.10 0.82 
12 40.82 0.07 0.84 
13 41.16 0.15 0.80 
14 40 0.24 0.81 
15 39.07 0.57 0.80 
16 38.20 0.74 0.80 
17 38.20 0.47 0.78 
18 37.90 0.59 0.77 
19 38.73 0.45 0.77 
20 42.15 0.83 0.80 
21 48.98 1 0.82 
22 51.68 1 0.80 
23 44.48 1 0.75 
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Day 6 – High magnitude of price, low wind power, summer load profile 
Table C6 – Values of price of electrical energy, wind power and load consumption on day 6  
Hour 
Price of electrical 
energy (€/MWh) 
Wind power (p.u. of 
rated power) 
Load consumption (p.u. of 
maximum consumption) 
0 44.40 0.20 0.66 
1 48.51 0.14 0.62 
2 44.40 0.07 0.58 
3 43.59 0.14 0.56 
4 42.40 0.38 0.54 
5 42.40 0.26 0.55 
6 43.59 0.21 0.56 
7 43.59 0.15 0.58 
8 40.38 0.20 0.65 
9 44.08 0.31 0.76 
10 49.30 0.35 0.80 
11 51.30 0.26 0.82 
12 64.99 0.27 0.84 
13 56.38 0.45 0.80 
14 52.01 0.34 0.81 
15 52.27 0.24 0.80 
16 52.01 0.43 0.80 
17 51.25 0.40 0.78 
18 49.51 0.53 0.77 
19 48.51 0.47 0.77 
20 46.10 0.22 0.80 
21 44.02 0.31 0.82 
22 44.99 0.28 0.80 
23 46.10 0.23 0.75 
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Appendix D - Output powers of the generators without and 
with the coordination of independent distributed 
generators 
The output powers of the generators without and with the coordination of 
independent distributed generators for each day of the selected period of 
operation are presented as follows. Load consumption is also presented 
(columns “Load (MW)”, “Load (MVar)” and “Load (MVA)”). Column “Distr. 
Circuit (MVA)” shows the utilisation of the distribution circuit. The utilisation 
of the distribution circuit is presented in absolute value. Column “Circuit limit 
(MVA)” shows the distribution circuit limit. The output powers of GenD with 
asterisk (*) in Tables D1, D3, D6 and D8 refer to curtailed outputs.  
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DAY 1 
Without coordination 
Table D1 - Output powers of the generators without coordination on day 1 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.19 1.71 5.46 8 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.68 1.54 4.93 8.46 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.40 1.44 4.63 8.72 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.23 1.40 4.46 8.88 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 4.18 1.36 4.40 8.80 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 4.23 1.40 4.46 7.98 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.34 1.44 4.57 8.78 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.56 1.50 4.80 8.57 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 5.08 1.66 5.34 7.73 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.09 * 0.63 * 2.18 * 5.75 1.89 6.05 15.00 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.43 * 0.73 * 2.54 * 6.10 2.01 6.42 15.00 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.65 * 0.8 * 2.77 * 6.32 2.07 6.65 15.00 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.32 2.07 6.65 14.58 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.4 * 0.72 * 2.51 * 5.97 1.97 6.29 15.00 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.10 2.01 6.42 14.81 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.15 2.02 6.47 14.76 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.10 2.01 6.42 13.25 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 6.15 2.02 6.47 11.5 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 6.49 2.14 6.83 8.68 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 6.93 2.28 7.3 11.74 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 6.93 2.28 7.3 10.83 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 6.77 2.23 7.13 9.56 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 6.49 2.14 6.83 13.21 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 6.04 1.98 6.36 11.58 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 57.79 14.95 60 61.25 9.95 62.74 135.5 44.57 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  948.89 
 
2153.94  11826.17 
    
Appendix D – Output powers of the generators without and with the coordination of independent distributed generators 
127 
With coordination 
Table D2 - Output powers of the generators with coordination on day 1 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.19 1.71 5.46 8 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.68 1.54 4.93 8.46 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.40 1.44 4.63 8.72 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.23 1.40 4.46 8.88 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 4.18 1.36 4.40 8.80 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 4.23 1.40 4.46 7.98 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.34 1.44 4.57 8.78 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.56 1.50 4.80 8.57 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 5.08 1.66 5.34 7.73 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.04 0.91 3.17 2.87 0.86  3 5.75 1.89 6.05 15.00 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.39 1.02 3.54 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2.01 6.42 15.00 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.61 1.08 3.77 2.87 0.86 3 6.32 2.07 6.65 15.00 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.32 2.07 6.65 14.58 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.36 1.01 3.51 2.87 0.86 3 5.97 1.97 6.29 15.00 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.10 2.01 6.42 14.81 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.15 2.02 6.47 14.76 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.10 2.01 6.42 13.25 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 6.15 2.02 6.47 11.5 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 6.49 2.14 6.83 8.68 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 6.93 2.28 7.3 11.74 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 6.93 2.28 7.3 10.83 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 6.77 2.23 7.13 9.56 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 6.49 2.14 6.83 13.21 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 6.04 1.98 6.36 11.58 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 55.87 14.37 57.99 63.16 10.51 64.74 135.5 44.57 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL   
INCOME BEFORE INCOME SHARING (€) 7511.63  1211.71 
 
938.20  2231.45 
 
11892.98 
  
INCOME AFTER INCOME SHARING (€) 7539.80  1228.78  962.09  2162.31  11892.98   
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DAY 2 
Without coordination 
Table D3 - Output powers of the generators without coordination on day 2 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 5.19 1.71 5.46 12.38 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.34 0 2.34 4.68 1.54 4.93 14.54 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.13 * 0 * 2.13 * 4.40 1.44 4.63 15.00 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 4.23 1.40 4.46 12.13 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 4.18 1.36 4.40 11.14 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.1 0 2.1 4.23 1.40 4.46 13.94 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 4.34 1.44 4.57 8.87 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 4.56 1.50 4.80 3.42 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 5.08 1.66 5.34 3.85 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 5.75 1.89 6.05 0.70 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 2.96 0.89 3.09 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.10 2.01 6.42 1.91 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.32 2.07 6.65 1.82 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.32 2.07 6.65 2.18 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.97 1.97 6.29 1.86 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2.01 6.42 2.63 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.15 2.02 6.47 5.88 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2.01 6.42 7.63 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.15 2.02 6.47 4.88 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.49 2.14 6.83 5.75 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.93 2.28 7.3 3.92 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.93 2.28 7.3 12.91 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.77 2.23 7.13 14.77 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.34 * 0 * 2.34 * 6.49 2.14 6.83 15.00 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.92 * 0 * 1.92 * 6.04 1.98 6.36 15.00 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.76 8.25 64.00 47.49 8.53 48.77 135.5 44.57 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.95  515.28 
 
1992.22  8707.93 
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With coordination 
Table D4 - Output powers of the generators with coordination on day 2 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 5.19 1.71 5.46 12.38 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.34 0 2.34 4.68 1.54 4.93 14.54 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 3.67 0 3.67 2.46 0 2.46 4.40 1.44 4.63 15.00 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 4.23 1.40 4.46 12.13 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 4.18 1.36 4.40 11.14 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 4.23 1.40 4.46 13.94 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 4.34 1.44 4.57 8.87 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 4.56 1.50 4.80 3.42 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 5.08 1.66 5.34 3.85 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 5.75 1.89 6.05 0.70 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.10 2.01 6.42 1.91 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 2.65 0.8 2.77 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.32 2.07 6.65 1.82 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.32 2.07 6.65 2.18 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.97 1.97 6.29 1.86 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2.01 6.42 2.63 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.15 2.02 6.47 5.88 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2.01 6.42 7.63 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.15 2.02 6.47 4.88 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.49 2.14 6.83 5.75 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.93 2.28 7.3 3.92 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.93 2.28 7.3 12.91 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.77 2.23 7.13 14.90 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 3.34 0 3.34 3 0 3 6.49 2.14 6.83 15.00 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 2.92 0 2.92 3 0 3 6.04 1.98 6.36 15.00 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.67 8.85 64 49.56 8.53 50.84 135.5 44.57 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL   
INCOME BEFORE INCOME SHARING (€) 5556.48  643.95 
 
505.31  2088.68 
 
8794.42 
  
INCOME AFTER INCOME SHARING (€) 5582.49  672.03  537.72  2002.18  8794.42   
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DAY 3 
Without coordination 
Table D5 - Output powers of the generators without coordination on day 3 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 2 0 2 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.60 0 0.60 5.19 1.71 5.46 1.99 15 
1 1.40 0 1.40 5 0 5 4 0 4 0.42 0 0.42 4.68 1.54 4.93 6.33 15 
2 0.70 0 0.70 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.21 0 0.21 4.40 1.44 4.63 1.44 15 
3 1.40 0 1.40 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.42 0 0.42 4.23 1.40 4.46 1.84 15 
4 3.80 0 3.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 1.14 0 1.14 4.18 1.36 4.40 4.57 15 
5 2.60 0 2.60 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.78 0 0.78 4.23 1.40 4.46 3.09 15 
6 2.10 0 2.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.63 0 0.63 4.34 1.44 4.57 2.46 15 
7 1.50 0 1.50 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.45 0 0.45 4.56 1.50 4.80 1.80 15 
8 2 0 2 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.60 0.18 0.63 5.08 1.66 5.34 1.07 15 
9 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 5.75 1.89 6.05 1.83 15 
10 3.50 0 3.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.05 0.32 1.10 6.10 2.01 6.42 7.13 15 
11 2.60 0 2.60 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.78 0.23 0.81 6.32 2.07 6.65 5.73 15 
12 2.70 0 2.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.81 0.24 0.84 6.32 2.07 6.65 5.86 15 
13 4.50 0 4.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.35 0.41 1.41 5.97 1.97 6.29 8.56 15 
14 3.40 0 3.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.02 0.31 1.07 6.10 2.01 6.42 7 15 
15 2.40 0 2.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.72 0.22 0.75 6.15 2.02 6.47 5.65 15 
16 4.30 0 4.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.29 0.39 1.35 6.10 2.01 6.42 8.17 15 
17 4 0 4 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.20 0.36 1.25 6.15 2.02 6.47 7.73 15 
18 5.30 0 5.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.59 0.48 1.66 6.49 2.14 6.83 9.07 15 
19 4.70 0 4.70 3.79 1.14 3.96 3.03 0.91 3.16 1.41 0.42 1.47 6.93 2.28 7.3 6 15 
20 2.20 0 2.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.66 0.2 0.69 6.93 2.28 7.3 1.21 15 
21 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 6.77 2.23 7.13 1.16 15 
22 2.80 0 2.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.84 0 0.84 6.49 2.14 6.83 2.27 15 
23 2.30 0 2.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.69 0 0.69 6.04 1.98 6.36 2.05 15 
TOTAL 68.40 0 68.40 77.58 16.42 80 62.06 13.1 64 20.52 4.32 21.15 135.5 44.57 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 3320.83  1131.72  905.16 
 
996.25  6353.97 
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DAY 4 
Without coordination 
Table D6 - Output powers of the generators without coordination on day 4 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.58 1.51 4.82 8.55 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.30 1.41 4.53 8.81 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.02 1.32 4.23 9.08 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3.89 1.28 4.10 9.20 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 3.75 1.23 3.95 9.20 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 3.82 1.25 4.02 8.36 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3.89 1.28 4.10 9.20 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.02 1.32 4.23 9.08 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 4.51 1.48 4.75 8.28 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.62 * 0.49 * 1.69 * 5.27 1.73 5.55 15.00 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.90 * 0.57 * 1.98 * 5.55 1.82 5.84 15.00 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.03 * 0.61 * 2.12 * 5.69 1.87 5.99 15.00 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.74 * 0.82 * 2.86 * 5.83 1.92 6.14 15.00 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.99 * 0.60 * 2.08 * 5.55 1.82 5.84 15.00 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.54 * 0.76 * 2.65 * 5.62 1.85 5.92 15.00 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 * 0.74 * 2.57 * 5.55 1.82 5.84 15.00 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 5.55 1.82 5.84 13.81 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 5.41 1.78 5.70 12.26 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 5.34 1.76 5.62 9.86 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 5.34 1.76 5.62 13.38 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 5.55 1.82 5.84 12.25 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 5.69 1.87 5.99 10.67 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 5.55 1.82 5.84 14.10 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 5.2 1.71 5.47 12.37 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 57.79 14.95 60 58.5 9.11 59.84 119.47 39.25 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  948.89 
 
2039.11  11711.33 
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With coordination 
Table D7 - Output powers of the generators with coordination on day 4 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.58 1.51 4.82 8.55 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.30 1.41 4.53 8.81 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.02 1.32 4.23 9.08 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3.89 1.28 4.10 9.20 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 3.75 1.23 3.95 9.20 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 3.82 1.25 4.02 8.36 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3.89 1.28 4.10 9.20 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.02 1.32 4.23 9.08 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 4.51 1.48 4.75 8.28 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 2.58 0.77 2.69 2.87 0.86 3 5.27 1.73 5.55 15.00 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 2.85 0.86 2.98 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 15.00 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 2.99 0.9 3.12 2.87 0.86 3 5.69 1.87 5.99 15.00 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.74 1.12 3.9 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.83 1.92 6.14 15.00 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 2.95 0.89 3.08 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 15.00 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.54 1.06 3.7 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.62 1.85 5.92 15.00 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.47 1.04 3.62 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.55 1.82 5.84 15.00 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 5.55 1.82 5.84 13.81 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 5.41 1.78 5.70 12.26 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 5.34 1.76 5.62 9.86 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 5.34 1.76 5.62 13.38 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 5.55 1.82 5.84 12.25 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 5.69 1.87 5.99 10.67 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 5.55 1.82 5.84 14.10 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 5.2 1.71 5.47 12.37 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 53.1 13.54 55.09 63.16 10.51 64.74 119.47 39.25 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL   
INCOME BEFORE INCOME SHARING (€) 7511.63  1211.71 
 
919.38  2231.45 
 
11874.17 
  
INCOME AFTER INCOME SHARING (€) 7580.96  1253.73  979.77  2059.71  11874.17   
 
Appendix D – Output powers of the generators without and with the coordination of independent distributed generators 
133 
DAY 5 
Without coordination 
Table D8 - Output powers of the generators without coordination on day 5 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 4.58 1.51 4.82 12.96 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.34 0 2.34 4.30 1.41 4.53 14.91 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.76 * 0 1.76 * 4.02 1.32 4.23 15.00 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 3.89 1.28 4.10 12.46 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 3.75 1.23 3.95 11.56 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 3.82 1.25 4.02 14.33 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 3.89 1.28 4.10 9.29 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 4.02 1.32 4.23 3.84 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 4.51 1.48 4.75 4.41 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 5.27 1.73 5.55 0.84 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 2.96 0.89 3.09 0.30 0.09 0.31 5.55 1.82 5.84 2.46 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.30 0.09 0.31 5.69 1.87 5.99 1.19 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 5.83 1.92 6.14 1.67 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 2.28 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.62 1.85 5.92 3.11 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 6.48 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 8.18 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.41 1.78 5.70 5.62 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.34 1.76 5.62 6.89 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.34 1.76 5.62 5.49 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 14.33 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.91 * 0.57 1.99 * 5.69 1.87 5.99 15.00 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.45 * 0 1.45 * 5.55 1.82 5.84 15.00 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.11 * 0 1.11 * 5.2 1.71 5.47 15.00 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.76 8.25 64 44.46 8.24 45.69 119.47 39.25 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.95  515.12 
 
1847.13  8562.68 
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With coordination 
Table D9 - Output powers of the generators with coordination on day 5 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 4.58 1.51 4.82 12.96 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.34 0 2.34 4.30 1.41 4.53 14.91 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 3.30 0 3.30 2.46 0 2.46 4.02 1.32 4.23 15.00 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 3.89 1.28 4.10 12.46 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 3.75 1.23 3.95 11.56 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 3.82 1.25 4.02 14.33 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 3.89 1.28 4.10 9.29 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 4.02 1.32 4.23 3.84 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 4.51 1.48 4.75 4.41 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 5.27 1.73 5.55 0.84 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 5.55 1.82 5.84 2.48 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 5.69 1.87 5.99 1.19 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 5.83 1.92 6.14 1.67 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.31 0.99 3.45 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 2.28 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.62 1.85 5.92 3.11 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 6.48 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 8.18 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.41 1.78 5.70 5.62 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.34 1.76 5.62 6.89 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.34 1.76 5.62 5.49 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 14.33 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 2.86 0.86 2.99 2.87 0.86 3 5.69 1.87 5.99 15.00 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 2.45 0 2.45 3 0 3 5.55 1.82 5.84 15.00 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 2.11 0 2.11 3 0 3 5.20 1.71 5.47 15.00 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.58 9.44 63.99 49.56 8.53 50.84 119.47 39.25 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL   
INCOME BEFORE INCOME SHARING (€) 5556.48  643.95 
 
484.65  2088.68 
 
8773.76 
  
INCOME AFTER INCOME SHARING (€) 5619.99  712.51  569.82  1871.44  8773.76   
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DAY 6 
Without coordination 
Table D10 - Output powers of the generators without coordination on day 6 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Load 
(MW) 
Load 
(MVar) 
Load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 2 0 2 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.60 0 0.60 4.58 1.51 4.82 2.21 15 
1 1.40 0 1.40 5 0 5 4 0 4 0.42 0 0.42 4.30 1.41 4.53 6.67 15 
2 0.70 0 0.70 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.21 0 0.21 4.02 1.32 4.23 1.41 15 
3 1.40 0 1.40 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.42 0 0.42 3.89 1.28 4.10 1.99 15 
4 3.80 0 3.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 1.14 0 1.14 3.75 1.23 3.95 4.95 15 
5 2.60 0 2.60 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.78 0 0.78 3.82 1.25 4.02 3.40 15 
6 2.10 0 2.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.63 0 0.63 3.89 1.28 4.10 2.76 15 
7 1.50 0 1.50 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.45 0 0.45 4.02 1.32 4.23 2.02 15 
8 2 0 2 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.60 0.18 0.63 4.51 1.48 4.75 1.57 15 
9 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 5.27 1.73 5.55 2.26 15 
10 3.50 0 3.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.05 0.32 1.10 5.55 1.82 5.84 7.70 15 
11 2.60 0 2.60 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.78 0.23 0.81 5.69 1.87 5.99 6.38 15 
12 2.70 0 2.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.81 0.24 0.84 5.83 1.92 6.14 6.37 15 
13 4.50 0 4.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.35 0.41 1.41 5.55 1.82 5.84 9 15 
14 3.40 0 3.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.02 0.31 1.07 5.62 1.85 5.92 7.49 15 
15 2.40 0 2.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.72 0.22 0.75 5.55 1.82 5.84 6.27 15 
16 4.30 0 4.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.29 0.39 1.35 5.55 1.82 5.84 8.74 15 
17 4 0 4 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.20 0.36 1.25 5.41 1.78 5.70 8.49 15 
18 5.30 0 5.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.59 0.48 1.66 5.34 1.76 5.62 10.25 15 
19 4.70 0 4.70 3.79 1.14 3.96 3.03 0.91 3.16 1.41 0.42 1.47 5.34 1.76 5.62 7.62 15 
20 2.20 0 2.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.66 0.2 0.69 5.55 1.82 5.84 0.96 15 
21 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 5.69 1.87 5.99 1.88 15 
22 2.80 0 2.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.84 0 0.84 5.55 1.82 5.84 2.48 15 
23 2.30 0 2.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.69 0 0.69 5.20 1.71 5.47 2.20 15 
TOTAL 68.40 0 68.40 77.58 16.42 80 62.06 13.1 64 20.52 4.32 21.15 119.47 39.25 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 3320.83  1131.72  905.16 
 
996.25  6353.97 
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Appendix E - Generation and consumption schedules 
without and with the coordination of distributed generators 
and controllable load 
The generation and consumption schedules without and with the 
coordination are presented as follows. Cases of ±10% and ±100% of load 
flexibility for each day are shown. Load consumption is presented in columns 
“Contr. load (MW)”, “Contr. load (MVar)” and “Contr. load (MVA)”. Column 
“Distr. Circuit (MVA)” shows the utilisation of the distribution circuit. The 
utilisation of the distribution circuit is presented in absolute value. Column 
“Circuit limit (MVA)” shows the distribution circuit limit. The output powers 
of GenD with asterisk (*) in Tables E1, E4, E7, E10, E13, E16, E20 and E23 
refer to curtailed outputs.  
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DAY 1: ±10% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E1 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 1 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.72 1.88 6.02 7.52 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.11 1.68 5.38 8.07 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.81 1.57 5.06 8.34 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.66 1.51 4.90 8.48 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 4.58 1.50 4.82 8.42 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 4.66 1.51 4.90 7.58 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.81 1.57 5.06 8.34 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.04 1.64 5.30 8.13 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 5.57 1.82 5.86 7.26 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.65 * 0.80 * 2.77 * 6.33 2.07 6.66 15 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.72 2.20 7.07 14.82 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.58 * 0.77 * 2.69 * 5.68 1.87 5.98 14.99 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.79 * 0.54 * 1.87 * 5.37 1.76 5.65 15 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.00 1.98 6.32 14.91 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 * 0.74 * 2.57 * 5.56 1.82 5.85 15 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.72 2.20 7.07 12.61 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 5.56 1.82 5.85 12.11 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.5 0.45 1.57 5.80 1.92 6.11 9.39 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 6.24 2.06 6.57 12.45 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.1 0.63 2.19 6.24 2.06 6.57 11.54 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 6.12 2.00 6.44 10.23 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 5.80 1.92 6.11 13.86 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 5.43 1.80 5.72 12.15 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 57.79 14.95 60 61.26 9.94 62.74 135.5 44.42 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  948.89 
 
2145.69  11817.92 
    
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
controllable load 
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With coordination (coordination of distributed generators) 
Table E2 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load (coordination of distributed generators, no coordination with the controllable load) on day 1 
(±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.72 1.88 6.02 7.52 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.11 1.68 5.38 8.07 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.81 1.57 5.06 8.34 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.66 1.51 4.90 8.48 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 4.58 1.50 4.82 8.42 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 4.66 1.51 4.90 7.58 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.81 1.57 5.06 8.34 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.04 1.64 5.30 8.13 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 5.57 1.82 5.86 7.26 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.61 1.08 3.77 2.87 0.86  3 6.33 2.07 6.66 15 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.72 2.20 7.07 14.82 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.59 1.08 3.75 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.68 1.87 5.98 15 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 2.75 0.83 2.87 2.87 0.86 3 5.37 1.76 5.65 15 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.00 1.98 6.32 14.91 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.47 1.04 3.62 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.56 1.82 5.85 15 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.72 2.20 7.07 12.61 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 5.56 1.82 5.85 12.11 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 5.80 1.92 6.11 9.39 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 6.24 2.06 6.57 12.45 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 6.24 2.06 6.57 11.54 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 6.12 2.00 6.44 10.23 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 5.80 1.92 6.11 13.86 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 5.43 1.80 5.72 12.15 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 55.89 14.38 58.01 63.16 10.51 64.74 135.5 44.42 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  929.63 
 
2231.45  11884.42 COST (€) 6067.03 
  
 
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
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With coordination (coordination of generators and controllable load) 
Table E3 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load with coordination on day 1 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.72 1.88 6.02 7.52 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.11 1.68 5.38 8.07 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.81 1.57 5.06 8.34 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.66 1.51 4.90 8.48 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 4.58 1.50 4.82 8.42 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 4.66 1.51 4.90 7.58 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.81 1.57 5.06 8.34 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.04 1.64 5.30 8.13 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 5.57 1.82 5.86 7.26 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.61 1.08 3.77 2.87 0.86  3 6.33 2.07 6.66 15 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.72 2.20 7.07 14.82 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.57 2.17 6.92 14.60 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.92 1.94 6.23 15 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.45 2.12 6.79 15 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.92 1.94 6.23 14.91 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.91 1.94 6.22 15 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 5.49 1.81 5.78 12.61 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 5.56 1.82 5.85 12.11 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 5.8 1.92 6.11 9.39 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 6.24 2.06 6.57 12.45 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 6.24 2.06 6.57 11.54 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 6.12 2 6.44 10.23 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 5.8 1.92 6.11 13.86 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 5.43 1.80 5.72 12.15 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 57.56 14.88 59.76 63.16 10.51 64.74 135.5 44.45 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  948.08 
 
2231.45  11902.87 COST (€) 6072.93 
  
 
 
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
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DAY 2: ±10% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E4 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 2 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 4.66 1.55 4.91 12.88 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.34 0 2.34 4.22 1.38 4.44 14.98 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.70 * 0 * 1.70 * 3.96 1.31 4.17 15 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 3.81 1.25 4.01 12.53 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 3.76 1.24 3.96 11.55 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 3.81 1.25 4.01 14.34 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 4.78 1.57 5.03 8.46 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 5.02 1.64 5.28 3.08 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 5.58 1.82 5.87 3.36 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 6.33 2.07 6.66 0.95 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 2.96 0.89 3.09 0.30 0.09 0.31 5.49 1.81 5.78 2.52 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.16 2.01 6.48 1.65 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.82 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.57 2.17 6.92 1.29 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.71 2.2 7.06 2.04 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.76 2.24 7.12 5.28 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.71 2.2 7.06 7.03 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.76 2.24 7.12 4.28 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.3 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.91 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.24 2.06 6.57 13.62 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.42 * 0.73 * 2.53 * 6.10 2 6.42 15 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.72 * 0 * 1.72 * 5.84 1.93 6.15 15 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.32 * 0 * 1.32 * 5.43 1.80 5.72 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.76 8.25 64 45.39 8.4 46.65 135.5 44.52 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.94  515.12 
 
1892.80  8608.34 
    
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
controllable load 
143 
With coordination (coordination of distributed generators) 
Table E5 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load (coordination of distributed generators, no coordination with the controllable load) on day 2 
(±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 4.66 1.55 4.91 12.88 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.34 0 2.34 4.22 1.38 4.44 14.98 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 3.24 0 3.24 2.46 0 2.46 3.96 1.31 4.17 15 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 3.81 1.25 4.01 12.53 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 3.76 1.24 3.96 11.55 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 3.81 1.25 4.01 14.34 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 4.78 1.57 5.03 8.46 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 5.02 1.64 5.28 3.08 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 5.58 1.82 5.87 3.36 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 6.33 2.07 6.66 0.95 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 5.49 1.81 5.78 3.41 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.16 2.01 6.48 0.91 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.82 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 2.39 0.72 2.50 2.87 0.86 3 6.57 2.17 6.92 2.11 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.71 2.2 7.06 2.04 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.76 2.24 7.12 5.28 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.71 2.2 7.06 7.03 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.76 2.24 7.12 4.28 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.30 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.91 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.24 2.06 6.57 13.62 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.38 1.01 3.53 2.87 0.86 3 6.1 2 6.42 15 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 2.72 0 2.72 3 0 3 5.84 1.93 6.15 15 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 2.32 0 2.32 3 0 3 5.43 1.80 5.72 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.60 9.32 64 49.56 8.53 50.84 135.5 44.52 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.94  492.23  2088.68  8781.34   
  
 
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
controllable load 
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DAY 3: ±10% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E6 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 3 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 2 0 2 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.60 0 0.60 5.71 1.88 6.01 1.94 15 
1 1.40 0 1.40 5 0 5 4 0 4 0.42 0 0.42 4.82 1.57 5.07 6.20 15 
2 0.70 0 0.70 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.21 0 0.21 4.84 1.58 5.09 1.61 15 
3 1.40 0 1.40 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.42 0 0.42 4.66 1.55 4.91 1.73 15 
4 3.80 0 3.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 1.14 0 1.14 4.60 1.51 4.84 4.22 15 
5 2.60 0 2.60 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.78 0 0.78 4.66 1.55 4.91 2.79 15 
6 2.10 0 2.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.63 0 0.63 4.78 1.57 5.03 2.21 15 
7 1.50 0 1.50 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.45 0 0.45 5.02 1.64 5.28 1.72 15 
8 2 0 2 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.60 0.18 0.63 5.58 1.82 5.87 0.77 15 
9 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 6.33 2.07 6.66 1.38 15 
10 3.50 0 3.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.05 0.32 1.10 5.49 1.81 5.78 7.76 15 
11 2.60 0 2.60 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.78 0.23 0.81 5.69 1.87 5.99 6.38 15 
12 2.70 0 2.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.81 0.24 0.84 5.69 1.87 5.99 6.51 15 
13 4.50 0 4.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.35 0.41 1.41 5.38 1.76 5.66 9.17 15 
14 3.40 0 3.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.02 0.31 1.07 5.49 1.81 5.78 7.63 15 
15 2.40 0 2.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.72 0.22 0.75 5.53 1.81 5.82 6.29 15 
16 4.30 0 4.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.29 0.39 1.35 5.49 1.81 5.78 8.80 15 
17 4 0 4 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.20 0.36 1.25 5.53 1.81 5.82 8.37 15 
18 5.30 0 5.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.59 0.48 1.66 5.84 1.93 6.15 9.74 15 
19 4.70 0 4.70 3.79 1.14 3.96 3.03 0.91 3.16 1.41 0.42 1.47 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.99 15 
20 2.20 0 2.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.66 0.20 0.69 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.19 15 
21 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.09 15 
22 2.80 0 2.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.84 0 0.84 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.28 15 
23 2.30 0 2.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.69 0 0.69 6.65 2.19 7.00 2.19 15 
TOTAL 68.40 0 68.40 77.58 16.42 80 62.06 13.1 64 20.52 4.32 21.15 135.5 44.45 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 3320.83  1131.72  905.16 
 
996.25  6353.97 
    
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
controllable load 
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DAY 4: ±10% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E7 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 4 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.04 1.64 5.30 8.13 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.73 1.56 4.98 8.42 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.43 1.45 4.66 8.69 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.28 1.39 4.50 8.83 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 4.12 1.36 4.34 8.86 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 4.20 1.38 4.42 8.01 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.28 1.39 4.50 8.83 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.43 1.45 4.66 8.71 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 4.96 1.63 5.22 7.85 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.12 * 0.64 * 2.21 * 5.8 1.89 6.10 15 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.42 * 0.73 * 2.53 * 6.10 2 6.42 15 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.57 * 0.77 * 2.68 * 6.25 2.06 6.58 15 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.14 * 0.64 * 2.23 * 5.24 1.74 5.52 14.99 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.42 * 0.43 * 1.48 * 5 1.63 5.26 15 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.11 * 0.63 * 2.20 * 5.21 1.72 5.49 15 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.90 * 0.57 * 1.98 * 5 1.63 5.26 15 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.10 2 6.42 14.38 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 4.86 1.61 5.12 12.83 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 4.81 1.57 5.06 10.41 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 4.81 1.57 5.06 13.93 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 5 1.63 5.26 12.82 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 5.12 1.68 5.39 11.26 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 5 1.63 5.26 14.62 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 4.68 1.55 4.93 12.86 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 57.79 14.95 60 59.02 9.27 60.38 119.5 39.16 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  948.89 
 
2000.89  11673.12 
    
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
controllable load 
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With coordination (coordination of distributed generators) 
Table E8 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load (coordination of distributed generators, no coordination with the controllable load) on day 4 
(±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.04 1.64 5.30 8.13 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.73 1.56 4.98 8.42 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.43 1.45 4.66 8.69 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.28 1.39 4.50 8.83 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 4.12 1.36 4.34 8.86 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 4.20 1.38 4.42 8.01 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.28 1.39 4.50 8.83 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.43 1.45 4.66 8.69 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 4.96 1.63 5.22 7.85 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.08 0.92 3.21 2.87 0.86  3 5.80 1.89 6.10 15 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.38 1.01 3.53 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2 6.42 15 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.53 1.06 3.69 2.87 0.86 3 6.25 2.06 6.58 15 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.15 0.95 3.29 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.24 1.74 5.52 15 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 2.38 0.71 2.48 2.87 0.86 3 5 1.63 5.26 15 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.12 0.94 3.26 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.21 1.72 5.49 15 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 2.91 0.87 3.04 2.82 0.85 2.95 5 1.63 5.26 15 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.10 2 6.42 13.25 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 4.86 1.61 5.12 12.83 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 4.81 1.57 5.06 10.41 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 4.81 1.57 5.06 13.93 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 5 1.63 5.26 12.82 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 5.12 1.68 5.39 11.26 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 5 1.63 5.26 14.62 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 4.68 1.55 4.93 12.86 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 53.65 13.7 55.68 63.16 10.51 64.74 119.5 39.16 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  902.44 
 
2231.45  11857.22 COST (€) 5252.73 
  
 
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
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With coordination (coordination of generators and controllable load) 
Table E9 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load with coordination on day 4 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 5.04 1.64 5.30 8.13 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.73 1.56 4.98 8.42 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.43 1.45 4.66 8.69 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.28 1.39 4.50 8.83 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 4.12 1.36 4.34 8.86 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 4.20 1.38 4.42 8.01 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.28 1.39 4.50 8.83 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 4.41 1.44 4.64 8.71 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 4.96 1.63 5.22 7.85 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.08 0.92 3.21 2.87 0.86  3 5.80 1.89 6.10 15 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.38 1.01 3.53 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2 6.42 15 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.53 1.06 3.69 2.87 0.86 3 6.25 2.06 6.58 15 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.92 1.94 6.23 15 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 2.82 0.85 2.95 2.87 0.86 3 5.44 1.80 5.73 15 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.12 0.94 3.26 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.21 1.72 5.49 15 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 2.91 0.87 3.04 2.82 0.85 2.95 5 1.63 5.26 15 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 5 1.63 5.26 14.38 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 4.86 1.61 5.12 12.83 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 4.81 1.57 5.06 10.41 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 4.81 1.57 5.06 13.93 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 5 1.63 5.26 12.82 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 5.12 1.68 5.39 11.26 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 5 1.63 5.26 14.62 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 4.68 1.55 4.93 12.86 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 53.65 13.7 55.68 63.16 10.51 64.74 119.5 39.15 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  916.16 
 
2231.45  11870.95 COST (€) 5257.56 
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DAY 5: ±10% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E10 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 5 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 4.12 1.36 4.34 13.4 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.02 * 0 * 2.02 * 3.87 1.26 4.07 15 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.37 * 0 * 1.37 * 3.62 1.19 3.81 15 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 3.50 1.14 3.68 12.83 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 3.37 1.12 3.55 11.92 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 3.43 1.13 3.61 14.71 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 4.28 1.39 4.50 8.92 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 4.43 1.45 4.66 3.51 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 4.96 1.63 5.22 3.97 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 5.80 1.89 6.10 0.69 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 2.96 0.89 3.09 0.3 0.09 0.31 5.00 1.63 5.26 3.03 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.3 0.09 0.31 5.12 1.68 5.39 0.66 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.41 2.12 6.75 2.28 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.73 1.88 6.03 2.10 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.18 2.01 6.50 2.55 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2.00 6.42 5.93 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2.00 6.42 7.63 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.95 1.95 6.26 5.08 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.87 1.93 6.18 6.36 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.87 1.93 6.18 4.96 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 5.00 1.63 5.26 14.90 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.44 * 0.40 * 1.50 * 5.12 1.68 5.39 15 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 4 0 4 0.91 * 0 * 0.91 * 5.00 1.63 5.26 15 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 4 0 4 0.60 * 0 * 0.60 * 4.68 1.55 4.93 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.76 8.25 64 42.23 8.1 43.44 119.5 39.18 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.94  515.12 
 
1790.87  8506.41 
    
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
controllable load 
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With coordination (coordination of distributed generators) 
Table E11 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load (coordination of distributed generators, no coordination with the controllable load) on day 5 
(±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 4.12 1.36 4.34 13.4 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 3.68 0 3.68 2.34 0 2.34 3.87 1.26 4.07 15 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 2.91 0 2.91 2.46 0 2.46 3.62 1.19 3.81 15 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 3.50 1.14 3.68 12.83 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 3.37 1.12 3.55 11.92 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 3.43 1.13 3.61 14.71 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 4.28 1.39 4.50 8.92 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 4.43 1.45 4.66 3.51 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 4.96 1.63 5.22 3.97 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 5.80 1.89 6.10 0.69 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 5.00 1.63 5.26 3.93 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 5.12 1.68 5.39 1.94 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.17 0.95 3.31 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.41 2.12 6.75 0.67 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 5.73 1.88 6.03 4.45 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.18 2.01 6.50 2.55 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2.00 6.42 5.93 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.10 2.00 6.42 7.63 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.95 1.95 6.26 5.08 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.87 1.93 6.18 6.36 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 5.87 1.93 6.18 4.96 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 5.00 1.63 5.26 14.90 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 2.40 0.72 2.51 2.87 0.86 3 5.12 1.68 5.39 15 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 1.91 0 1.91 3 0 3 5.00 1.63 5.26 15 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 1.60 0 1.60 3 0 3 4.68 1.55 4.93 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.51 9.95 64 49.56 8.53 50.84 119.5 39.18 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.94  470.64  2088.68  8759.76   
  
 
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
controllable load 
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DAY 6: ±10% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E12 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 6 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 2 0 2 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.60 0 0.60 5.03 1.67 5.30 2.04 15 
1 1.40 0 1.40 5 0 5 4 0 4 0.42 0 0.42 3.88 1.26 4.08 7.05 15 
2 0.70 0 0.70 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.21 0 0.21 4.42 1.44 4.65 1.44 15 
3 1.40 0 1.40 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.42 0 0.42 4.28 1.42 4.51 1.82 15 
4 3.80 0 3.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 1.14 0 1.14 4.13 1.37 4.35 4.62 15 
5 2.60 0 2.60 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.78 0 0.78 4.20 1.38 4.42 3.10 15 
6 2.10 0 2.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.63 0 0.63 4.28 1.42 4.51 2.49 15 
7 1.50 0 1.50 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.45 0 0.45 4.42 1.44 4.65 1.83 15 
8 2 0 2 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.60 0.18 0.63 4.97 1.63 5.23 1.16 15 
9 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 5.80 1.92 6.11 1.79 15 
10 3.50 0 3.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.05 0.32 1.10 5 1.63 5.26 8.27 15 
11 2.60 0 2.60 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.78 0.23 0.81 5.12 1.68 5.39 6.97 15 
12 2.70 0 2.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.81 0.24 0.84 5.25 1.74 5.53 6.97 15 
13 4.50 0 4.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.35 0.41 1.41 5 1.63 5.26 9.57 15 
14 3.40 0 3.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.02 0.31 1.07 5.06 1.67 5.33 8.07 15 
15 2.40 0 2.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.72 0.22 0.75 5 1.63 5.26 6.84 15 
16 4.30 0 4.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.29 0.39 1.35 5 1.63 5.26 9.31 15 
17 4 0 4 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.20 0.36 1.25 4.87 1.61 5.13 9.05 15 
18 5.30 0 5.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.59 0.48 1.66 4.81 1.57 5.06 10.80 15 
19 4.70 0 4.70 3.79 1.14 3.96 3.03 0.91 3.16 1.41 0.42 1.47 4.81 1.57 5.06 8.17 15 
20 2.20 0 2.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.66 0.20 0.69 6.07 2 6.39 0.80 15 
21 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 6.26 2.06 6.59 1.44 15 
22 2.80 0 2.80 2 0 2 1.6 0 1.6 0.84 0 0.84 6.10 2 6.42 2.30 15 
23 2.30 0 2.30 2 0 2 1.6 0 1.6 0.69 0 0.69 5.72 1.88 6.02 2.07 15 
TOTAL 68.40 0 68.40 77.58 16.42 80 62.06 13.1 64 20.52 4.32 21.15 119.5 39.25 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 3320.83  1131.72  905.16 
 
996.25  6353.97 
    
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
controllable load 
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DAY 1: ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E13 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 1 (±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.35 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.62 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.50 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.39 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 6.94 2.26 7.30 10.69 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 3.68 1.19 3.87 11.59 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 2.28 1.15 2.55 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 2.98 1.15 3.19 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.24 * 0.07 * 0.25 * 0 0 0 15 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 1.90 0 1.90 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 10.75 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 53.29 14.95 55.64 54.79 8.73 56.11 135.5 44.13 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  810.16 
 
1610.97  11144.47 
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With coordination (coordination of distributed generators) 
Table E14 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load (coordination of distributed generators, no coordination with the controllable load) on day 1 
(±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.35 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.62 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.50 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.39 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 6.94 2.26 7.30 10.69 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 3.68 1.19 3.87 11.59 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 3.30 0.99 3.45 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.31 0.69 2.41 0 0 0 15 15 
20 7 0 7 4.18 1.25 4.36 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.10 0.63 2.19 0 0 0 15 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 2.30 0.69 2.40 1.77 0.53 1.85 0 0 0 15 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 2.87 0 2.87 1.60 0 1.60 2.43 0 2.43 0 0 0 15 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 10.75 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 68.04 18.08 70.68 49.28 13.11 51.22 63.16 10.51 64.74 135.5 44.13 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1089.26  610.16 
 
2231.45  11442.50 COST (€) 4543.77 
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With coordination (coordination of generators and controllable load) 
Table E15 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load with coordination on day 1 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.35 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.62 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86  3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.04 1.99 6.36 14.87 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.50 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.39 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 2.77 0.92 2.92 15 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 0.41 0.13 0.43 15 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.31 0.69 2.41 3.77 1.24 3.97 15 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.10 0.63 2.19 2.89 0.94 3.04 15 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.77 0.53 1.85 1.52 0.5 1.60 15 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.43 0 2.43 4.61 1.51 4.85 15 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 2.47 0.81 2.60 15 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 57.79 14.95 60 63.16 10.51 64.74 135.5 44.20 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  948.89 
 
2231.45  11903.67 COST (€) 4859.43 
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controllable load 
154 
DAY 2: ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E16 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 2 (±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 3.50 0 3.50 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 2.20 0 2.20 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.46 0 2.46 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.92 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 6.94 2.26 7.30 9.61 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 6.94 2.26 7.30 8.60 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 6.94 2.26 7.30 11.39 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.80 0 1.80 2.19 0 2.19 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.74 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.36 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.15 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.46 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.92 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.94 2.26 7.30 0.45 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.94 2.26 7.30 0.55 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.20 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.09 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.10 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.80 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.11 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.30 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.91 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.90 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 0 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 14.86 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 3.63 0 3.63 0 * 0 * 0 * 3.68 1.19 3.87 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.49 10.12 64 36.40 7.67 37.55 135.5 44.13 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.94  328.96 
 
1462.17  7991.17 
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With coordination (coordination of distributed generators) 
Table E17 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load (coordination of distributed generators, no coordination with the controllable load) on day 2 
(±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 4.95 0 4.95 1.60 0 1.60 1.95 0 1.95 0 0 0 15 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 3.26 0 3.26 1.60 0 1.60 2.34 0 2.34 0 0 0 15 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.46 0 2.46 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.92 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 6.94 2.26 7.30 9.61 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 6.94 2.26 7.30 8.60 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 6.94 2.26 7.30 11.39 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 3.94 0 3.94 2.19 0 2.19 6.94 2.26 7.30 8.79 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.36 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.15 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 0.57 0.17 0.59 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.33 15 
10 1 0 1 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.01 15 
11 1 0 1 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.01 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 3.51 1.05 3.66 3.83 1.15 4 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.31 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.17 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.09 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.10 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.80 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.11 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.30 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.91 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.90 15 
21 10 0 10 1.93 0.58 2.02 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 0 0 0 14.87 15 
22 10 0 10 2 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 15 15 
23 10 0 10 4.03 0 4.03 1.60 0 1.60 3 0 3 3.68 1.19 3.87 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.20 12.03 80 62.39 10.81 64 49.56 8.53 50.84 135.5 44.13 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 5556.48  581.05  301.45  2088.68  8527.66 COST (€) 6130.62 
  
 
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
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With coordination (coordination of generators and controllable load) 
Table E18 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load with coordination on day 2 (±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 2.47 0.81 2.60 15 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.34 0 2.34 4.20 1.38 4.42 15 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.46 0 2.46 4.74 1.56 4.99 15 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 1.29 0.43 1.36 15 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 0.24 0.07 0.25 15 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 4.86 1.61 5.12 13.34 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.55 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.36 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.15 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.46 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 3.40 1.02 3.55 0.30 0.09 0.31 0 0 0 8.72 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.46 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.82 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 0.96 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.83 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.10 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.80 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.11 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.30 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.91 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.90 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.68 2.19 7.03 14.86 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 3.77 0 3.77 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 15 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 3.77 0 3.77 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.74 8.38 64 49.56 8.53 50.84 135.5 44.21 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.95  512.66 
 
2088.68  8801.77 COST (€) 6265.80 
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DAY 3: ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E19 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 3 (±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 2 0 2 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.60 0 0.60 6.93 2.29 7.30 2.40 15 
1 1.40 0 1.40 5 0 5 4 0 4 0.42 0 0.42 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.49 15 
2 0.70 0 0.70 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.21 0 0.21 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.32 15 
3 1.40 0 1.40 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.42 0 0.42 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.72 15 
4 3.80 0 3.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 1.14 0 1.14 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.77 15 
5 2.60 0 2.60 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.78 0 0.78 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.26 15 
6 2.10 0 2.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.63 0 0.63 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.34 15 
7 1.50 0 1.50 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.45 0 0.45 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.65 15 
8 2 0 2 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.60 0.18 0.63 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.36 15 
9 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.09 15 
10 3.50 0 3.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.05 0.32 1.10 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.26 15 
11 2.60 0 2.60 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.78 0.23 0.81 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.09 15 
12 2.70 0 2.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.81 0.24 0.84 0 0 0 12.46 15 
13 4.50 0 4.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.35 0.41 1.41 0 0 0 14.78 15 
14 3.40 0 3.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.02 0.31 1.07 0 0 0 13.36 15 
15 2.40 0 2.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.72 0.22 0.75 0 0 0 12.07 15 
16 4.30 0 4.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.29 0.39 1.35 3.74 1.24 3.94 10.61 15 
17 4 0 4 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.20 0.36 1.25 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.91 15 
18 5.30 0 5.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.59 0.48 1.66 6.94 2.26 7.30 8.61 15 
19 4.70 0 4.70 3.79 1.14 3.96 3.03 0.91 3.16 1.41 0.42 1.47 6.93 2.29 7.30 5.99 15 
20 2.20 0 2.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.66 0.20 0.69 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.19 15 
21 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.09 15 
22 2.80 0 2.80 2 0 2 1.6 0 1.6 0.84 0 0.84 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.28 15 
23 2.30 0 2.30 2 0 2 1.6 0 1.6 0.69 0 0.69 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.29 15 
TOTAL 68.40 0 68.40 77.58 16.42 80 62.06 13.1 64 20.52 4.32 21.15 135.6 44.24 142.64   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 3320.83  1131.72  905.16 
 
996.25  6353.97 
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DAY 4: ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E20 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 4 (±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.35 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.62 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 2.25 0.68 2.35 0 * 0 * 0 * 1.53 0.50 1.61 15 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.50 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.39 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.12 0.94 3.26 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.09 * 0.33 * 1.14 * 0 0 0 15 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.79 1.44 5 2.36 0.71 2.46 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
20 7 0 7 4.79 1.44 5 3.02 0.91 3.15 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.24 * 0.07 * 0.25 * 0 0 0 15 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 5 0 5 1.9 0 1.9 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 10.75 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 72.27 18.72 75 51.12 13.59 53.12 49.49 7.14 50.57 119.5 38.91 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1211.71  783.51 
 
1351.27  10858.12 
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With coordination (coordination of distributed generators) 
Table E21 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load (coordination of distributed generators, no coordination with the controllable load) on day 1 
(±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.35 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.62 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 2.61 0.78 2.72 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.82 0.85 2.95 1.53 0.50 1.61 14.93 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.50 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.39 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.3 1.29 4.49 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.07 0.62 2.16 0 0 0 15 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.42 1.03 3.57 1.50 0.45 1.57 0 0 0 15 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 3.3 0.99 3.45 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.31 0.69 2.41 0 0 0 15 15 
20 7 0 7 4.18 1.25 4.36 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.10 0.63 2.19 0 0 0 15 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 2.30 0.69 2.40 1.77 0.53 1.85 0 0 0 15 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 2.87 0 2.87 1.60 0 1.60 2.43 0 2.43 0 0 0 15 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 10.75 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 65.37 17.27 67.89 44.29 11.61 46.01 63.16 10.51 64.74 119.5 38.91 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1053.29  539.92 
 
2231.45  11336.29 COST (€) 3654.44 
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With coordination (coordination of generators and controllable load) 
Table E22 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load with coordination on day 1 (±10% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
1 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
2 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
3 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
4 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.97 0 2.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.35 15 
5 9.30 0 9.30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.79 0 2.79 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.62 15 
6 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
7 10 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.47 15 
8 9.90 0 9.90 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6 15 
9 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
10 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
11 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 14.60 15 
12 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.92 1.94 6.23 15 15 
13 9.90 0 9.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.45 2.12 6.79 15 15 
14 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 6.94 2.26 7.30 13.95 15 
15 9.40 0 9.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.82 0.85 2.95 5.92 1.94 6.23 15 15 
16 8.20 0 8.20 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.46 0.74 2.57 4.4 1.44 4.63 15 15 
17 6.90 0 6.90 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.07 0.62 2.16 2.77 0.92 2.92 15 15 
18 5 0 5 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.50 0.45 1.57 0.41 0.13 0.43 15 15 
19 7.70 0 7.70 4.23 1.27 4.42 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.31 0.69 2.41 0.93 0.3 0.98 15 15 
20 7 0 7 4.18 1.25 4.36 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.10 0.63 2.19 0 0 0 15 15 
21 5.90 0 5.90 4.79 1.44 5 2.3 0.69 2.4 1.77 0.53 1.85 0 0 0 15 15 
22 8.10 0 8.10 2.87 0 2.87 1.6 0 1.6 2.43 0 2.43 0 0 0 15 15 
23 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 2.47 0.81 2.60 15 15 
TOTAL 212.5 0 212.5 68.97 18.36 71.65 49.28 13.11 51.22 63.16 10.51 64.74 119.5 38.98 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 7511.63  1110.54  610.16 
 
2231.45  11463.77 COST (€) 3698.80 
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DAY 5: ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E23 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 5 (±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 3.50 0 3.50 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 2.20 0 2.20 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 1.80 0 1.80 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 1.53 0.49 1.61 14.76 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 6.94 2.26 7.30 8.60 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 6.94 2.26 7.30 11.39 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.55 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.36 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.15 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.46 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 2.96 0.89 3.09 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.06 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.46 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.82 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 0.96 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.83 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.10 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.80 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.11 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.30 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.91 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.90 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 0 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 14.86 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 0 0 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 46.43 7.1 47.50 33.94 7.67 35.09 119.5 38.91 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.94  314.58 
 
1355.45  7870.45 
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With coordination (coordination of distributed generators) 
Table E24 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load (coordination of distributed generators, no coordination with the controllable load) on day 5 
(±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 1.55 0 1.55 1.95 0 1.95 0 0 0 15 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 3.26 0 3.26 1.60 0 1.60 2.34 0 2.34 0 0 0 15 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 2.74 0 2.74 1.60 0 1.60 2.46 0 2.46 0 0 0 15 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 1.53 0.49 1.61 14.76 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 6.94 2.26 7.30 8.60 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 6.94 2.26 7.30 11.39 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 3.83 0 3.83 2.19 0 2.19 6.94 2.26 7.30 8.68 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 3.37 0 3.37 0.93 0 0.93 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.34 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.15 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 4.7 1.41 4.91 3.83 1.15 4 0.57 0.17 0.59 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.09 15 
10 1 0 1 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.01 15 
11 1 0 1 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.30 0.09 0.31 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.01 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.62 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.17 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.09 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 7.39 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.80 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.11 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.30 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.91 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.30 12.90 15 
21 10 0 10 1.93 0.58 2.02 0 0 0 2.87 0.86 3 0 0 0 14.87 15 
22 10 0 10 2 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 15 15 
23 10 0 10 2 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.02 13.25 80 62.29 11.5 64 49.56 8.53 50.84 119.5 38.91 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 5556.48  566.09  279.76  2088.68  8491.01 COST (€) 5352.21 
  
 
Appendix E – Generation and consumption schedules without and with the coordination of distributed generators and 
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With coordination (coordination of generators and controllable load) 
Table E25 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load with coordination on day 5 (±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 6.50 0 6.50 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.95 0 1.95 2.47 0.81 2.6 15 15 
1 7.80 0 7.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.34 0 2.34 4.2 1.38 4.42 15 15 
2 8.20 0 8.20 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.46 0 2.46 4.74 1.56 4.99 15 15 
3 5.60 0 5.60 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.68 0 1.68 1.29 0.43 1.36 15 15 
4 4.80 0 4.80 5 0 5 4 0 4 1.44 0 1.44 0.24 0.07 0.25 15 15 
5 7 0 7 5 0 5 4 0 4 2.10 0 2.10 3.13 1.01 3.29 15 15 
6 7.30 0 7.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 2.19 0 2.19 6.94 2.26 7.3 6.55 15 
7 3.10 0 3.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.93 0 0.93 6.94 2.26 7.3 2.36 15 
8 4.20 0 4.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 1.26 0.38 1.32 6.94 2.26 7.3 2.15 15 
9 1.90 0 1.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.57 0.17 0.59 6.94 2.26 7.3 1.46 15 
10 1 0 1 3.73 1.12 3.89 3.40 1.02 3.55 0.30 0.09 0.31 0 0 0 8.72 15 
11 1 0 1 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.30 0.09 0.31 0 0 0 4.89 15 
12 0.70 0 0.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.21 0.06 0.22 6.52 2.15 6.87 2.39 15 
13 1.50 0 1.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 0 0 0 8.06 15 
14 2.40 0 2.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.3 1.83 15 
15 5.70 0 5.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.3 5.10 15 
16 7.40 0 7.40 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.3 6.80 15 
17 4.70 0 4.70 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.3 4.11 15 
18 5.90 0 5.90 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.3 5.30 15 
19 4.50 0 4.50 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.3 3.91 15 
20 8.30 0 8.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.94 2.26 7.3 12.90 15 
21 10 0 10 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 2.87 0.86 3 6.68 2.19 7.03 14.86 15 
22 10 0 10 5 0 5 3.77 0 3.77 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.3 15 15 
23 10 0 10 5 0 5 3.77 0 3.77 3 0 3 6.94 2.26 7.3 15 15 
TOTAL 129.5 0 129.5 78.43 10.38 80 62.74 8.38 64 49.56 8.53 50.84 119.5 38.98 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL  Contr. load   
INCOME (€) 5556.48  643.95  512.66 
 
2088.68  8801.77 COST (€) 5524.80 
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DAY 6: ±100% fraction of load flexibility 
Without coordination 
Table E26 - Output powers of the generators and the controllable load without coordination on day 6 (±100% load flexibility) 
hour 
GenA 
(MW) 
GenA 
(MVar) 
GenA 
(MVA) 
GenB 
(MW) 
GenB 
(MVar) 
GenB 
(MVA) 
GenC 
(MW) 
GenC 
(MVar) 
GenC 
(MVA) 
GenD 
(MW) 
GenD 
(MVar) 
GenD 
(MVA) 
Contr. 
load 
(MW) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVar) 
Contr. 
load 
(MVA) 
Distr. 
circuit 
(MVA) 
Circuit 
limit 
(MVA) 
0 2 0 2 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.60 0 0.60 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.38 15 
1 1.40 0 1.40 5 0 5 4 0 4 0.42 0 0.42 6.94 2.26 7.30 4.49 15 
2 0.70 0 0.70 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.21 0 0.21 6.94 2.26 7.30 3.32 15 
3 1.40 0 1.40 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.42 0 0.42 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.72 15 
4 3.80 0 3.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 1.14 0 1.14 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.77 15 
5 2.60 0 2.60 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.78 0 0.78 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.26 15 
6 2.10 0 2.10 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.63 0 0.63 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.34 15 
7 1.50 0 1.50 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.45 0 0.45 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.65 15 
8 2 0 2 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.60 0.18 0.63 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.36 15 
9 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.09 15 
10 3.50 0 3.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.05 0.32 1.10 6.94 2.26 7.30 6.26 15 
11 2.60 0 2.60 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.78 0.23 0.81 0 0 0 12.33 15 
12 2.70 0 2.70 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.81 0.24 0.84 0 0 0 12.46 15 
13 4.50 0 4.50 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.35 0.41 1.41 0 0 0 14.78 15 
14 3.40 0 3.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.02 0.31 1.07 0 0 0 13.36 15 
15 2.40 0 2.40 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 0.72 0.22 0.75 0 0 0 12.07 15 
16 4.30 0 4.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.29 0.39 1.35 0 0 0 14.52 15 
17 4 0 4 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.20 0.36 1.25 1.59 0.51 1.67 12.47 15 
18 5.30 0 5.30 4.79 1.44 5 3.83 1.15 4 1.59 0.48 1.66 6.94 2.26 7.30 8.61 15 
19 4.70 0 4.70 3.79 1.14 3.96 3.03 0.91 3.16 1.41 0.42 1.47 6.94 2.26 7.30 5.99 15 
20 2.20 0 2.20 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.66 0.20 0.69 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.19 15 
21 3.10 0 3.10 1.92 0.58 2.01 1.54 0.46 1.61 0.93 0.28 0.97 6.94 2.26 7.30 1.09 15 
22 2.80 0 2.80 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.84 0 0.84 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.28 15 
23 2.30 0 2.30 2 0 2 1.60 0 1.60 0.69 0 0.69 6.94 2.26 7.30 2.29 15 
TOTAL 68.40 0 68.40 77.58 16.42 80 62.06 13.1 64 20.52 4.32 21.15 119.6 38.93 125.77   
 GenA  GenB  GenC  GenD  TOTAL     
INCOME (€) 3320.83  1131.72  905.16 
 
996.25  6353.97 
    
 
